US President Donald Trump’s unprecedented security assurances to Qatar helped pave the way for the recent Gaza ceasefire agreement. Along with other measures, they reassured Arab leaders about the value of their partnership with the United States. Though unrelated to the recent Saudi-Pakistani defense pact, offering these kinds of supplementary assurances could help Washington retain support among more allies who might seek alternative alignments.
This article first reviews the reasons for the new US security assurances and related measures. Washington’s immediate goal was to sustain existing policies by restoring US credibility as the leading non-regional security actor in the Middle East. The text then evaluates the near- and potential long-term impact of the new US reassurance measures. In the short term, they have catalyzed regional diplomatic efforts leading to the Gaza ceasefire. In the longer term, they could help sustain US primacy in the regional balance of power by discouraging Gulf states from pursuing alternative alignments. The final section reviews potential scenarios for the US security relationship with these partners.
In the longer term, US assurances could help sustain US primacy in the regional balance of power by discouraging Gulf states from pursuing alternative alignments
Changing the Regional Equation
In an Executive Order (EO) released on October 1, Trump affirmed that “it is the policy of the United States to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of the State of Qatar against external attack.” The wording resembles that found in the security guarantees Washington offers its closest military allies in Europe and Asia. In declaratory terms, the United States has termed Qatar its most important military partner in the Gulf region.
For now, Trump’s action does not represent a structural shift in Washington’s Gulf strategy. The new EO was one of several compensatory moves the United States undertook following the Israeli attack on Qatar. The realization that Washington proved unable, or unwilling, to prevent the September 9 air strike shocked Doha and its neighbors. They presumed their extensive US ties would preclude such an attack. Qatar hosts the largest US military facility in the Middle East, and the United States has designated it a Major Non-NATO Ally. However, neither these nor other connections shielded its territory.
In response to the alienation among Gulf partners, Trump took bold action to sustain their support. We should see the EO as part of Trump’s reassurance package to Qatar and, indirectly, other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The EO now makes explicit a previously implicit US security guarantee. In addition to underscoring the US commitment to Gulf security, these can augment existing Qatari and US force structures once operationalized in concrete projects.
The Trump Turnaround
Trump has criticized US security pledges for years due to entanglement risks. Yet, Qatar is a very exposed state, having been attacked twice in the past three months by Iran and then Israel. It remains vulnerable due to its location and modest self-defense capabilities. Prominent members of Trump’s MAGA movement have criticized Trump for deviating from his “America First” doctrine in offering Qatar additional security commitments.
Yet, the new security assurances to Qatar do not foreshadow a change in US military goals or force structure in the Gulf. The EO was a low-risk move since the White House presumably secured Netanyahu’s pledge beforehand not to conduct another such attack. Meanwhile, the Iranian government, with its weakened military and proxy axis, is seeking to improve relations with its Gulf neighbors to lessen international pressure regarding its nuclear program. Trump could have offered the new assurances to Qatar with some confidence that he would not have to execute them.
Still, the assurances represent the latest evidence that Trump has become more comfortable with defense alliances, security commitments, and targeted multilateralism in his second term. He no longer threatens to leave NATO and has supported the alliance’s offering security guarantees as part of any Ukraine peace agreement. In the Indo-Pacific region, the Trump administration has maintained support for the US alliances with South Korea, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines. The administration has also continued previous regional security projects such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense industrial partnership.
The assurances represent the latest evidence that Trump has become more comfortable with defense alliances, security commitments, and targeted multilateralism in his second term
Commentators note that the new security assurances to Qatar are embodied in an EO rather than a formal treaty. A US president can issue an EO on his own authority, whereas a treaty requires senatorial ratification. Since securing congressional approval on any measures is challenging these days, Trump has issued hundreds of executive orders since returning to the presidency. In practice, the differences are less stark. Presidents have withdrawn from both executive agreements and treaties. Barack Obama committed to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal through an executive agreement, which Trump reversed in 2018. Trump is currently pondering a Russian offer to extend New START, a Senate-ratified international treaty, for another year through an EO.
Sustaining US Diplomatic and Security Leadership
Trump’s reassurance package arguably proved critical for sustaining GCC and US engagement in the Gaza peace process. The Israeli strike on Qatar catalyzed elevated presidential participation in Middle East diplomacy. Although the White House published the EO on October 1, Trump signed the document on September 29, the day he met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House. While there, Trump also induced Netanyahu to apologize to the Qatari prime minister for the attack. A couple of days before this, the president held a special meeting in New York with Arab leaders on the sidelines of the 78th session of the UN General Assembly.
All these steps underscored the US commitment to their security and to sustaining their engagement in the US-led Middle Eastern peace process. As intended, they arrested the near-term erosion of US security ties with regional partners. Gulf leaders have, at least publicly, absolved the United States of direct involvement in Israel’s strike on Qatar and seem confident that it will not recur. They also appreciate the White House’s renewed attention to their concerns.
In the longer term, though, GCC allies will have additional opportunities to drift from their currently overwhelming reliance on the United States. China’s foreign security operations are growing; Russian military diplomacy will increase following the Ukraine War, while Pakistan and perhaps other countries like India may expand their security commitments in the Gulf.
In the longer term, GCC allies will have additional opportunities to drift from their currently overwhelming reliance on the United States
Future Scenarios
If the GCC leaders continue to value US diplomatic and military leadership, their security partnership could expand and deepen. If the GCC governments become dissatisfied with Washington, they could reorient their defense cooperation inward. Alternatively, they could seek security partnerships with other major military powers, similar to the mutual defense pact Saudi Arabia recently concluded with Pakistan, which excluded the United States.
Expanding US Security Ties
The strengthening of the GCC-US security cooperation could proceed in two directions. First, the United States could offer similar enhanced security assurances to other GCC members. Seeking such commitments would be unsurprising, as other GCC governments would expect to receive equivalent treatment to Qatar because they also have close diplomatic, economic, and security ties with the United States. Washington would probably accede to this demand to sustain their support and reinforce an integrated regional security structure led, de jure or de facto, by the United States.
Second, the US partnership with GCC countries could deepen. The United States could supplement or replace informal security assurances with one or more formal defense treaties with GCC participants. The Saudi and UAE governments have long sought a more formal defense pact. Furthermore, the United States could harmonize GCC security policies with Israel, quietly at first, then more overtly should GCC-Israeli relations improve following the end of the Gaza war or in response to a heightened Iranian military threat.
Although this wider and deeper security integration would enhance collective protection of Washington and its Gulf partners, it would also increase mutual dependencies. GCC countries and the United States would more likely become entangled in each other’s conflicts, and their collective defenses would suffer even if one party failed to fulfill its commitments.
Although wider and deeper security integration would enhance collective protection of Washington and its Gulf partners, it would also increase mutual dependencies
A More Autonomous GCC
GCC governments could mitigate these vulnerabilities of relying primarily on US security guarantees, which would be subject to changes in US politics and policies after Trump leaves office, by focusing their defense alignments inward toward other GCC partners. Last month, the GCC’s Joint Defense Council committed to exchanging more intelligence about air and missile threats. The Gulf monarchies could further enhance their capabilities and save money by pooling more assets, engaging in regular multinational exercises, and constructing a more integrated command and control system.
But the GCC members would have to remove US troops and bases from their territory to establish a fully autonomous military structure. Otherwise, the de-confliction problems would prove insurmountable, as US forces would employ their own defenses if attacked. Moreover, the GCC, even collectively, could not soon compensate for the loss of US intelligence, logistical, and technological capabilities.
Cooperation with Non-US Partners
If the GCC members curtail defense cooperation with the United States, they could turn to other foreign partners for substitute capabilities. Acquiring security pacts with a variety of external partners would limit dependence on any single foreign protector.
China, Russia, and European countries represent the most likely non-US defense partners. The GCC countries already buy weapons and dual-use technologies from these countries. Though constrained by domestic requirements related to the Ukraine war, Russia has historically been a leading global supplier of weapons, especially to Arab states. China has carved out a niche in the arms market by offering systems based on Russian designs but at a lower cost. Some European companies also offer advanced weapons systems. GCC states could plausibly host exercises with these countries, expand military exchanges, and engage in other activities to strengthen mutual defense ties.
However, managing multiple suppliers would be challenging due to the need to sustain overlapping supply chains and maintenance operations. If one GCC member’s relationship with a key defense partner soured or found itself caught between competing partners (as Turkey did when it purchased the Russian S-400 air defense system), the entire GCC collective defense network could suffer from the resulting export controls, sanctions, and other punishments.
If US-GCC diplomatic efforts continue to make progress and the new security assurances deter further attacks on Qatar or its neighbors, the US-Qatari assurances could set a precedent for a new type of non-treaty defense guarantee that Washington could offer other partners in the Middle East and beyond.
