The Israeli strike on the Qatari capital, Doha, was not just a passing military operation but a moment that shattered the sense of immunity Gulf states had long believed was guaranteed under the American security umbrella. The shock was both severe and profound, reviving memories of the uncertainty that dominated US–Gulf relations between 2015 and 2022. This time, however, it laid bare the fragility of the Gulf security architecture and put the strategic partnership with Washington to a serious test.
American abandonment did not begin in Doha. It accumulated through pivotal phases: from the nuclear deal struck by the Obama administration with Tehran in 2015, disregarding the Arab Gulf’s concerns, to the trajectory of the Yemen war from 2015 to 2019, when allies were left to face mounting international pressure before Washington halted coalition forces at the gates of Hodeidah. Then came the 2019 Aramco strike, followed by the Houthis’ attacks on Abu Dhabi in 2022, exposing not only the vulnerability of the US defense umbrella but also Washington’s reluctance to provide political and military support commensurate with the scale of the threat.
Against this backdrop, the targeting of Doha appeared as the culmination of a long decline in American credibility. The strike was not perceived as an attack on Qatar alone but as an existential warning to the Gulf security sphere as a whole. More alarming was the sense that Washington refrained from intervening to stop the operation despite its presumed capacity to do so.
Thus, the strike unfolded into a multi-layered crisis: a security crisis as it crossed red lines that represented deterrence thresholds inside the Gulf states; a political crisis because it cast doubt on the limits of reliance on the US partnership; and a public crisis that undermined the narrative that Israel’s integration with the region (normalization) would provide the perceived cover of stability and prosperity.
Within this context, the targeting of a Gulf capital in this manner became a moment of profound reassessment, compelling Gulf states to rethink the foundations of their security and strategic partnerships; the strike showed that exclusive reliance on Washington is no longer sufficient, and it is in the Gulf’s interest to re-engineer its security on the basis of balance and diversification.
The strike showed that exclusive reliance on Washington is no longer sufficient, and it is in the Gulf’s interest to re-engineer its security on the basis of balance and diversification
The Nature of Gulf Decision-Making
Gulf behavior is generally characterized by caution and restraint, avoiding impulsive reactions. It is therefore unlikely that the Gulf states will make sudden leaps or completely pivot away from Washington. This explains the Qatari and broader Gulf discourse after the Doha strike. Despite shock and anger, official rhetoric avoided direct criticism of Washington, reaffirmed the partnership, and conveyed political messages without explicit naming. Qatar’s prime minister described the incident as a “betrayal,” without specifying who had committed the betrayal.
These states operate with measured practices rooted in a long tradition, eschewing populist rhetoric or cycles of mass mobilization. Hence, the shock will remain within closed-door deliberations, managed calmly and with in-depth assessments to determine the next steps, without provoking Washington, especially given that the current US president is prone to impulsive, unpredictable reactions.
The shock will remain within closed-door deliberations, managed calmly and with in-depth assessments to determine the next steps, without provoking Washington
Gulf Divergences and the Sensitivity of the Moment
Although the Arab Gulf states fall under the umbrella of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), their policies diverge and at times are even contradictory, particularly on issues such as Sudan, Libya, Syria, political Islam, or the Palestinian issue. Yet these divergences are managed with a delicate balance, stemming from a shared understanding that the GCC’s foreign policy is not collective, and that the council is closer to a framework of cooperation and coordination than a full union akin to the EU.
Today, however, despite the persistence of these differences, the targeting of Qatar revealed a general truth: Gulf security is organically interconnected, and a threat to one state is a threat to all. In the light of this realization, priorities of security integration advance, while rivalries over regional leadership recede. Security now takes precedence, as all development gains rest on stability. Accordingly, enhanced security coordination is expected to accelerate, though it is unlikely to reach the level of a unified defense umbrella.
No Immediate Alternative and Extracting the Possible from Washington
The Gulf states recognize that their security interdependence with the United States is structural, as their defense systems are tied to American hardware. Ready alternatives do not exist, and even if they do, shifting to them would require long timelines for training and adaptation. Moreover, Washington remains the world’s foremost power, and the costs of direct confrontation with it are high.
Thus, Gulf states will seek to convert assurances into verifiable arrangements: binding defense agreements that obligate Washington to defend their sovereignty and security in the event of an attack. This time, however, it is unlikely that they will settle for vague reassurances; instead, they will pursue institutional frameworks for US commitments.
Gulf states will seek to convert assurances into verifiable arrangements: binding defense agreements that obligate Washington to defend their sovereignty and security
While the current US administration may be open to such measures to restore trust, such agreements require lengthy processes involving military committees and congressional approval, and they could face serious obstacles from American legislators. Cognizant of this reality, Gulf states will also aim for other gains, such as easier arms deals, faster licensing and exemptions, and expanded technology transfers; however, these too are subject to congressional oversight, export controls, and political considerations, particularly those tied to the Israeli lobby.
In parallel, each state will exploit the moment politically to serve its own interests. Qatar will seek to repair its image by assuming a role in the Gaza conflict and pressing the United States to pressure Israel into opening crossings and allowing aid as a symbolic victory for Doha. Saudi Arabia will push for at least a symbolic political commitment to a two-state solution to assert its role as a regional leader defending Arab causes. The UAE will focus on arms deals, cyber defense, and artificial intelligence. Kuwait and Bahrain will fall within the orbit of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, while Oman will continue its traditional policies with a partial shift away from the caution that has long defined its Gulf posture.
Balance Instead of Exclusive Reliance
Whatever the outcome with Washington, the shock of the Doha strike will entrench a trajectory of balance and diversification. Gulf states will neither abandon their US ally nor rely solely on it. Accordingly, they are expected to enter deep negotiations with European and Asian states, and to a limited extent with Moscow and Beijing, to acquire defense systems that erode American monopoly, particularly in air defense, though such moves may face US vetoes.
The UAE appears to be the most prepared to advance in this direction, further building its strategic partnership with France and broad ties with South Korea, Russia, and China, alongside a development model built on comprehensive security. Qatar, despite its reliance on Al-Udeid Air Base, may pursue limited diversification and regional options. Saudi Arabia is moving more slowly but decisively, befitting its regional weight.
The Gulf states have multiple options to diversify their defense architectures without abandoning their traditional American ally. While maintaining the US backbone through Patriot and THAAD upgrades and binding defense assurances, they can open European and Asian windows via arms deals that strengthen tiered defenses and reduce vulnerability to external targeting.
The Gulf states have multiple options to diversify their defense architectures without abandoning their traditional American ally
Along this path, the European option stands out: Rafale fighter jets, as in Abu Dhabi’s 80-aircraft deal, European weapons packages, and tiered air defense systems such as SAMP/T and NASAMS to protect capitals and critical infrastructure. An Asian track is also emerging rapidly through South Korea and Turkey, with systems like M-SAM and drones.
Meanwhile, despite the complications of engaging with China and Russia, both remain available options within a balanced formula that avoids direct confrontation with Europe or the United States. The goal is a balanced procurement mix that reduces exclusive reliance on Washington through carefully chosen European and Asian alternatives, while reinforcing tiered defenses to safeguard the security that has always been the decisive factor in Gulf strategies.
Normalization and the Palestinian Question
The Gulf shock is unlikely to trigger a radical reversal in the trajectory of normalization with Israel, though it will slow its pace. The UAE and Bahrain will maintain the track, but with more visible caution. Saudi Arabia will tie progress to a full ceasefire in Gaza and an American commitment to a two-state solution. Qatar, meanwhile, will use the Palestinian issue to restore its regional standing by bolstering its mediator role in Gaza.
Features of a New Gulf Doctrine
The Doha strike dealt a direct blow to the Gulf doctrine regarding US security guarantees; it cannot be overcome through mere reassurance. There is a strong conviction that Washington has the practical capacity to rein in Israel within defined thresholds. Accordingly, Gulf states are likely to adopt several practical strategic tracks in the coming phase:
First, a comprehensive diversification across security, politics, and the economy, with a reconsideration of Gulf security integration and openness to new international partners.
Second, retaining Washington as the principal partner while gradually breaking away from its security monopoly, since Gulf actors recognize that a clean break with the United States would be inconsistent with their cautious approach.
Third, prioritizing shared security over intra-Gulf disputes, despite deep substantive divergences on Sudan, Libya, Syria, political Islam, and the Palestinian issue. But this calls for a broader practical coordination and ring-fencing non-urgent disagreements from the defense industry, procurement, and early warning and control technologies.
In a nutshell, the Doha strike inaugurated a new era in Gulf security: one of balance and of diversification. Washington is no longer the sole guarantor, normalization with Israel is no longer a political or security assurance, and security has become the overriding priority.
