As Bashar al-Assad was defecting to Moscow heralding the end of Assad family’s 55 years of rule, Syria’s Kurds were harboring lofty ambitions. All the cards seemed to come together seamlessly for the Kurds to birth their long-aspired independent state or an autonomous region like the Iraqi Kurdistan at bare minimum.
The Kurds finally were witnessing an excellent opportunity of having their own state following Assad’s exit and as Syria fell into the hands of a new regime whose past made regional and international communities look at them with suspicion and apprehension. Moreover, the new Damascus regime appeared vulnerable, poised to lack official acceptance at the international level for long. To top it off, the Kurds anticipated continued strategic favor from the United States, given their pivotal role in the anti-ISIS coalition.
The Kurdish leadership may have overestimated their geopolitical leverage amid evolving regional dynamics and shifting international priorities. Regional and international powers sharing a greater vision for the Middle East have sidelined Kurdish aspirations to build on momentum to change the face of the region for good. Amid the ongoing developments, the region is on the precipice of spawning a new Middle East.
The Kurdish leadership may have overestimated their geopolitical leverage amid evolving regional dynamics and shifting international priorities. Regional and international powers sharing a greater vision for the Middle East have sidelined Kurdish aspirations to build on momentum to change the face of the region for good.
Seven months into Ahmed al-Sharaa’s rule in Syria, attitudes and behaviors towards the new regime have undergone a 180 degrees shift. Today, al-sharaa – the man who once led a designated terrorist organization Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – has reformed himself into a president garnering wide regional and international support. Notably, he has also earned admiration of US President Donald Trump. To quote the American president: “I think he’s got the potential. An attractive, strong young man with a strong past. A very strong past, a fighter.”
Syrian Kurds: Since Ottoman era till the end of Assad rule
Following World War I and before the formation of Syria as a state, the Jazira region lying between Tigris and Euphrates rivers was under the Ottoman Empire and home to Syriacs, Kurds and few Arab tribes. In those times whenever Turkish authorities and Kurds clashed, Kurdish people migrated to the Jazira in leaps and bounds. Natural reasons such as employment and social relations also continued migration.
In 1962, the then Syrian government held a census. The government that year recognized everybody registered in that census as Syrian citizens, and successive government followed the same policy. People reaching the Jazira region after the census were not acknowledged as Syrians. Eventually, a large population of Kurds turned out to be stateless. Matters got worse due to Kurds’ refusal to register new births and denial to serve in the Syrian military.
Before the Syrian movement started in 2011, Kurdish political parties put forward various demands, including citizenship to the unregistered population, acknowledgement of Kurdish language as one of Syria’s national languages, and political rights to form parties and participate in politics. The governments of Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar rejected these demands and state intelligence apparatus routinely subjected Syrian Kurdish activists to harsh treatment and often detention in prisons.
During the time, the senior Assad formed working relationship with Abdullah Ocalan-led faction of Turkish Kurds, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), who demanded secession from Turkey. The Assad government agreed to provide weapons and training to the PKK in return for facilitating drug smuggling across the border. Later in 1988, Hafez al-Assad abandoned this working relationship under mounting pressure and military threats from Ankara.
When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan-led Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey, the elder Assad established formal ties with Ankara. The Syrian-Turkish ties further strengthened in the years that followed and during the son’s rule. Especially after the Arab world isolated the junior Assad amid accusations of his involvement in the killing of Rafik Hariri, Turkey became his sole ally. This relationship between Bashar al-Assad and Turkey had severely affected Syrian Kurds.
As the 2011 Syrian revolution unfolded, Turkey switched loyalty and extended its support to Bashar’s opposition. This development compelled junior Assad to offer an olive branch to the Kurds. He developed good relations with the Kurds to take the pressure off himself and to press Ankara. During that cordial time, the Syrian government fulfilled most of human rights and culture related demands of the Kurds. In addition, Bashar entrusted Kurdistan Union Party (PUK), successor to PKK, with security and livelihood responsibilities in majority Kurdish-inhabited areas.
In 2015, the Kurds were closest to forming their own state after the establishment of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) with the support of US in its fight against the Islamic State (ISIS). If the US and allies had not formed a coalition to tackle ISIS, then the likelihood was high that all Kurdish areas would have been wiped out. The Kurds became the ultimate beneficiary of that coalition against ISIS and gained control of vast areas, including Arabian cities like Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. Later, the Kurds formed Autonomous Governance Authority and its military apparatus, the Syrian Democratic Forces, by incorporating groups of Syriacs.
The Kurds after the Fall of Bashar al-Assad’s Regime
After the Bashar al-Assad regime toppled, fears rose of an ugly confrontation between the new regime and the Kurds, given their past history and animosities held towards each other. The new regime led by al-Sharaa and some in his ranks – previously part of the ISIS – had committed gruesome acts against Kurdish Yazidi in the Jazira region. The Kurds have bitter memories. Simultaneously, the Syrian regime formed an alliance with Turkey-backed Syrian National Army that included factions, who defeated the Kurds and wrested control over areas such as Afrin in northern Aleppo and Ras al-Ain in the Syrian Jazira.
Given the Kurds extensive role in the US-led international coalition pushing back ISIS in northern and eastern Syria, they strongly believed that their relationship with the US would favor their demand of an independent Kurdish state, either within the framework of autonomy or outright succession. On the other side, the new Syrian regime viewed the Autonomous Governance Authority as an extremist group that controlled expansive oil and gas fields and had captured Arab cities devoid of Kurdish population. The battle fought between them near the Tshrin dam in Manbij signaled that the dynamics between the two opposing forces would lead to worse and wider conflict.
Given the Kurds extensive role in the US-led international coalition pushing back ISIS in northern and eastern Syria, they strongly believed that their relationship with the US would favor their demand of an independent Kurdish state, either within the framework of autonomy or outright succession.
Separatist Ambitions and Internal Divisions
Apart from external pressures, political dissonance also plagues the Kurdish ambition. Competing Kurdish factions each assert exclusive legitimacy, exacerbating fragmentation and undermining collective political agency.
The Kurdish movement is bearing witness to a major shift in broad political vision throughout the regional and international nexus. At the heart of the Kurdish dispute lies the fundamental issue of self-rule, its forms, and mechanisms. The lack of consensus among the Kurdish political class on this fundamental issue has dented their negotiating power in the past decades, be it in dealings with former regimes or even with the present one. Amid political dissonance and largely scattered Kurdish forces across vast land, regional powers are exploiting the Kurds to advance their own agendas. Power centers are strengthening Kurdish forces in some instances, and in others, weakening them.
This evolving reality has increasingly marginalized Kurdish demands within Syria’s emerging political architecture.
Kurdish Stakes and Washington’s Shock
The Kurds, who have long been the spearhead of the US-led international coalition against terrorist organizations like ISIS in Syria, depended much on the US. But President Donald Trump jarred them by announcing his administration’s plan to cut down forces in Syria.
The US was set to retreat in the fight against ISIS, making the Kurds less relevant. President Trump sought new Syrian regime’s help in preventing the resurgence of ISIS and asked the regime to take control of detention centers in the country’s northeastern region. With this, the Kurds trump card turned against them. The US began pressuring them to accept the new regime in Syria. Finally, a US military aircraft transported the commander of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), General Mazloum Abdi, to Damascus where he signed an agreement with Syrian President al-Sharaa.
The deal signed by the Kurds and the Syrian ruler was more of a declaration of intent lacking clear resolutions and did not bargain anything for the Kurds. There was not a single provision in the agreement that needed negotiations, even in matters of security. For instance, the agreement provisioned oil sharing but fell short of outlining the modality for it. Likewise, it failed to mention the security protocol to adopt along the borders with Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. The agreement left the fate of the SDF in the lurch without specifying whether the SDF would join the army as one whole bloc or as individual members.
After signing the deal albeit under pressure and amid growing US fondness towards al-Sharaa regime, the straw that ultimately broke the Kurds’ back was when US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said, “We owe them (the Kurds), but the question is: What do we owe them? We don’t owe them the ability to have their own independent government within a government.”
The straw that ultimately broke the Kurds’ back was when US envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said, “We owe them (the Kurds), but the question is: What do we owe them? We don’t owe them the ability to have their own independent government within a government.”
Considering all the developments so far, Kurdish issues that once topped the list of agenda in a post-Assad regime have been relegated now as regional and international interests evolve and overlap with that of the current rulers of Damascus.
Future Scenarios for Syria’s Kurds:
First Scenario: Integration without Assimilation
In light of recent developments linked to regional and international consensus with the new Syrian regime and US’s abandonment of the Kurds, the next scenario could be the Kurds returning to their pre-Assad demands concerning identity, culture and language and quit their decentralization stance.
The new rulers of Damascus may accept to incorporate the Kurds into Syria while denying them autonomy. Integration is likely since the Syrian government reasserted its “firm commitment to the principle of one Syria, one army and one government, and categorically refuses any form of division or federalism that conflicts with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic. The state welcomes the integration of Syrian fighters from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into its ranks, within the approved constitutional and legal frameworks.”
This scenario is highly likely given the staunch opposition of regional and international powers regarding autonomy or independence. On part of the US, it would not act to weaken the new Syrian regime due to the possibility of furthering Syrian-Israeli normalization, which if deeper understanding resonates would significantly contribute to the US administration’s vision for the Middle East. This has been confirmed by the statement of Washinton’s envoy to Syria, who urged SDF to realize that Syria is one country.
On part of Turkey, it is also wary of the talks of Kurdish autonomy or secession as it fears spill over effects into Turkey, posing threat to the country’s national security. Such a move would set the precedent for Turkish Kurds’ aspirations to press on for autonomy or independence. Moreover, Turkey views the formation of Kurdish administration as a vacuum Iran could try to fill by supporting the Kurds. Thus, Ankara is fully backing the new regime in Damascus and would go at great lengths to deprive the Kurds of any concessions.
As per Arab states, they are principally opposed to any division in the region, including in Syria, as they consider such move to pose a threat to the regional stability and have dire consequences to the wider region.
Amidst all this, the Kurdish political dissonance is the weakest link in the powerful nexus of Damascus, the US and regional partners opposing any modality of self-governance or independence. Lack of political clarity has been a major hurdle to furthering Kurdish issues over the past decade.
The Second Scenario: Autonomy
The Syrian Kurds may consider the Iraqi Kurdistan as a model suitable to them. The existing Kurdish autonomous region will self-govern within the framework of federalism in which the Kurds will have their say on internal issues such as education, health, and the economy. However, foreign policy and defense will still be handled by the central government in Damascus. This demand was also put forth in the document of the First National Conference of Syrian Kurds.
However, the viability of such a scenario has diminished in the current state of affairs, given Washington’s strengthening alliance with the new Damascus regime and US’s withdrawal of support from the Kurds. Moreover, the reasoning of the first scenario — integration — renders this prospect of autonomy much weaker.
The Third Scenario: An Independent State
Despite geopolitical headwinds, the aspiration for statehood remains deeply entrenched within segments of the Kurdish political movement. This dream has persisted throughout all eras of Syrian politics, mostly as they felt out of place surrounded by the Arabs. However, the likelihood of this scenario looks unachievable, if not impossible, for several reasons. The main one being Damascus’s outright rejection of the idea. Moreover, Arab countries and Turkey unequivocally reject any form of autonomy or secession and Washington has reversed its policy on Syria.
Among the prospects presented and considering the zeitgeist, integration seems to be the most suitable scenario. Nevertheless, the desire for Kurdish secession shall continue to overcome all wars, deals, and political understandings. Therefore, it would be fair to say that the Kurds are going through a phase in Syria with limited alternatives at present. It should be viewed just as a dot in the long timeline of Kurdish struggle. Whatever concessions they make for integration now will not deter them from their long-held aspiration. Thus, the Kurdish issue may lie dormant going into the future but would surface again whenever Kurds find a conducive environment before them.
