More than three years into Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the conflict has transformed international relations. What Moscow had conceived as a limited and rapid campaign has evolved into a protracted war that has reshaped the global strategic landscape. The confrontation has transcended the European theater and served as an entry point for non-European states to assert themselves into novel geopolitical equations. In particular, the war has pushed Russia to seek strategic alliances in Asia, notably with North Korea. What began as a tactical recourse to a breakdown of Russia’s military-industrial complex has developed into one of the most consequential bilateral tracks to emerge from the war. 

The Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) have unexpectedly established one of the most decisive alignments impacting both European and Asian security. Though Russian-DPRK ties have been on the upswing during the past decade, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 transformed the relationship as North Korea provided critical support for the Russian war effort. During the past year, Russian-DPRK interactions have expanded beyond military exchanges to encompass more non-defense spheres. This foundation could help sustain Russian-DPRK cooperation even when the Russia-Ukraine war ends.

North Korean Supplies to Moscow

North Korea has made critical contributions to Moscow’s war against Ukraine. Heads of Russian national security apparatus spectacularly misjudged the difficulties they would encounter in launching a full-scale invasion. They overestimated Russian military prowess and underestimated the will and capacity of the Ukrainian armed forces to resist. Anticipating a sweeping victory in a matter of days, the Russian military-industrial complex had not stockpiled the munitions or made other preparations required for what has morphed into a multi-year war.

Anticipating a sweeping victory in a matter of days, the Russian military-industrial complex had not stockpiled the munitions or made other preparations required for what has morphed into a multi-year war

The DPRK has adroitly filled this gap. At the time, North Korea was fortuitously the only possible foreign supplier that could rapidly deliver large stocks of Russian-compatible munitions. Many of the DPRK arms stockpiles and production facilities produced munitions that were compatible with those used by the Russian military, thanks to their common Soviet origins. North Korea began shipping munitions to Russia in the fall of 2023. By October 2024, Western analysts calculated that perhaps more than half the shells Russian troops employed in Ukraine came from North Korea.

According to a May 2025 report of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) tracking DPRK-related transactions that violate UN resolutions, North Korea has sent approximately 20,000 containers of military supplies to Russia since September 2023. These shipments have included 82mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, and 170mm shells for various Russian howitzers and canons, Bulsae-4 anti-tank missiles, Hwasong-11 (KN-23) and Hwasong-11B (KN-24) short-range ballistic missiles; and several types of DPRK self-propelled guns, multiple rocket launchers, and other combat and combat support vehicles. A network of entities, including Russian-flagged cargo vessels, orchestrate these covert shipments using multiple modes of transportation.

These DPRK deliveries have proved critical for the Russian war effort, due to both their sheer volume and their timing. Russian forces received the infusion when they were desperately preparing for Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive. With the new munitions, the Russian troops overmatched the Ukrainian artillery and stopped the Ukrainian ground forces from making major gains. Since then, Russian forces have exploited their artillery advantage to win several battles and occupy more Ukrainian territory.

Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become a war of attrition, the addition of the DPRK personnel besides deliveries of munitions has substantially aided the Russian war effort

Though less decisive militarily, thousands of soldiers and other DPRK nationals in Russia have helped ease Russia’s military recruitment drive and labor shortages. Thus far, North Korea has rotated approximately 15,000 soldiers into western Russia, where they helped expel Ukrainian troops from the Kursk Oblast. Various estimates put the number of DPRK soldiers killed or wounded in Russia at between 1,200 and 4,000. Perhaps, another 10,000 North Koreans worked in Russia last year, freeing up labor for the Russian military or other purposes. Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict has become a war of attrition, the addition of the DPRK personnel besides deliveries of munitions has substantially aided the Russian war effort.

Boosting Russian Power in Northeast Asia

Besides receiving near-term military help, the DPRK’s support also helps advance Moscow’s longer-term goals. These include demonstrating that Russia remains a major player in Northeast Asia, threatening the West for aiding Ukraine, and building a multipolar world in which the United States and its allies have less influence. Russian President Vladimir Putin has long been interested in improving relations with DPRK. The failure of DPRK-U.S. nuclear negotiations and the Russia-Ukraine war has now given him an opportunity to realize these plans.

Though the Kremlin has declined to confront NATO militarily for its robust defense support for Ukraine, supplying military-technical assistance to the DPRK demonstrates how Moscow can retaliate. In the longer term, a strong and secure North Korea aligned with Moscow against the West helps preoccupy South Korean and Japanese security managers and challenge U.S. power.

The longer term, a strong and secure North Korea aligned with Moscow against the West helps preoccupy South Korean and Japanese security managers and challenge US power

North Korea Gains Combat Experience

The DPRK has also gained from its stronger Russia ties. Relatively weak and isolated five years ago, it now finds itself with substantially improved military, diplomatic, and economic prospects.

Until recently, the North’s Korean People’s Army (KPA) has not fought a major war since 1953. The deployments in the Kursk Oblast have now ended that draught. Though KPA forces initially suffered heavy casualties due to their lack of combat practice, they received Russian training in modern warfare operations and reportedly improved their performance over time. The experience has also enabled the KPA to improve its tactics and weaponry through field testing. The KPA leadership is sharing these improvements beyond those forces that serve in Ukraine. For example, soldiers returning from Russia relayed their insights to colleagues at this May’s KPA Seventh Conference of Training Officers.

Military Modernization

Participating in Russia’s war has also allowed the North to modernize its stocks of ammunition and military manufacturing. Not only has the DPRK profitably discarded old ammunition stocks and replaced them with newly produced and likely better-quality munitions, but Russian orders have enabled the DPRK to expand and improve its defense manufacturing capacity. For example, DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un stated that the North now produces four times as many shells annually compared to previous years. Russia has also helped the North improve the guidance of its ballistic missiles and co-manufacture several drone models, including the long-range Shahed-136/Geran-2 strike drones widely used against Ukraine.

Russia has transferred other weapons systems to the KPA, including the Pantsir-class mobile air defense system and electronic warfare jamming equipment for cargo planes. South Korean intelligence assesses that Russia supplied the North with an advanced air-to-air missile that is superior to those manufactured in South Korea. Open-source reporting indicates that Russia has also agreed to give the North more advanced warplanes, possibly the Su-27 and the MiG-29. The North can leverage Russia’s defense industrial assistance for both its own rearmament and to sell better weapons to other clients besides Russia.

North Korea in Russia’s Diplomatic Sphere

The North has also benefited from elevated Russian diplomatic support. Assisting Russia’s war in Ukraine has elevated the North’s status in Moscow’s hierarchy of global partners. DPRK leaders now meet more often with their Russian counterparts than those of any other partners, including China. In March 2024, the Russian government vetoed renewal of the Panel of Experts the UN Security Council (UNSC) established in 2009 to report on DPRK-related sanctions implementation. South Korea, Japan, the United States, and eight additional UN members had to establish the independent MSMT.

Russia and North Korea also signed and ratified a Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2024. DPRK officials later cited Article 4 of the Treaty, which commits the parties to “provide military and other assistance” if either “is put in a state of war by an armed invasion,” to justify sending troops to Russia. In this May’s Victory Day military parade in Moscow celebrating the defeat of NAZI Germany, Putin shook the hands of attending KPA generals, marking their contributions to Russia’s recent war efforts.

Nuclear Weapons State

The Russian government may also help the DPRK achieve its ultimate goal of recognition as a de facto nuclear weapons state. In September 2024, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that given U.S. nuclear threats toward the DPRK and the expanding nuclear dimension of U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea, Moscow considered that pursuing the “denuclearization” of North Korea “no longer makes any sense. For us, this is off the table.” Lavrov used similar language to defend the DPRK nuclear weapons program following the July 2025 U.S. and Israeli bombing of Iran.

The Russian government may also help the DPRK achieve its ultimate goal of recognition as a de facto nuclear weapons state

Russia-North Korea Trade

Though China remains the North’s primary economic partner, Russian-DPRK commerce has substantially grown, which has boosted the overall North Korean economy.The DPRK has imported copious quantities of Russian oil, food and agricultural assistance, and dual-use technology. Given the colossal size of the North’s military sector, its integration into Russia’s defense supply chain has probably improved the North’s overall industrial capacity. The two countries use a Russian bank in South Ossetia, technically a separatist region of Georgia but under Moscow’s de facto control, to execute UNSC-banned transactions.

Moscow has also declined to adopt new or upgraded sanctions on the North, while Russian enforcement of existing sanctions has waned. Russia routinely ignores the UN-mandated caps that limit the quantity of refined petroleum products the DPRK can procure and the number of North Korean citizens that can work in Russia. The soldiers, laborers, and other DPRK nationals in Russia surrender a substantial portion of their salaries to the regime, further boosting the North’s revenue from Russia. The two governments are also launching new infrastructure projects, such as construction of their first road bridge over the Tumen River.

Future Scenarios

Moscow and Pyongyang both receive substantial benefits from their partnership, while the West has not imposed substantial costs on the parties to curtail it. For this reason, Russia-DPRK ties could strengthen further. Instead of covertly circumventing UN sanctions, Moscow might openly demand their removal. DPRK forces could deploy to additional parts of Ukraine. Russian warships and warplanes might regularly access North Korean ports and airfields. Further Russian infrastructure investment in North Korea could support greater bilateral economic exchanges.

The end of the Russia-Ukraine war, though, would remove a central pillar driving the Russian-DPRK partnership and clarify the relative power balance between Moscow and Pyongyang within their alignment. A post-Putin leadership could retread the path Moscow pursued in the early 1990s of abandoning Pyongyang to seek more profitable partnerships with Western countries. Even if the war does not soon end, the importance of the North’s military assistance to Moscow will decrease as Russia’s defense industries increase their indigenous production.

Furthermore, if Beijing were to challenge the Russia-DPRK alignment, Moscow would likely sacrifice its relations with the North rather than risk alienating China, Russia’s most important partner. These considerations likely explain the atypical alacrity with which the DPRK has seized opportunities to strengthen ties with Russia even at the cost of connections with other partners; Kim and his advisers recognize that Pyongyang’s leverage is at its apex now but could easily decline in coming years.