Iran Sells Nuclear Program, Buys Closure

By Guest Contributor
Iran Sells Nuclear Program, Buys Closure
Dan Caine speaks during a press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington. AFP
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At moments of prolonged confrontation, diplomacy tends to shrink. It becomes cautious, procedural, and trapped in familiar patterns—sanctions met with defiance, negotiations reduced to technicalities, and breakthroughs postponed in favor of temporary fixes. The long standoff between Iran and the United States is a case in point. What is missing is not dialogue, but imagination anchored in strategic realism.

If I were an Iranian negotiator, I would argue that the time has come for something altogether different: not another interim agreement, but a comprehensive settlement that resolves the nuclear issue by transforming it into a broader economic and political bargain.

If I were an Iranian negotiator, I would argue that the time has come for something altogether different

Reframing the Nuclear Program as National Capital

The central insight is simple but often avoided. Iran’s nuclear program is not only a proliferation concern; it is also a multi-decade national investment—financial, technological, and political. Any lasting resolution must therefore grapple not only with future restrictions, but also with past costs.

Consider the most sensitive issue: Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium. According to international estimates, Iran has accumulated hundreds of kilograms of uranium enriched to around 60%—material that significantly shortens the technical path to weapons-grade levels. Rather than treating this stockpile solely as a liability, it can be reframed as strategic leverage.

Under a serious agreement, Iran could accept the full neutralization or transfer of this material—roughly 450 kilograms enriched to 60%—under strict international verification. But such a step cannot be politically sustainable if presented domestically as a unilateral concession. It must be embedded in a broader settlement that recognizes what Iran is giving up, which is precisely why a more innovative approach becomes necessary.

Selling the Program, Buying Closure

Iran could, in effect, sell its nuclear program. For a price in the range of $200 billion, Iran would agree not only to relinquish its existing stockpile—including its 60%-enriched uranium—but also to dismantle the strategic ambiguity and long-term potential embedded in its nuclear infrastructure. Viewed through this lens, the figure is not arbitrary; it is anchored in economic logic.

For a price in the range of billions, Iran would agree not only to relinquish its existing stockpile, but also to dismantle the strategic ambiguity embedded in its nuclear infrastructure

Over decades, Iran has likely invested between $100 billion and $200 billion in developing its nuclear capabilities—facilities, enrichment technology, scientific networks, and protective systems. Beyond these direct costs stand even greater indirect burdens: lost economic growth under sanctions, restricted oil revenues, and the prolonged freezing of national assets abroad.

Seen in this light, a $200 billion settlement is not excessive—it barely compensates for what has already been spent and lost. More importantly, such an arrangement would create a rare alignment of interests. Iran would recover much of its historical investment, allowing its leadership to justify the agreement domestically as a strategic repositioning rather than a retreat. At the same time, the United States and the international community would obtain something that decades of pressure have failed to deliver: verifiable, durable assurance that Iran has exited the nuclear threshold.

Energy Security and Economic Reintegration

In other words, the world would not be paying for a promise—it would be paying for closure. A second pillar of this grand bargain, meanwhile, would require a strategic shift in Iran’s energy policy. Tehran could agree to suspend nuclear energy development for civilian electricity generation. In exchange, international partners—led by Washington—would invest in alternative energy infrastructure, including modernized hydrocarbon-based power generation and upgraded national grids. Such an arrangement would address proliferation risks while ensuring Iran’s long-term energy security.

A second pillar of this grand bargain, meanwhile, would require a strategic shift in Iran’s energy policy

Equally essential to any durable settlement would be economic normalization. The release of Iranian assets held abroad and a structured, credible lifting of sanctions would be indispensable components of any agreement. Without tangible economic reintegration, no deal—however well designed—can endure.

A final component of such a settlement would allow Iran to formalize a commitment of global consequence: guaranteeing the security and openness of the Strait of Hormuz. At a time when global energy markets remain fragile, such a guarantee would reposition Iran not as a source of disruption, but as a stakeholder in stability.

Iran Sells Nuclear Program, Buys Closure
A security personnel stands guard ahead of the expected US–Iran peace talks in Islamabad. AFP

The Real Cost of Realism

Critics will argue that such a proposal is politically unrealistic. But realism, properly understood, is not about limiting ambition—it is about recognizing costs. The cost of this agreement, however substantial, would still be far lower than the cumulative price of continued confrontation: recurring crises, regional instability, and the ever-present risk of military escalation.

The cost of this agreement, however substantial, would still be far lower than the cumulative price of continued confrontation

Diplomacy is often framed as a process of mutual concession. But at its most effective, it is an exercise in reframing—turning liabilities into assets, and conflicts into strategic bargains.

A Definitive Settlement

If I were an Iranian negotiator, I would not seek a narrow compromise. Instead, I would seek a definitive settlement—one that allows Iran to close the chapter on its nuclear program with dignity and compensation, while offering the United States and the world something they have long demanded but never fully secured: lasting assurance. Because, in the end, the question is not whether peace is expensive, but whether conflict is cheaper.

Monji Hamdi served as Tunisia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
Monji Hamdi

Guest Contributor

Monji Hamdi served as Tunisia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2014. He previously held the position of Assistant Secretary-General at the United Nations, and was also appointed as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations mission in Mali. He is distinguished by a career that combines diplomacy, international work, and technology.

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