The success of the Israeli military operations, and the subsequent US operations against Iran in June 2025, placed Moscow in a difficult position. Despite years of expanding economic and military ties with Iran, the Kremlin offered little more than diplomatic condemnation. However, several reasons prevented Russian military intervention during the Twelve-Day War, including the short duration of the conflict, Moscow’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine, and Russia’s relations with other countries concerned about or opposed to Iran’s growing military assertiveness.
In the Kremlin’s hierarchy of international partners, Iran ranks below China, North Korea, and several other countries. However, Russians fear that Moscow’s weak response to the attack on Iran has weakened Russia’s standing and influence with publics in the Middle East, and perhaps elsewhere.
Russians fear that Moscow’s muted response to the attack on Iran has damaged Russia’s standing and influence in the Middle East and perhaps beyond
For many in Tehran, this incident reflected a broader pattern. Just months earlier, Moscow had been distancing itself from its longtime ally, Bashar al-Assad, as the contours of a post-war political transition in Syria took shape. Now, with Iran largely left to face military escalation alone, questions are growing across the region about Russia’s ability to remain a reliable partner.
Although Russia no longer needs Iran’s defense assistance, Iran remains a valuable partner in Russian foreign policy calculations, albeit a lower strategic priority than China and North Korea. Moscow may therefore decide to help the Iranian military recover from its recent defeat to bolster Russia’s influence in the Middle East and prevent China or other countries from displacing Russia as the Iranian regime’s primary security partner. The Kremlin understands that abandoning Tehran comes at a price. Moscow’s continued strategic hesitation risks diminishing its regional leverage and allowing external powers to fill the vacuum.
Russian Rhetoric vs. Actions
After Israel abruptly initiated military operations against Iran on June 13, Russian officials denounced Israel for violating international law and defended Iran’s right to self-defense. To avert U.S. military intervention, they warned of the potentially catastrophic consequences of escalation, urged Washington to continue talking with the Iranian government, and offered to mediate between Iran and Israel.
Russian rhetoric became even more critical after the United States joined the attack, launching a surprise strike with special weapons against Iran’s highly protected underground nuclear facilities. Vasily Nebenzya, Moscow’s U.N. Ambassador, characterized the U.S. attack as an “irresponsible, dangerous and provocative” act that risked undermining the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Despite its harsh rhetoric, the Russian government did not rush military or other concrete assistance to Iran or impose sanctions on Israel or the United States for their use of force. Instead, Moscow mostly continued to call for de-escalation and dialogue.
A Limited Partnership
As a manifestation of the expanding economic and security cooperation between Russia and Iran over the past decade, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty in January 2025. The treaty gave a symbolic boost to Tehran, which had by then engaged in several rounds of air and missile strikes against Israel after its regional proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria had suffered major setbacks. Although the document referenced “military-technical” cooperation and prohibited either signatory from aiding any state that attacked the other party, the text did not obligate Russia or Iran to render military assistance to each other.
Iran ranks below China, North Korea, and other countries in the Kremlin’s international network. As a result, cooperation has typically lagged Iranian aspirations
Tehran is a significant Russian partner, but Iran ranks below China, North Korea, and other countries in the Kremlin’s international network. As a result, cooperation has typically lagged Iranian aspirations. Though Iranian officials stated in November 2023 that Russia had agreed to sell Iran more advanced weaponry—the S-400 Triumf surface-to-air missile defense network the Sukhoi Su-35 Flanker advanced multi-role fighter, Mi-28 attack helicopters, and Yak-130 training jets—Russia only provided the Yak-130s, contributing to Iran’s inability to thwart Israeli air attacks and generating open frustration among some Iranians.
Furthermore, Russia provided little concrete support for Iran or its proxies when Israel, strongly supported by the United States, decimated Tehran’s proxies. Perhaps due to the need to bolster its air defenses against Ukraine’s expanding drone strikes against Russian territory, Moscow even failed to restore or replace the S-300 air defense systems that Israel destroyed in its limited April 2024 and October 2024 strikes on Iran, leaving Iranian air defenses debilitated. In the June 2025 war, Israel rapidly achieved air superiority over much of western Iran.
Competing Considerations
A seeming failure to anticipate Israel’s attack and the conflict’s short duration may explain the Russian government’s lethargic response to the June 2025 war. Additionally, Russian attention and resources remain fixated on Ukraine-related events. Indeed, many Russian and foreign analysts speculated that, whatever its public statements, the Kremlin hoped that the U.S. would focus on the Middle East and divert resources from supporting Ukraine.
Furthermore, the Russian government’s desire to sustain ties with other partners partly explains its low-energy response during the Iran-Israel war. Moscow has enjoyed generally good relations with Israel and many GCC countries, which often compete with Iran for regional influence. These governments have broadly cooperated with Russia on multiple economic issues and applied a minimally restrictive sanctions regime on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine—designed more to appease Washington than to punish Moscow.
Russia’s Weakening Standing and Reliability
Since the war, the Kremlin has strived to counter accusations that Russia provided insufficient support to Iran—an accusation that both worsens Russian-Iranian relations and, following the collapse of the Assad regime, further decreases confidence in Russia’s military reputation in the Middle East. Observing that, “There are many who would like to pour fuel on the fire and damage the partnership between Moscow and Tehran,” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov insisted that, “Russia has indeed supported Iran through the clear position it has taken,” adding that “We intend to continue developing our relationship with Iran.”
Iranian officials will have to suppress any anger they feel toward Russia since they lack alternative great power patrons. The June 2025 war has substantially worsened U.S.-Iranian ties while European governments are preparing to restore international sanctions on Iran due to Tehran’s opaqueness regarding its nuclear program and intentions. The Iranian government will need Moscow’s help at the IAEA and UN to avert additional sanctions.
Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov termed the Russian-Iranian partnership “unbreakable” while implying that Moscow might render military assistance to Tehran: “We are working with Iran in various areas, and it would be irresponsible to disclose some details of this cooperation.” The Iranian government likely will seek Russian help in rebuilding its military given how Iran exhausted much of its existing drone and missile stockpile in the June 2025 fighting, while Israeli air strikes considerably disrupted Iran’s future missile and drone production.
Iran’s overtaxed military-industrial complex probably cannot provide weapons to Russia for a while. In theory, this shortfall should decrease the value of the Russian-Iranian defense partnership from Moscow’s perspective. In practice, though, Russia’s expanding domestic defense production combined with the munitions provided by North Korea and dual-use technologies supplied by China means Russia no longer needs Iranian weapons.
If the Ukraine war ended, Iran would likely be one of the few countries seeking to purchase large volumes of Russian arms. Such purchases could help Russia dispose of excess weaponry
Conversely, Russia would be better positioned to supply armaments to Iran if its own defense requirements regarding Ukraine declined. Russian arms sales in the Middle East have been falling both because Russia’s domestic needs have grown due to the protracted war with Ukraine, which is backed by many Western countries, and because Western sanctions make many countries wary of purchasing Russian weapons. If the Ukraine war ended, Iran would likely be one of the few countries seeking to purchase large volumes of Russian arms. Such purchases could help Russia dispose of excess weaponry and transition away from its wartime economy.
Future Scenarios
Another constraint on the Kremlin’s reaction to the June 2025 war was Putin’s desire to cultivate ties with U.S. President Donald Trump in the hopes of improving Russian-U.S. ties, reducing Western sanctions, and decreasing U.S. military support for Ukraine. However, Trump’s abrupt declaration and enforcement of an Israeli-Iranian truce only 12 days after the war started helped avert the protracted conflict that could have elevated oil prices and boosted Russia’s export revenue.
When the fighting ended, Peskov said that Russia would compartmentalize U.S. military actions against Iran from other dimensions of the Russian-U.S. dialogue. On June 24, Ryabkov told the Russian daily Izvestiya that the U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, following the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, inflicted severe damage on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In his view, if the United States could attack a country that was a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) member, allowed for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard inspections, and did not have a confirmed nuclear weapons program, then other countries could reassess the relative benefits of nuclear abstention.
Though Ryabkov agreed with Tehran’s position that a prerequisite for further Iranian nuclear talks was a cessation of foreign military attacks on Iran, he added that Russia would continue to offer creative solutions to help stabilize the situation. Further, Ryabkov said that Russia wanted to continue working with the Trump administration on other urgent issues such as expanding visa and delegation exchanges, restoring direct air traffic, recovering Russian diplomatic property in the United States, resolving the Ukraine conflict, and managing their growing nuclear arms race.
Putin and other Russian officials also offered to help Iran dispose of its “excessively enriched” uranium and provide mediation services between Iran and other countries. Moscow could gain economic and diplomatic influence in Washington, Tehran, and elsewhere if the parties perceived Russia as a valued interlocutor. But Trump declined Putin’s offer to mediate, expressing his view that the Russian president could more beneficially work to end the Russia-Ukraine War. Trump seems keen to negotiate directly with the Iranian leadership on its nuclear program rather than through intermediaries.
The growing rift between Trump and Putin, if sustained, could relax Russian pressure on Iran to rein in its nuclear ambitions, remain in the NPT, and restore access to IAEA inspectors. Furthermore, worsening Russian-U.S. relations could decrease Moscow’s inhibitions about re-arming Iran in coming months to fortify the Iranian regime against future U.S. and Israeli threats.
The growing rift between Trump and Putin, if sustained, could relax Russian pressure on Iran to rein in its nuclear ambitions, remain in the NPT, and restore access to IAEA inspectors
If Russia continues to withhold advanced conventional weapons from Iran, Tehran is likely to turn elsewhere, most notably to China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC), a key Iranian arms supplier until the mid-1980s, may be poised to re-enter this space. Although a media report has already claimed that China has provided Iran with long-range surface-to-air missiles. Acquiring advanced Chinese fighters would also fill a critical gap in Iran’s air defenses and provide Iran another means of projecting military power besides missiles and drones.
Should China resume arms sales to Iran for the first time in over two decades, Beijing may attempt to obscure these dealings in order to preserve its delicate relationships with Israel, the Gulf states, Europe, and the United States. For example, China (or Russia) could provide military-technical assistance or dual-use items through third parties such as North Korea.
Ultimately, Russia’s restraint during the June 2025 war may have helped it avoid a direct confrontation with powerful regional actors, but it has raised serious questions about Moscow’s credibility and influence in the Middle East. Tehran’s disappointment reflects a broader regional skepticism, suggesting that Russia is no longer perceived as a dependable partner when the stakes are high.
For now, Moscow’s balancing act remains intact. However, with every moment of hesitation, the cost of ambiguity increases, and so does the opportunity for other powers, particularly China, to reshape the regional landscape in ways that may further marginalize Russia.
