In just 12 days, Ahmed al-Sharaa underwent a life-changing transformation from leading a banned jihadist organization to becoming the president of a state whose future trajectory directly impacts the overall stability of the Middle East. This meteoric ascent was utterly unforeseen; it blindsided all actors without exception.
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In just 12 days, Ahmed al-Sharaa underwent a life-changing transformation from leading a banned jihadist organization to becoming the president of a state whose future trajectory directly impacts the overall stability of the Middle East. This meteoric ascent was utterly unforeseen; it blindsided all actors without exception. Just a few weeks ago, influential players in the region were working to bolster the regime of former President Bashar al-Assad as a fait accompli in their efforts to keep Syria aligned away from the Iranian axis.
The dramatic development of al-Sharaa’s sudden rise left everyone bewildered: how to handle Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who effectively took control of a crucial state, given numerous considerations, from its sensitive geographic location to its mosaic-like demographics.
More than seven months after Ahmed al-Sharaa entered the People’s Palace in Damascus, global perceptions of him underwent a near-total reversal; an upheaval scarcely conceivable just a few months earlier. In the past, he was pursued by the United States and had a $10 million bounty on his head for information leading to his capture. By now, he has already met with the US president in Riyadh, visited numerous capitals, received the highest presidential honors, and is soon to become the first Syrian president to address the United Nations since 1967.
The shift in global perception of al-Sharaa is not the only change. The man himself bears little resemblance to his past. His current rhetoric, mannerisms, and behavior show a fundamental contradiction to the man who was Abu Muhammad al-Julani. The jihadist, who once led Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has become a pragmatic leader who considers interests and appears far removed from anything related to his ideological roots, which he publicly renounced, according to statements from several media professionals he recently met in Damascus. He was quoted as saying that he is not an extension of Islamist parties, whether jihadist organizations or the Muslim Brotherhood, nor is he an extension of the Arab Spring.
Al-Sharaa’s transformation cannot be interpreted within the context of a personal journey and should be viewed through the lens of a broader geopolitical landscape shaped by internal and external factors, which create the framework under which any new leader in Syria must operate. Otherwise, he will face a harsh reality and a potential political death for his experiment before it even gets started.
Al-Sharaa’s transformation cannot be interpreted within the context of a personal journey and should be viewed through the lens of a broader geopolitical landscape shaped by internal and external factors, which create the framework under which any new leader in Syria must operate
But the key question is: Is his shift toward pragmatism enough to legitimize his rule and initiate a national project that unites Syrians under his leadership? Or is he merely pursuing a tactic under pressure now, only to return to his roots once the situation stabilizes? Or is everyone setting a trap for him in the form of a broader deal for the region?
Born in 1982, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa gained prominence during the Syrian Civil War after he founded Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012. In 2013, his organization became a branch of al-Qaeda in Syria. He left al-Qaeda in 2016 and renamed the group as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, and then to Jabhat Tahrir al-Sham in 2017. Later, he took control of Idlib and established a Salvation Government that administered the so-called liberated areas in northern Syria.
In November 2024, while everyone was preoccupied with the events in Gaza and Israel’s strikes against Hezbollah and its top brass, al-Sharaa led a coalition of groups and organizations against the former regime as part of the “Deterrence of Aggression” campaign. The events unfolded as a timeline and in a military sequence that no one could have predicted. In 12 days, al-Sharaa stormed the People’s Palace as reports surfaced about the former president fleeing and revealing his destination of refuge.
For days, Sharaa remained silent, managing affairs behind the scenes; dealing with Turkey, his primary backer, and the groups that participated in the offensive. The circle soon expanded to include regional powers that rushed in to probe the shifting landscape and seize opportunities to cement their influence in the new Syria, thereby protecting their national security interests. Amid this and under the pretext of filling the political and security vacuum, al-Sharaa was announced as interim president at the revolution’s “Victory Conference” in January 2025. Since then, the dramatic change in al-Sharaa’s persona started to take shape.
The interim Syrian president has adopted an approach that reflects a radical and profound shift, transforming himself from a hardline ideological figure into a pragmatic politician who has mastered the art of reconciling contradictions, navigating rival imperatives with calculated dexterity. He has aligned with everyone’s interests in line with the region’s sensitive dynamics, mainly the fear that instability in Syria will spill beyond its borders and drag the wider region into the vortex of instability, threatening to engulf all simultaneously in a spiral of chaos.
This approach represents the highest level of adaptability: the ability to interpret the wishes and demands of the surrounding environment, manage a complex web of interests and rivalries, and pursue ambitions to bury the so-called axis of resistance. Most importantly, it highlights al-Sharaa’s ability to align himself with the vision of the New Middle East, characterized by prosperity and stability.
Since his first day, al-Sharaa has sent messages to all sides, seeking to allay the anxieties of all stakeholders, first and foremost, the Syrian people themselves. He clearly stated that his mission was to rebuild and develop Syria regardless of people’s orientations, affiliations, or beliefs, and sought nothing beyond its borders.
Since his first day, al-Sharaa has sent messages to all sides, seeking to allay the anxieties of all stakeholders, first and foremost, the Syrian people themselves. He clearly stated that his mission was to rebuild and develop Syria and sought nothing beyond its borders
These messages were not just media statements or empty rhetoric, but part of a deliberate political outreach aimed at building an Arab and regional support network to shield him from the unanimous international rejection of his jihadist background and references. Perhaps even before entering Damascus, he believed that his survival would depend not only on widespread support for liberation from the tyranny of the previous regime but also on convincing those around him, balancing power, and managing everyone’s economic, political, and security interests.
Turkey was the natural starting point, given its previous support and close ties with Syrian military opposition factions, most notably Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. Therefore, the initial signals were quite clear: Ankara is the guarantor of the new era. On the other hand, Qatar, which is close to Islamists, was eager to appear victorious on the Syrian issue as it was one of those countries rejecting Assad’s rule and his continued presidency. Al-Sharaa skillfully balanced relationships with both countries: he maintained a close connection with Ankara by addressing its security and economic interests in Syria, while also keeping the door open to Doha for potential financial and political support.
On the Jordanian side, al-Sharaa leveraged Jordan’s demands and concerns, considering the sensitive link between Syrian security and Jordanian national security. Syria’s stability under a central government aligns with Jordan’s interests for effective border control. Additionally, al-Sharaa relies on Jordan’s respected international voice to help gain global acceptance of his rule. Furthermore, Amman could support establishing Damascus as a stabilizing force to prevent a vacuum that might lead Syria into chaos.
Al-Sharaa, however, had his eye on the grand prize: Saudi Arabia, a crucial player seeking regional dominance, eager to bring Syria into the Saudi alliance and isolate it from Iran. Also aware of the UAE’s skepticism and Abu Dhabi’s fear of establishing a jihadist-ruled regime while also seeking its support to increase influence in the region, al-Sharaa sent clear messages that threats of jihadist rule were not genuine and that Syria was ready to be positioned as a pragmatic state committed to stability and prosperity, free from ideology.
These understandings did not stem from mutual trust or a coherent regional project but from the convergence of conflicting interests: Turkey focused on the Kurds, Qatar on proving its historical vindication, Saudi Arabia on diminishing Iranian influence, the UAE on containing political Islam, and Jordan on protecting its borders. With pragmatic intelligence, al-Sharaa reassured each stakeholder, without abandoning any axis. Thus, what appears to be a support network for the new government is, in essence, a tenuous web of mutual understandings that, when put together, constitute a lever granting acceptance and continuity.
Al-Sharaa reassured each stakeholder, without abandoning any axis. What appears to be a support network for the new government is, in essence, a tenuous web of mutual understandings that, when put together, constitute a lever granting acceptance and continuity
The Syrian and regional landscape reinforces the assumption that al-Sharaa’s transformation was a necessity, not a choice. There are pressing internal and external factors that pose a fundamental challenge to his rule. If they are not addressed with intelligence and pragmatism, al-Sharaa’s fate will likely be similar to that of others who insisted on approaches that contradicted their surroundings. Thus, the pragmatism of the transitional Syrian president is shaped by several drivers:
The major influential Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Israel, would never have allowed the creation of an Islamic emirate or a strict, radical government in Syria. Al-Sharaa understood the message clearly: either regional acceptance by adopting the nation-state approach and avoiding the language of radical groups and organizations, or confronting everyone all at once.
The region’s rejection of any ideological regime was just one of the obstacles. Global powers, especially Washington and Paris, would never have legitimized a new regime unless it completely abandoned its jihadist legacy, with the international community leading this effort. Through the network of regional understandings, particularly with Saudi Arabia, al-Sharaa was able to convince the US president that the new regime was not an extension of any ideological rule and that it was prepared to actively contribute to the vision of a new Middle East, including openness to Israel. From there on, the long chain of international acceptances of al-Sharaa began.
Historically, Syria has never been a country representing only one identity. Syrian society is like a mosaic, and any exclusionary effort risks causing further disintegration. Al-Sharaa understands that governance in Syria cannot rely on a single identity but must instead be based on a balanced mix of its diverse components. Despite his tolerance for all and his efforts to avoid the dilemma of sectarianism, social harmony remains very fragile, and it is hard to predict how things will develop with the Alawite, Druze, and Kurdish populations.
Over the past centuries, Syria has not experienced extremism, and Syrian society has always been open to the world. The regimes of Assad father and son lasted for over five decades, fostering a secular character in society. Additionally, many Syrians suffered greatly under the cover of al-Nusra, ISIS, and al-Qaeda, and most people strongly reject extremist ideological projects.
Therefore, the new Syrian regime knows it must have strong public support to survive. Perhaps al-Sharaa’s lesson is to adopt a practical national discourse, focus on development, work to improve living standards, and steer clear of extremist ideological paths to maintain control.
Al-Sharaa came to power at a time when Israel was basking in the euphoria of victory. Therefore, any hostile rhetoric could give Israel a pretext to end this rule before it even begins. The interim Syrian president has, to this day, ignored all Israeli actions, even expressing his openness to make peace with Israel if it served Syria’s national interests. These combined forces make al-Sharaa’s pragmatism an inevitable response to a complex geopolitical dynamic that intersects with an internal equation rejecting extremism and exclusion.
Some fear the trap hypothesis, and that al-Sharaa is setting it up for everyone by donning the mask of pragmatism and adopting the language of reality to ensure the permanent consolidation of his regime and tighten control over the state and all its apparatus, without any regional or international repercussions. He then returns to the jihadist legacy that propelled him to power.
On the other end of the spectrum, some believe that everyone has set a trap for al-Sharaa by assuring him of regional and international acceptance in exchange for abandoning his jihadist past and ideas about the government’s structure, effectively blocking his project. Later, they move to dismantle the entire regime after he loses the legitimacy of a revolutionary figure and is seen as someone who makes concessions to secure his continued rule.
However, reality shows that Shara’s personality is not naive. It’s unlikely that he has fallen into the regional trap, especially since Turkey is a major and genuine supporter of his regime. It would be implausible for him to resort to political taqiyya — a dissimulation that his vigilant environment would expose instantly and ruthlessly, as he knows well that the forces opposing his legacy are capable of overthrowing him at any moment. Therefore, al-Sharaa’s pragmatism is not just a mask, but a necessity for maintaining power within a regional and international system that does not tolerate ideological risks. Still, the real test of this pragmatism has not yet begun. The very equations that enabled his ascent may ossify into suffocating constraint should the interests of one actor clash with another.
The real test of pragmatism has not yet begun. The very equations that enabled his ascent may ossify into suffocating constraint should the interests of one actor clash with another
Three main scenarios are open to discussion:
The first scenario is that pragmatism succeeds in solidifying his rule and he gains entry into the “New Middle East” club, especially if he continues to present himself as a statesman capable of reconciling contradictions.
The second scenario is that the regime will collapse as the fragile balance of power falls apart due to a severe internal crisis or regional confrontation. Old suspicions will resurface, and al-Sharaa will be stuck in his jihadist past, unable to break free from it no matter how hard he tries.
The third scenario, which is the most dangerous, is that pragmatism itself will become problematic, seen as a fragile mask hiding an internal crisis of legitimacy and an inability to create a unifying national project.
Ultimately, it seems that the al-Sharaa regime cannot afford to choose between ideology and pragmatism. Instead, it is limited to a fragile path: managing a precarious equilibrium that will either consolidate an unprecedented legitimacy or unravel with alarming speed, hurling Syria back into the unknown.
In any case, one last question remains: Is this exceptional ability to quickly understand and adapt to pressing internal and external factors within and beyond the region the result of a singular mind? Or is there someone else behind the scenes providing significant assistance, including rehabilitation, to the new regime? Turkey might have a major stake, but others with even greater interests could be influencing the future of Syria’s new leader.
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