Between an interim Syrian president who is hedging his bets on regional alliances and an Israeli prime minister committed to preventing the emergence of an independent nation-state, Syrians today find themselves caught at the heart of a complex regional equation, despite the current wave of regional and international openness toward the new government in Damascus following the ouster of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024.

What Syria is experiencing today is no longer a matter of yes or no as much as it is a matter of recalibrating the regional balance. Damascus has entered an unprecedented transitional phase in which Ahmad Al-Sharaa assumed the presidency in an interim capacity. This phase, which has reshaped the regional geopolitical landscape, has brought with it a new kind of conflict. Damascus is no longer the eye of the storm because of Iran, ISIS, or Russia. However, it has become the target of direct Israeli pressure through which Tel Aviv wants to forge the new Syrian state into such a structure that is politically malleable or deliberately weakened, without engaging in a full-fledged war.

A Perilous Transition

Although Syria emerged from over a decade of bloody attrition following the fall of the former regime, this rise has yet to translate into security or structural stability. Ahmad Al-Sharaa inherited a fragmented state, a collapsed army, and a deteriorating economy. The newly formed military and security forces are composed of armed factions sharing diverse ideological backgrounds, most notably Islamist jihadist groups. All this is occurring in the absence of electoral and constitutional legitimacy. Al-Sharaa’s legitimacy, in turn, depends entirely on his ability to hold the state together and prevent its collapse.

In this context, and in a clear attempt to capitalize on unfolding events, Israel began redefining its role in the Syrian territory. Although Iran’s final exit eliminated the traditional security pretext that Tel Aviv had long relied upon, Israeli raids on Syrian territory did not cease. On the contrary, the pace of its intervention intensified — particularly in southern Syria.

What Israel is doing today cannot be interpreted as an attempt to overthrow the existing authority but can be perceived as a deliberate effort to keep it weak, fragmented, and vulnerable to pressure and concessions. This is the essence of Israel’s strategy: We do not want a strong, sovereign state next to our borders, but neither do we want complete chaos that could open the pandora’s box leading to more radical and hostile actors.

The essence of Israel’s strategy: We do not want a strong, sovereign state next to our borders, but neither do we want complete chaos that could open the pandora’s box

Sweida: From Tactics to Dominance

On July 13, 2025, Israel jets bombed positions belonging to the new Syrian army after its forces entered Sweida, under the pretext of “protecting the Druze” and in line with Tel Aviv’s earlier declaration that southern Syria must remain a demilitarized zone. Israel did not adopt restraint there, it delivered an explicitly harsh message to Damascus by targeting the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff Command building, and the vicinity of the presidential palace. In response, President Al-Sharaa referenced Israel as “the entity” in a public speech, which triggered a campaign of incitement in the Israeli media that branded him “the head of the snake” and “a jihadi disguised as a statesman.” All of this coincided with a shift in Israel’s posture from cautious observation to an overt attempt to impose new facts on the ground.

The Normalization Trap: Who’s Maneuvering Whom?

Before the recent flare ups in Sweida, talks of Syrian-Israeli meetings in Amman, Baku and Abu Dhabi had intensified. At the time, some believed that normalization between Damascus and Tel Aviv was imminent soon.

Al-Sharaa now finds himself caught in a vise. On one hand, he is leading a transitional authority lacking a popular mandate and relying primarily on former factions with Salafist or hardline nationalist backgrounds. Any move toward normalization with Israel would likely rupture this internal balance. On the other hand, failure to respond to Israeli attacks undermines the state’s sovereignty. Al-sharaa is walking a tightrope: neither full scale confrontation is viable, nor political settlement is acceptable at home.

However, Israel does not seek an equitable path to normalization where both states are equal partners. It wants peace with Syria on its own terms, primarily demanding major concessions from Damascus, particularly on the Golan Heights. At the same time, Israel prefers to see a weak and fragile authority in the neighboring country and refuses to tolerate the emergence of a strong and stable state. 

Israel does not seek an equitable path to normalization where both states are equal partners. It wants peace with Syria on its own terms

Israel is waging a high-stakes maneuver with Al-Sharaa while operating under the cover of fire. By supporting the Druze, striking sovereign institutions in Damascus, and imposing a demilitarized zone in the south, it is pressuring him with all its might to coax out the concessions it demands if he wants the situation to stabilize. But Al-Sharaaunderstands that any public openness toward Tel Aviv would mean losing both the street and the factions.

Al-Sharaa, on his part, is maneuvering in his own way, deliberately allowing the Syrian tribes to take the lead on behalf of the state in the Sweida clashes. It is as if he is telling Israel: “Either you deal with me, or with unruly crowds that you cannot simply bomb from the air.”

In doing so, he is betting on a long-game strategy, consolidating de facto authority, steering clear of battles he is not equipped to fight, and refusing to offer any sovereign concessions.

Will the Situation Explode?

Although the situation in Sweida has begun to slightly stabilize, following clear concessions from Damascus to Druze leader Hikmat al-Hijri and his Israeli supporters, it could still erupt at any given moment, especially if the Druze make a miscalculation that brings armed tribal mobilizations back to the forefront.

This scenario could lead to an Israeli ground incursion in southern Syria to support the Druze factions, which would be by far the most dangerous possibility. Such a move would effectively divide the country and destroy the foundations of the new state-building project. In that case, Al-Sharaa would be unable to survive politically. If he fails to respond, a popular or factional response would become inevitable, risking a full-scale explosion across the country.

If Al-Sharaa offers any direct or indirect concessions to Sweida, and fails to assert state sovereignty over the province, this would not be a localized failure and would set a dangerous precedent that could pave the path for broader conflicts across the new Syria.

The Druze, whose only significant backing comes from Israel, stand in stark contrast to the Kurds, who possess all the right ingredients for secession: organized and trained military forces, heavy weaponry, substantial economic resources, a self-governing framework established years ago, and pragmatic relations with Western powers. Meanwhile, the Alawites maintain firm control over the coastal region, preserving a cohesive security and administrative apparatus inherited from the Assad era.

Any perceived weakness of the Syrian state in handling the Sweida crisis would likely embolden Kurdish and Alawite calls for autonomy, especially if these groups begin to view the central authority in Damascus as incapable of reining in rival factions.

Therefore, any failure in the south could quickly replicate in the Kurdish north and the coastal regions, threatening to fragment the new Syrian state even before it gets full shape.

Any perceived weakness of the Syrian state in handling the Sweida crisis would likely embolden Kurdish and Alawite calls for autonomy

Washington’s Conflict Management Dilemma

Given this scenario, the U.S. administration, which is heavily involved in Syrian affairs and betting on rehabilitating the new state as well as investing in its stability, remains mired in conflict management rather than resolving the crises or offering meaningful solutions.

On the one hand, Washington does not want to publicly oppose Israel or take a clear stance against the Israeli Prime Minister’s plans for Syria and the region. At the same time, it avoids antagonizing its regional allies, particularly the Arab Gulf states, on whom the U.S. President heavily relies on to promote his narrative built around securing multi-trillion-dollar investments from the Gulf. Also at play is the dilemma of Jordan, an important American ally, which remains the most directly affected by developments in the Syrian arena.

So far, Washington’s position remains fragile. Yet, in light of Netanyahu’s overreach and his belief that the moment is ripe to reengineer the region, U.S. President Donald Trump may reconsider his priorities. After all, he is first and foremost a dealmaker rather than a traditional mediator and may come to view Netanyahu’s recklessness as an obstacle to his own vision of reshaping the Middle East.

Trump now appears to be walking a tightrope. On one hand, he does not want to antagonize Israel or the influential pro-Israel lobby in the United States. On the other, he cannot afford to alienate key regional powers, particularly Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Therefore, Trump may settle for a position that falls short of confronting Israel directly yet goes beyond merely acquiescing to its strategic ambitions in Syria. He still holds significant leverage, particularly through arms deals and the Gaza file.

If Al-Sharaa Endures

If Ahmed Al-Sharaa succeeds in thwarting Israel’s southern push without being dragged into an open war, he will emerge from this phase and command the strongest form of legitimacy. It will be the legitimacy of someone who stood firm and resisted pressure and blackmail. At that point, the world will begin to treat him as an undeniable political reality rather than a transitional president.

The conflict in southern Syria no longer revolves around military front lines, but rather around the contours of a new regional legitimacy. Israel recognizes that a Syria without Iran may prove more dangerous than the previous one aligned with Iran. Meanwhile, the United States is aware that renewed chaos could undermine its most critical alliances in the region.

Amid all this, Ahmad Al-Sharaa stands in the middle. He lacks the strength to confront and the flexibility to concede. Yet, so far, he survives, and in doing so, he is laying the ground for a new equation that could redefine the very notion of “sovereignty” in the Middle East.

Ahmad Al-Sharaa stands in the middle. He lacks the strength to confront and the flexibility to concede. Yet, so far, he survives

But the most pressing question remains: What if Al-Sharaa fails to endure? Would the region then plunge into a dramatic unraveling that extends beyond Syria’s borders, a price everyone may end up paying simply because Benjamin Netanyahu insists on a restricted normalization built upon the foundation of a weak and fragile Syrian state?