The Houthis’ seizure of Mokha has returned the group to a section of Yemen’s western Red Sea coast from which it was driven nearly a decade ago, reversing one of the most important territorial gains made by UAE-backed Yemeni forces during the west coast campaign.
Witnesses told French media they saw Houthi forces entering the strategically important port city on Thursday while chanting “death to America, death to Israel.” A Yemeni military source said the Iran-backed group had seized Mokha and was advancing south toward the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
The advance is part of a wider Houthi offensive launched last week against forces aligned with Yemen’s internationally recognized government, which is backed by Saudi Arabia. At least 500 people, mostly combatants, have been killed since fighting resumed, according to a tally compiled from several sources. Nearly 20,000 people have fled their homes, according to the International Organization for Migration.
The fighting has also spread to the Red Sea. An unnamed military source said the Houthis had seized Zuqar Island, extending the group’s territorial gains beyond the mainland.
Saudi Arabia has intensified airstrikes against Houthi positions after the group launched missile and drone attacks against the kingdom. The Houthis said Thursday that Saudi forces had conducted around 40 strikes in Taiz, Hodeida, Al-Jawf, and Marib. The Saudi-led coalition said Wednesday that the Houthis had fired ballistic missiles and drones at several cities in southern Saudi Arabia.
The attacks have also raised questions about whether Saudi Arabia could invoke its recently signed Mecca Joint Defense Agreement with Pakistan and Turkey. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said continued attacks on Saudi territory could activate the pact, while Pakistan has urged Iran to rein in the Houthis. Islamabad clarified Thursday, however, that no military response under the agreement was currently being discussed.
Britain also condemned the renewed Houthi offensive and attacks on Saudi Arabia, including the targeting of civilian and energy infrastructure. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office said the Houthis bore “full responsibility for this crisis” and warned that their actions threatened regional stability, freedom of navigation, and vital trade routes through the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Reversing the West Coast Campaign
Mokha formed part of a territorial buffer that had kept Houthi ground forces away from the approaches to Bab al-Mandab since 2017.
The previous battle for the city formed part of Operation Golden Spear, launched by the Saudi-led coalition and allied Yemeni forces in January 2017. UAE-backed forces retook Mokha and subsequently captured the Khalid ibn al-Walid military base farther inland, establishing an anti-Houthi presence along the southern Red Sea coast and providing a platform for a push north.
The campaign expanded in 2018 as UAE-backed Yemeni formations, including the Giants Brigades and National Resistance forces, advanced toward Hodeidah, the principal Houthi-held port on the Red Sea. Saudi- and UAE-backed forces launched a major operation to capture the city but ultimately stopped short amid international concern over civilian casualties and disruption to humanitarian supplies.
The December 2018 Stockholm Agreement subsequently froze the Hodeidah front. Even without capturing the city, the west-coast campaign had changed the military geography farther south by keeping Houthi ground forces away from the immediate approaches to Bab al-Mandab.
Mokha later became an important base for the National Resistance Forces commanded by Tareq Saleh, a member of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council. Originally established with UAE support, Saleh’s forces developed into one of the principal anti-Houthi formations operating along the west coast.
Mokha’s loss therefore removes an important position from the anti-Houthi military architecture established along the Red Sea and reverses part of the strategic geography created by the 2017–18 campaign.
Mokha’s loss therefore removes an important position from the anti-Houthi military architecture established along the Red Sea and reverses part of the strategic geography created by the 2017–18 campaign.
That architecture has since been weakened by the political and military divergence between Saudi Arabia and the UAE and their respective Yemeni partners, making the west coast less cohesive than it was at the height of the 2017–18 campaign.
A Different Strategic Environment
The significance of that reversal is greater today because Houthi maritime capabilities have developed considerably since the group was driven from Mokha.
Since 2023, the Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to threaten commercial and military vessels across the Red Sea using missiles and drones. They therefore do not need conventional control of Bab al-Mandab to produce a strategic effect. A stronger position along the coast could complement their existing sea-denial capabilities.
The reported seizure of Zuqar Island adds to that concern, while further movement toward Dhubab and Mayun would substantially increase the significance of the Mokha advance. Dhubab lies on the approaches to Bab al-Mandab, while Mayun, also known as Perim Island, occupies a strategic position inside the strait. Roughly 10–12 percent of global trade passes through the Bab al-Mandab corridor, underscoring the waterway’s importance to international shipping and supply chains.
The wider Iran conflict makes those developments more consequential. Iran’s restrictions on shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have increased the importance of Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea outlet as an alternative route for oil exports. Saudi crude and condensate loadings at Yanbu, a key port for bypassing Hormuz, have rebounded in September after reaching a six-month low in August. Vortexa estimates loadings increased from 3.2 million barrels per day in August to 3.7 million in September, while Kpler also recorded a substantial increase.
The two theaters are therefore becoming strategically linked in effect, without evidence that Tehran is directing the Houthi ground offensive. Pressure around Hormuz is increasing the value of the Red Sea alternative precisely as the Houthi advance erodes the land buffer protecting the Yemeni approaches to Bab al-Mandab.
Pressure around Hormuz is increasing the value of the Red Sea alternative precisely as the Houthi advance erodes the land buffer protecting the Yemeni approaches to Bab al-Mandab.
Mokha alone does not give the Houthis control of the strait. But if its fall is followed by advances toward Dhubab and Mayun, the strategic buffer established nearly a decade ago could begin to disappear just as the regional conflict is increasing dependence on the route it was designed to protect.
