Mapping the Security, Sectarian, and Strategic Contours of a Post- Assad Syria
After more than fifty years of Ba’ath Party rule, Syria today appears to be a country at a difficult and complex crossroads; as complex as the country itself, mostly due to its demographic and geographic composition. With each and every political change, including the one that took place in Syria, researchers fall into a classic fallacy where they believe that after the end of a long dictatorship, a healthy society will emerge with the wave of celebratory freedom that accompanies the process of change. People take to the streets and reignite their interest in public affairs and the nascent political life. During this time, it seems that anything is possible.
These expectations overlook the deep distortions that dictatorship leaves in society: corruption, chaos, dependency, the extent of injustices, demands for justice, and unbridled revenge. In Syria, both Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad did not reward anyone for being proactive, creative, or patriotic. The society of fear carefully engineered over a prolonged period of time conditioned a large number of Syrians to refrain from participating in the process of change. And for the Syrians, everything that was happening was in fact preparing the ground for the next dictator. This happens especially in the absence of political culture and traditions of dialogue, the ban on political parties, the focus on one-party rule, and rituals of worshipping the individual.
The Baath Party’s rule, which extended for more than sixty years, leaves most living Syrians with no knowledge of any other type of government. In a society where people are accustomed to sycophancy, reliance on family ties, kinship, clan, and their sectarian branch for social mobility, most of the population believes that these matters are standard life practices. The new regime is also surrounded by a crowd of people who want to replay the same roles played by their predecessors. They want to secure the new leader in a shell of personality worship, isolate him from the public, and return to previous practices.
So, is the recent political change capable of rescuing Syria, or will it sink the country into further chaos and civil war? There is a global benchmark to gauge governance: the first 100-day test of a ruler and his team. It shows what goals or promises are fulfilled and what are yet to be achieved. This standard is crucial because it determines the resilience of the ideas and promises made when faced with complexities of the nation’s realities.
Using this benchmark, one can examine what Ahmed al-Sharaa’s presidency promised and achieved, and where he failed in his first 200 days in Syria.
Al-Sharaa Government’s 200-Day Test
Ahmed al-Sharaa, the interim president of Syria, pledged to work to establish Syria as a peaceful country that does not seek war and does not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries in the region. He vowed to establish warm relations with Arab and foreign countries, including countries that sent forces to support the Bashar al-Assad regime such as Russia and Iran. This particular area of foreign policy appears to be the most significant success of the new regime in Syria. The regime has begun developing relations, which were almost frozen during Bashar al-Assad’s rule, with the Arab Gulf states. These countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, pledged to provide financial assistance for reconstruction and pay employee salaries. Numerous business contracts have been signed to develop electricity, water, internet infrastructure as well as Syrian air fleet and airports.
One of the most notable political successes of Al Sharaa was his meeting with US President Donald Trump in Saudi Arabia during the US president’s tour of the region. During the meeting, Washington announced it would freeze most, or all of the sanctions imposed by successive US administrations on Syria, a move Trump actually implemented upon his return to Washington. US sanctions, especially the Caesar Act, had prevented any country from establishing economic relations with Syria. Had they not lifted, it would have eliminated any chance for the new regime to succeed or improve the standard of living for Syrians.
Continuing the success in international diplomacy, Al-Sharaa visited Paris and met with President Emmanuel Macron at the Elysee Palace. A large number of European foreign ministers visited Damascus with promises of support in several fields, such as reconstruction and fighting terrorism, among others. Europe is also rooting for the success of the new rulers in Damascus to avoid a new wave of migration or persuade a large number of Syrian refugees in Europe to return to their country.
In return, the new Syrian government made promises to form a representative government in which all Syrian factions and sects participate and elect a new parliament within the framework of a new constitution for the country.
Constitutional Declaration
A conference organized by the government, dubbed the National Conference, was widely criticized for its hasty organization. No Kurds, Druze, or Alawites attended. The conference issued general recommendations, better ones of which can be found online, along with a constitutional declaration. The general impression of this declaration was that it avoided key issues such as the form of government and the identity of the state. It probably was a copy of the constitution declared by the previous regime. The declaration’s sole purpose was to provide legislative cover for the regime for five years. The new regime continued its legislative process by announcing the new parliament, with little explanation. The paragraph discussing parliament in the declaration represented a retreat even by standards of the fake parliaments of both Hafez al-Assad and his son’s eras. In fact, no one specified how the participating figures would be selected or the nature of their representation. Suffice it to say that the legitimate president chooses one-third of the members, and the remaining two-thirds are chosen by a committee he appoints. Likewise, in the transitional justice process, another committee was formed in the same manner, but nothing concrete was issued.
Avoiding key issues such as the form of government and the identity of the state, the new regime’s constitutional declaration offered it legislative cover for five years.
A large number of Syrians expressed their anger on social media at seeing figures who participated in or funded the regime’s forces or affiliated militias receiving special treatment and personal protection teams. They returned to the spotlight based on a national reconciliation program that offered no standards for accountability or amnesty. Some financial figures from the former regime signed some of the reconstruction contracts, while the remaining contracts were signed with companies without announcing any tenders. State property and the property of figures from the former regime were seized and simply settled by officials and figures close to the new regime, without any attempt to sell them at public auction or benefit the national economy. These assets are estimated to be worth billions.
Following the constitutional declaration, the government formation process proved equally disappointing, with only one woman appointed to simultaneously represent both women and Christians. The Druze and Alawites declared that the two figures representing their sects did not, in fact, represent them. The Kurds mocked the Kurdish figure who was given a marginal ministerial position. All the key sovereign positions went to former leaders of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, some of whom are wanted internationally due to their jihadist past. Have the forces governing Syria today profoundly changed (knowing that its roots are Salafist jihadists who espouse al-Qaeda’s ideology)?
Political Steps of New Rulers of Damascus
The new regime began its political journey by changing the name of its leader from the jihadist name of Abu Muhammad al-Julani. Al-Julani moved from being an activist and leader of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, to the Islamic State in Iraq, and to the Levant (ISIS), and to Jabhat al-Nusra, which linked to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Later, he joined Jabhat al-Nusra, which severed its ties with al-Baghdadi and pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, and then to Jabhat al-Nusra, which severed its ties with al-Qaeda and transformed into a Syrian jihadist movement joined by roving jihadists from Central Asia, Egypt, France, and Belgium.
Al-Julani returned to his original family name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, the family that settled in Damascus after the 1967 war and was displaced from Al Julani area after the region fell into Israeli hands. The message al-Sharaa wants to convey is a break with his jihadist past and a connection with another past, one of Damascene inclinations and that of being born in Saudi Arabia. The symbolic step remained symbolic because it did not involve anyone other than al-Julani himself. He did not specify whether the break was only with his personal jihadi past, or does it include the Salafi jihadi thought?
While Al-Sharaa formally severed his organizational ties with Al-Qaeda, he has yet to renounce its ideological legacy; he did not confirm whether he had broken away from Al-Qaeda as a creed. Some other matters in the world of scenography specific to Al-Sharaa are his declarations about the end of the revolution and the birth of the state. He also announced of severing ties with all regional issues to focus only on Syria. While doing this, Al-Sharaa ignored two key factors, the first intellectual and the second practical. The intellectual side is that he announced what he left behind his past but did not mention what he adopted as an alternative. The fact that he is now only Syrian means that he has abandoned the transnational Salafi jihadi internationalism. The Salafi ideology in all its manifestations is a transnational thought. The other dilemma of a practical nature is that he acted as president in a way that reminds of his jihadi past and gave key positions in the new Ministry of Defense to former colleagues in jihad in the new Syrian army.
Victory Conference
After the first symbolic step of al-Sharaa changing his name or restoring his family name, came the second step. In reality, this step came as manipulation and opportunism, as the Sweida governorate is under the control of various factions, most of which are hostile to the Damascus regime. A conference called the “Victory Conference” was held to unify over 18 military factions into a new national army. All military factions pledged to integrate and assimilate into the new Syrian army. However, the pledge of the faction leaders to dissolve their militias and join a new army are mere promises that have not been fulfilled so far.
Internal Challenges and Local Power Balances
Presence of unaccountable militias
The Druze militias in the Sweida governorate, with the support of religious authorities, publicly refuse to dissolve their forces. And what makes matters worse is that there is more than one militia in Sweida, some of which are loyal to the Damascus government, which may portend local fighting. In neighboring Daraa as well, a number of varying military factions maintain their presence, some of which are loyal to Damascus, while others refuse the entry of Damascus forces into Daraa. An additional factor was added to this dilemma with Israel warning the Damascus government not to expand and spread into the three southern provinces: Quneitra, Daraa, and Sweida, due to their proximity to the Israeli border. This warning hindered the Damascus government’s ability to impose its control over these provinces. In any case, Israel warned the new regime that its presence would not be accepted in all the southern governorates that share borders with Israel.
In the east, the agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces seems unclear as the remaining factions pledged to dissolve themselves but did not follow suit. The agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces, however, does not include this pledge at all. Rather, the agreement entrusted these forces with new tasks, such as fighting ISIS.
In the rest of the provinces controlled by the Damascus government, the government’s success rate in controlling matters varies, with things looking disastrous on the Syrian coast. Many militias, including foreign jihadists, are acting as they please in cities such as Latakia, Tartus, Jableh and Baniyas. Some of these militias have committed horrific massacres against Alawites. More bodies are being discovered and leaked videos show horrific violations against the population. Some of these violations include the burning of homes, farms, and crops, in an apparent effort to displace the population. Thousands are sheltering at the Russian military base of Hmaimeem, near the city of Jableh, or have crossed the border into Lebanon. The Damascus government has threatened them to return immediately without guarantees of safety. If they do not return, their properties will be confiscated. If they do, there is no guarantee of safety.
While the rest of the factions and foreign jihadists are wreaking havoc, the Damascus forces, affiliated with “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” appear to be the most disciplined. Still, this has not prevented individuals from participating in violations.
Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama
In Aleppo, the first major city where the regime was expelled during the recent offensive, the security situation is very fragile. Acts of revenge are taking place not based on the unrest the country witnessed over the past fourteen years. Kidnappings with ransom demands and robberies are widespread. The city is controlled by a mixture of militias known for their corruption when they operated in the northern countryside. They have practically metamorphosed into gangs of highwaymen. The Damascus government appears helpless or indifferent to what is happening there.
In Hama, the remnants of the Ahrar al-Sham faction control the city, with a symbolic presence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham forces, whose code name has become General Security. In Homs, the bad security situation, chaos and attacks on Alawites and Christians have stopped. During the days of the massacres against the Alawites in coastal areas, Damascus forces thwarted an attempt to attack the Alawite neighborhoods in Homs and in the Alawite, Ismaili and Christian countryside of Homs and Hama. Things seem under less control with attacks on villages or ambushes against residents, but there are fewer killings now. However, there is widespread sectarian animosity and attempts at humiliation.
In the north, military factions linked to Türkiye continue to control large areas along the Syria-Turkey border, estimated at about 900 kilometers. The only city where security control is at a reasonable level is the capital, Damascus, due to the presence of the ruling regime, foreign embassies, and the press. Although there are still kidnappings, armed robberies, and street justice. In practical terms, the actual presence of Damascus forces is limited to the capital itself, Aleppo, Homs, and Idlib. The coast, with various violations of this control and manifestations of security chaos, followed the Victory Conference.
Lack of Basic Infrastructure & a Middle Class
The state suffers from a near-paralysis in the electricity, internet, and energy sectors due to the control of the Kurdish autonomous administration. The hospitals’ conditions appear catastrophic, as do most of the service departments, which are now controlled by people who have no knowledge of the nature of the challenges they face. The security situation seems worse. The oil and gas fields and the agreement signed in Damascus between the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces and the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, are still unclear. Many basic issues have yet to be agreed upon such as the percentage of oil sharing.
In a post-Bashar Al-Assad Syrian society, the middle class is decimated. Most of them left the country during the period of unrest and were able to build new lives abroad and educate their children in new countries. They will find it difficult to return to their previous lives, which means that the new regime faces the challenge of rebuilding the country without the presence of the middle class.
Druze, Alawite, and Christian Minorities: Role and Concerns
The rise of Islamists to power, for instance the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the rule of Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib, and the Islamic State in Mosul and Raqqa – these past experiences of Iraq and Egypt raise legitimate concerns about ethnic and religious minorities. However, the most fundamental problem has always been the Islamists attempt to impose a fanatical vision of Islam on the broader Sunni communities that disagree with this vision.
In the experience of Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham’s rule in Idlib, all these fears are real. Although Idlib and its countryside are a highly religiously conservative region, the model presented by Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham was widely condemned by civil and religious forces. Since the first days of Idlib’s rule, the Druze were brutally suppressed, Christians migrated to regime-controlled areas such as the coast, Damascus, and Aleppo, and moderate Sunni voices were silenced. The relationship between the Druze and the new rulers of Damascus were extremely bad during the Syrian unrest that began fourteen years ago.
When the “Al-Nusra Front” occupied areas in Idlib, particularly Jabal al-Summaq, which is inhabited by a Druze minority, there were clashes between the two sides. When al-Nusra, the predecessor to Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, took control, it forced the Druze population to adopt the Salafi form of Islam and even monitored residents to force them to attend mosques. All of this has created a precarious relationship between al-Nusra and its successor, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, something unlikely to change anytime soon. This model, which met with opposition in a conservative city like Idlib, would turn into a disaster in a diverse city like Damascus, which has schools with a quite different version of Sunni Islam.
Damascus and Aleppo, for centuries, have been dominated by Sufi and Ash’ari schools with their various trends, so much so that the people of Damascus call this model “Shami Islam”, which is essentially an Islam that accepts others who are different, like Jewish, Christian, and the Shiite, and deals with them daily in trade and social occasions. The only red line of “Shami Islam” is marriage relations and intermarriage.
Non-Syrian Salafi Preachers
The most worrying thing in Damascus is the itinerant preachers with long beards who spread out in garbs – clothes similar to Islamic preachers in Afghanistan – using loudspeakers trying to convert Christians in Damascus to Islam. Streets in Damascus have witnessed clashes between local residents and these “preachers.” Most of these preachers are not of Syrian origin but Chinese Turkestani, Tajik, Uzbek, some Saudis, and Jordanians. Problems did not take long to appear, whether in minority or majority neighborhoods alike. The non-Syrian Salafi preachers are causing trouble everywhere – starting from the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus to the neighborhoods with Christian, Alawite, and Ismaili constituencies and in the Sunni mosques in Hama and Aleppo. But the al-Sharaa government in Damascus seems uninterested in controlling the preachers and unwilling to engage with them. Despite popular demand to control them, the Damascus government has distanced itself from them. The unrest that is happening because of these people in the streets of Damascus, Hama and Aleppo has turned into a bloodbath in the Alawite areas.
Coastal Massacre
Following the news of attacks on the new Damascus regime forces by supporters of the former regime, calls for jihad began in the pulpits of mosques, and al-Sharaa himself participated in them. An organized group began committing massacres in Alawite villages, and the death toll reached thousands of victims. It followed waves of mass flights towards the Lebanese border and to the Russian Khmeimim military base near the city of Jableh.
What happened was a shock in Syrian circles, and it seemed that Damascus’ demand to control the Kurdish or Druze areas was completely baseless. There were also demands for international protection for the Alawite and Christian areas on the Syrian coast. The reaction of Damascus and al-Sharaa — to what happened — was very weak. No mourning or apology was shared. Moreover, the supporters of the new regime, after initially denying the occurrence of these massacres, returned and praised the acts. They considered that all Alawites deserved what happened to them because of their alleged participation in violations of the former regime. Amidst this, what is the fate of ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Syriacs, Assyrians, Armenians, and Circassians? And what is the future of religious minorities: Christians, Druze, Alawites, Ismailis, and Shiites?
Messages from neutral Syrian intellectuals did not reach the supporters of the new regime. The messages pointed out that violations of the former regime were the work of people from all sects. It added that not all leaders of the former regime had left the country and some figures, especially those who were not Alawites, roamed freely in the country. The Alawites felt safe from those who did not flee because they had not participated in any violations. Some of them had also joined the new regime.
Sectarian Discrimination
Currently most of the state structures appear to be damaged, this problem was exacerbated after the new regime dismissed a large number of state employees due to suspicions of their cooperation with the previous regime or for sectarian reasons. For example, Alawites constituted a sizable percentage of state employees, especially in the field of education and higher education due to their control over the system of foreign scholarships and study abroad. Additionally, their current fear of sectarian violence, after the massacres that took place on the Syrian coast, will hinder their reintegration into the state.
The New Covenant men have expelled most Alawites from government jobs. Alawite areas are witnessing frightening unemployment as a large number of the children of the sect were working in government jobs as teachers, doctors, and nurses, or in the dissolved army or security services. Despite warnings from Western and American security services of armed attacks on churches, a suicide bomber blew himself up in an Orthodox church in Damascus, killing dozens.
The Syrian government accused ISIS, but an organization that was close to the government until three months ago, Ansar al-Sunna, claimed responsibility for the attack. This organization announced itself because of its objections to what it described as the tolerance of Sharia law towards other sects and excessive pragmatism in the immediate implementation of Islamic Sharia law. Thus the Christians joined the Druze, who were subjected to humiliating treatment after their areas near Damascus were stormed, the Alawites, who are still suffering the repercussions of the attack in their areas, and the Kurds, who are still considered by the supporters of the new regime to be the greatest enemy of the regime of Ahmed al-Sharaa.
Regional Acceptance: Between Caution and Common Interests
Relations with neighboring countries, however, have been much less successful. Countries in the region had varying opinions on the political change in Damascus. Türkiye and Qatar considered themselves victorious in the conflict due to their covert ties with “Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham,” the faction controlling most of the country. Qatar strongly resisted the UAE-led efforts to re-establish the Assad regime. And Türkiye, which has military and security ties with “Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham” due to its coordination with it over the past years, joined the usurpers.
Immediately after the “fall” of Damascus, Saudi Arab joined the new regime, and there appeared to be a shared desire between Damascus and Riyadh to improve relations. Riyadh considered what had happened was a weakening of the Iranian project in the region, especially after the defeat suffered by Hezbollah in Lebanon. It began almost immediately to communicate with the new Damascus government.
Egypt, the most important Arab country, followed suit after much hesitation due to its fears of Egyptian jihadists being in the ranks of the new leaders in Damascus. The country was also apprehensive about Muslim Brotherhood ties to the new regime. However, Egypt eventually joined after receiving assurances that Egyptian elements among the jihadists had been arrested. Furthermore, no trace of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood organization appeared in the new governing structures. Egypt welcomed the new Syrian regime, but the media controlled by the government still wages a broad campaign against the new regime in Syria. The Egyptian media accuses the new regime of being allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, against which the Egyptian authorities have been waging a relentless war since the overthrow of the regime of former President Mohamed Morsi. Jordan was also among those welcoming the change in Damascus after having long suffered from smuggling of Captagon across its borders by the Damascus regime.
As for Iraq, relations are still very tense despite a short visit by the Syrian Foreign Minister to Baghdad after a few security meetings. Iraq fought Shiite factions close to the Iraqi government along with Bashar al-Assad and appeared very hesitant and sent its intelligence chief, Hamid al-Shatri, to Damascus. The two capitals did not show great enthusiasm for rapprochement. A wall of mistrust between the two sides prevented the development of a relationship. The regime in Baghdad could not ignore that the interim Syrian president was one of the jihadists in Iraq who fought in the ranks of al-Qaeda against the American army and against Iraqi Shiite factions. Also, most of the new Syrian structure comes from a jihadist al-Qaeda background that previously worked in Iraq.
President Al-Sharaa did not participate in the Arab Summit in Baghdad, despite the Iraqi government extending an official invitation. Baghdad expressed concerns about the fate of the small Shiite minority in Syria and the Shiite religious shrines in Damascus and other provinces. Baghdad blames Damascus for controlling the holy Shiite sites; they are also accusing the new regime of persecuting the Shiite and Alawite minorities in the country.
Damascus, for its part, has confirmed that it will protect the Shiite religious sites and not hinder the practice of their faith. The approaching date of some Shiite religious occasions seems to be decisive in the development of relations between the two sides. In any case, the border between the two sides is calm and there have been no attempts to breach or clashes, but the relationship seems likely to deteriorate with any future incident.
With Lebanon, meetings were held at the highest levels, but all problems remain unresolved such as the issues of demarcating the land border, the return of refugees from Lebanon, Syrian funds held in Lebanese banks, and the issue of Syrian prisoners in Roumieh prison, or the older issue of Lebanese prisoners in Syria. The border witnessed several short clashes, but they were contained. Ultimately, the Lebanese-Syrian relationship is linked to all regional issues, from the fate of Hezbollah, the situation of Christians in Syria, and Iran’s role in the region after the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel.
The Lebanese-Syrian relationship is linked to all regional issues, from Hezbollah to the situation of Christians in Syria, and Iran’s role in the region after the twelve-day war between Iran and Israel.
Tensions with Israel
The greatest regional tension came from Israel. From the very first day of the fall of the Assad regime, the Israeli Air Force destroyed most of the remnants of the Assad army, including headquarters and weapons, for fear of them falling into the wrong hands. But this was only the beginning. Israel developed a new strategy that stipulates rejecting the deployment of Damascus forces in the three southern provinces of Quneitra, Daraa and Sweida. This later developed into a threat to Damascus not to touch the Druze minority in Sweida or any of the suburbs of Damascus. Israel accompanied its threats with a ground advance on Mount Hermon and completed the occupation of the buffer zone that was under the control of the UN Disengagement Forces and penetrated the western Daraa province.
Understanding Between Israel and Syrian Druze
It indicated a kind of alliance between Israel and a movement within the Druze leadership led by the Sheikh of the Druze community in Syria, Hikmat al-Hijri. This is something that the Sheikh of the Druze community in Israel, Sheikh Muwaffaq Tarif, has been talking about openly and has been working for years to exploit the relationship with the Druze of Sweida.
Of course, all these developments were met with rejection from Damascus. The relationship with Sweida province became tense after Druze leaders refused the entry of forces from Damascus into the province. Although this is not new.
Israel’s behavior also does not help. It is still expanding its areas of control in the Golan Heights and the city of Quneitra, and sometimes extends towards the villages of Daraa, and set up checkpoints to search civilians and prevent the presence of Al Sharia forces in three southern governorates. In addition, Israel is trying to present itself as the protector of the Druze in the Sweida Governorate, and encouraging the most important cleric in Sweida, Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, to reject Damascus’s demands or give up his weapons.
The Road to Abraham Peace Accords
On the streets of Tel Aviv, a banner bearing President Al Sharaa’s image appeared alongside images of Arab leaders who had signed, or were about to sign, the Abraham Accords, a peace agreement between Arab countries and Israel. The prospect of President Sharaa, who last year was a jihadist pledging to liberate Jerusalem, joining the accord seemed more like a science fiction movie. Al Sharaa received a delegation of American Jews of Syrian origin with whom he spoke of his desire for peace. The delegation was allowed to begin the process of rehabilitating a historic synagogue in Damascus. The US envoy to Syria spoke of regular meetings held by people close to Al Sharaa with Israeli officials, in which all disagreements between the two sides were discussed. Despite his repeated statements that he does not intend to attack or incite against Israel, it appears the road to the new regime in Damascus joining the Abraham Accords is extraordinarily long.
Al Sharaa may send reassuring messages in all directions, but convincing his hardline colleagues may seem impossible. The jihadists who have become ministers and rulers may agree to a long-term truce or a pledge not to act against Israel. They will find in the books of Islamic heritage what justifies their position on the truces concluded by the Prophet Muhammad with the Jews or other “enemies”, but the signing of a peace agreement, the normalization of relations, and the establishment of an Israeli embassy in Damascus seem beyond their imagination for these temporary or conditional truces.
Moreover, this supposed peace will be met with strong opposition in Israel, whether from extremist politicians or from the military establishment, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will be reminded of his attempt to contain Hamas and facilitate the provision of funds to it, which ended with the attack of October 7.
Notably, Syria differs from the rest of the countries of the Abraham Accords. These countries are geographically far from Israel and do not have territories occupied by it. While Israel is occupying the Syrian Golan Heights since 1967, and there are UN resolutions demanding its withdrawal from it. This dilemma seems intractable as President Al Sharaa cannot give up the Golan Heights, lest it appears that the era of Assad, father and son, has rejected all American offers for a partial withdrawal from the Golan, and a Sunni Islamist with a jihadist background comes along and agrees. In addition, the sectarian issue seems very apparent here, as Al Sharaa will not allow himself to record in history that the Sunnis in Syria have agreed to what the Alawites have repeatedly rejected.
President Al Sharaa cannot give up the Golan Heights, otherwise it would appear that the Assad regimes — father and son — rejected all American offers of partial withdrawal from the Golan, only for a Sunni Islamist with a jihadist background to come along and surrender it.
On the other hand, Al Sharaa will not be able to demand the return of the Golan Heights, because no leader in Israel agrees to hand over the strategic heights that control all of northern Israel to the ‘’Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’’ organization, which was on the global terrorist lists until recently, nor even to the new Syrian army, which includes international jihadists from Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Afghans, whom President Sharaa allowed to join this army in one of the strangest decisions taken by the new regime. In an attempt to provide a romantic solution to this problem, the Israelis proposed that the Golan Heights be a “Garden of peace”, which is similar to an old proposal that was made by former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin during the era of former Syrian President Hafez al-Assad.
Away from the rosy dreams, no determination has been made as to who will have sovereignty of this peace garden, nor the fate of the Israeli settlers in the Golan, nor the future of more than twenty thousand Syrian citizens living in the occupied villages in the Golan, such as Majdal Shams and Buqaata. Incidentally, these Syrians in the Golan belong to the Druze sect, and the sect in general is experiencing a conflict with the new rulers of Damascus and refuses the entry of President AL Shara’s forces into its areas in the Sweida Governorate.
Overall, the region’s reaction to the change in Damascus offers a glimmer of hope for Syrians. The Syrian population hopes the wealthy Gulf states will contribute to reconstruction or help alleviate the current harsh living conditions through financial support or oil and gas. Indeed, it appears that many countries have hope for the success of the Damascus experiment. The Gulf states have a real interest in curtailing Iranian expansion, or what is known as the Shiite Crescent, which threatened their security, especially Saudi Arabia, which has a large Shiite community in the east of the country.
The Kurdish Issue in Syria
Origins and the 1960 Census
In the world before the emergence of the Syrian state after World War I, the Syrian Jazira, between the Tigris and Euphrates, was a land for Syriacs, Kurds, and some Arab tribes. When there were no borders, as long as it was all part of the Ottoman Empire, there were no differences between the Kurds of Syria and Türkiye in areas such as Qamishli -which became part of independent Syria- and the Turkish city of Nusaybin. There were kinship ties, marriages, and migration.
After the establishment of the Syrian state, the Syrian Jazira continued to welcome waves of Kurdish migration from Türkiye. The Kurds moved for natural reasons such as migration for work, herding, agriculture, marriage, and settlement. Apart from these, they also relocated whenever the relationship between Türkiye and its Kurds became complicated until the 1960 census. Successive Syrian governments (the rule of Abdel Nasser in Syria, the secessionist government, and the Baath Party) considered anyone registered as Syrian before this census to be of Syrian nationality. These governments refused to recognize anyone who came after that. Therefore, a substantial portion of Kurds remained unregistered and unrecognized as Syrians, in addition to the population’s custom of refusing to register births. They also avoid military service.
Kurdish Demands Before 2011 Movement
The demands of the Kurdish parties before the Syrian revolution in 2011 were limited to the recognition of all stateless persons, in addition to cultural demands such as the recognition of the Kurdish language as one of the official languages in the country, and general national demands such as the right to form parties and political participation. During the era of both Hafez al-Assad and his son, all of these demands were rejected, and Kurdish activists regularly visited Syrian prisons and intelligence agencies.
Al-Assad’s Alliance with Türkiye
On the other side of the equation, the regime established working relations with a section of Turkish Kurds demanding secession, namely the Kurdistan Labor Party, led by Abdullah Ocalan. These relations included the provision of weapons and training, in addition to drug smuggling activities. Then, the Hafez al-Assad regime was forced to abandon this relationship under pressure from Turkish military threats in 1998. Bashar Al-Assad established an alliance with Ankara after the Justice and Development Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan came to power in Türkiye in 2002. After that, Syrian markets were opened to Turkish goods, and citizens of both countries began to move freely. This relationship was consolidated after the regime was isolated by the Arab world due to accusations of being behind the assassination of Rafic Hariri. In practice, Türkiye became the sole ally of the Bashar Al-Assad regime.
Kurds’ Demands Addressed
As a reflection of this alliance, the relationship between the Bashar regime and the Kurds deteriorated significantly. Bloody events took place such as the burning of the Hasakah prison, and clashes between Arab tribes and Kurds following a dispute over a football match. The clashes extended to the Kurdish neighborhoods of Damascus. The relationship between Damascus and Qamishli was only saved by the outbreak of the Syrian revolution in March 2011 and Türkiye’s support for the Syrian opposition. Then, the regime quickly responded to most of the Kurds’ human rights and cultural demands and even handed over security and livelihood responsibilities in the Kurdish-majority areas to the Kurdistan Union Party, the successor to the Kurdistan Labor Party. During the Syrian events, the Islamic State (ISIS) expanded into large areas of the Syrian Jazira and almost completely eliminated the Kurdish areas. Had it not been for the intervention of the United States and its allies in the international coalition to fight ISIS.
Kurds Establish Autonomous Governance Authority
The Kurds took advantage of the defeat of ISIS and took control of large areas that included Arab cities such as Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa. They established the Autonomous Governance Authority and its military apparatus, the Syrian Democratic Forces, to which they incorporated groups of Syriacs. The Arabs also controlled the main oil and gas areas in Syria. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, it seemed that the stage was open to a broad confrontation between the new rulers and the Kurds, especially with the feelings of hatred prevailing between the two sides. The Kurds consider that the new rulers, or at least some of them, were part of the Islamic State organization, which committed horrific violations in the Syrian Jazira, especially against the Kurdish Yazidi sect. Also, the new government is allied with the so-called Syrian National Army, supported by Türkiye, which includes factions that fought the Kurds and seized their areas in Afrin, north of Aleppo, and in Ras al-Ain in Jazira.
The new rulers of Damascus consider the Autonomous Administration Authority an extremist secular group, the heir to the Marxist ideology of the Kurdistan Labor Party. It views it as an agent of the United States seizing Arab areas in which there is no Kurdish presence, besides its control over oil and gas fields. The whole scene was very prepared for a bloody confrontation between the two sides, the features of which actually began in the battles that took place near the Tishrin Dam in the city of Manbij.
New Regime, SDF strike deal
Contrary to all expectations, and in the wake of the massacres against the Alawites on the coast, everyone was surprised by the signing of an agreement between the Syrian transitional president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces, General Mazloum Abdi. This agreement came in the form of a declaration of intent and vague general outlines, and every line of it requires negotiation.
For example, it did not specify the form of oil sharing or security control over the borders with Iraqi Kurdistan and Türkiye, nor did it specify the ultimate fate of the Syrian Democratic Forces—whether they would join the army as individuals or as a military bloc. In any case, the two sides began negotiating sessions that resulted in a preliminary agreement on the Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo. Observers believe that the possibility of a military confrontation is unlikely as long as US forces are deployed in Kurdish areas to protect the prisons holding ISIS members. Everyone is awaiting the Trump administration’s next move.
The Sunni Dilemma (The Mother of All dilemmas)
In the first days of the new rule in Damascus, one of Damascus’ most prominent religious figures, Osama Al-Rifai, was welcomed back from Türkiye. Before he was forced to leave Syria because of his opposition to the former regime. The celebration of Sheikh Al-Shami also extended to his attendance at all major events in the Republican Palace, such as the constitutional declaration and the new government before he was personally appointed Grand Mufti of the country. This appointment sparked a wave of anger in Salafi circles that support al-Sharaa, and social media pages circulated accusations of heresy, polytheism, the sanctification of graves, and outright excommunication.
In mosques, the battle was not virtual, and the Sufi and Salafi crowd fought on the pulpits, and the new leadership was accused of trying to impose a model of Islam that was not compatible with Damascus, Aleppo, and Hama. The problem in the world of Islamic fundamentalism, and its never-ending race towards extremism, is countless intellectual sources drawn from the Wahhabi jihadist sheikhs of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Libya. They are in a constant state of conflict, and most of the time, this conflict is not fought in words. Dozens of clashes and accusations of blasphemy have occurred between Salafist jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra, Jaysh al-Islam, Ahrar al-Sham, and Bayt al-Maqdis. Even today, Salafist takfiris, most of whom are non-Syrian, play a prominent role within the new ruling elite. Moving forward, between the outbreak of civil war and the collapse of the country – the possibilities of which are increasing day by day and the Sunni-Sunni conflict may be another cause of disagreement.
International Sanctions and Reconstruction: Reshaping of Power
US Backing of Syrian Opposition
With the beginning of the civil war in Syria, the United States, under the administration of President Barack Obama, provided military and political support to the Syrian opposition. The US established a joint military operations room on the Turkish side of the Syrian-Turkish border with Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Politically, Washington organized the Friends of the Syrian People Group, which includes more than seventy countries, to support the political transition in Syria. Obama’s Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, emerged as the most enthusiastic supporter of the victory of the Syrian opposition.
Reversal in Policy
Everything was reversed during Obama’s second presidency. Most of the Free Syrian Army factions, which were the de facto military arm of the Syrian opposition, were mostly eliminated or marginalized by extremist Islamic brigades such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam. Then the Nusra Front absorbed these factions. This was in western Syria, while in the east, what is known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled most areas and cities, including oil wells and gas fields. All of this changed the American view of the Syrian scene. First, Washington decided that what was happening west of the Euphrates River was a civil war and America would only interfere in matters related to fighting terrorism.
Moscow Decimates Syrian Opposition
Accordingly, the second Obama administration’s Secretary of State, John Kerry, entrusted Moscow with handling the situation west of the Euphrates. And Washington devoted itself to fighting ISIS in alliance with the Kurds and their military faction, the Syrian Democratic Forces. At the time, Moscow nearly eliminated the Syrian opposition with the help of Assad’s forces and seized most of the areas militarily or through what is known as reconciliations. Moscow deported those who rejected Assad’s rule to Idlib Governorate, which remained with only areas of northern Aleppo as the only land of the Syrian opposition. A political solution was absent in the vortex of UN envoys.
Dr. Sebastian Gorka, senior counterterrorism expert at the US National Security Council, says: “The Syrian situation is complex. Anyone who tells you they know Syria’s future is lying. Everything about it is fluid and volatile. It is a country open to all possibilities. No one shed tears over the fall of the Assad regime. With its fall, the supply routes to Iran’s proxies in the region are cut off. This is good.”
Status of Syrian Mission to UN
Dr Gorka adds, “But the truth is, what we have today in Damascus is the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, who was a founding member of the al-Nusra Front, an offshoot of al-Qaeda. He, al-Sharaa, believes that Islamic law will be the law of Syria, which includes Kurds, Christians, Alawites, and Druze.”
The US official’s statements came after a decision by the US State Department to amend the legal status of the Syrian mission to the United Nations. Syrian mission to the UN is now not recognized by the United States. A US State Department official said: “The United States does not currently recognize any entity as the government of Syria.”
What the State Department did not say was said by President Donald Trump during his reception of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The day Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham forces entered into Damascus, President Trump made a statement praising Turkish President Erdoğan, saying: “Turkey has been striving for control of Damascus for two thousand years, and it has finally achieved that.” He added: “I congratulated Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on his takeover of Syria.” Trump concluded his remarks by saying, “We, Washington, are satisfied with that.” He added that although Erdogan initially refused to acknowledge this, he eventually did. Trump added: “Any problems between Turkey and Israel in Syria, I can resolve them because I am a friend of the Turkish president.” These American positions are not very surprising.
The scene may seem like a complex set of inexplicable complications. Washington supports the Kurdish Autonomous Administration in eastern Syria, deployed forces during the war against ISIS, and retained them to protect the region after ISIS’s defeat. Despite repeated statements during Trump’s first term about his intention to withdraw US forces from eastern Syria, he avoided making a decision during his second term, and Ankara has repeatedly affirmed that it will not accept any special status. For the Kurds in eastern Syria to avoid their influence spreading to the Kurdish regions in Turkey.
The Mystery of US Envoy Thomas Barrack
Despite the US decision to freeze sanctions on Syria for six months and President Trump’s meeting with Al Sharaa, the US administration avoided appointing an ambassador to Damascus. It instead chose to appoint the US ambassador to Turkey as a special envoy to Syria. This may seem like a mere measure to avoid establishing diplomatic relations with a regime that had just emerged from the shadow of terrorism, or a trial period to monitor the behavior of the new regime in Damascus.
The appointment of the US Ambassador to Turkey as special envoy to Syria, and the hesitancy to appoint an ambassador, indicate US precaution toward a regime that emerged from the shadow of terrorism and is undergoing a trial period to monitor its behavior.
The United States’ ambassador to Turkey, Thomas Barrack, is trying to please everyone amid contradictory demands and hopes. Barrack was not known in political circles in Washington, and he shares the same background from which President Trump chooses his aides, i.e., a businessman, most likely from real estate development, with whom he plays golf, and who lacks past previous political experience. Thomas Barrack is also of Lebanese origin, belonging to the city of Zahle, near the Syria-Lebanon border. The influence of his Arab roots is clear as he prefers compliments and spends a long time praising and commending everyone: Erdogan, Saudi Crown Prince bin Salman, Sheikh Tamim, the ruler of Qatar, Israeli officials, and of course President Al Sharaa.
The American envoy has embraced the mission of bringing Lebanon and Syria to the Abraham peace accord, which seemed impossible until December 8 of last year, but he believes that it has become possible after the defeat of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the fall of Assad in Damascus. The American envoy seems to be in a similar position to an old envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin, who tried to please everyone and reconcile sects and ethnicities, that have conflicts dating back hundreds of years, using his knowledge of regional affairs, his nationalist background, and his closeness to the then-US President George W. Bush. However, all of this was not enough to resolve old conflicts and historical grievances, and things ended with a sectarian war in Iraq and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.
Barak chose to adopt an old language used by Arab nationalists to denounce the Anglo-French Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the former Ottoman possessions in the Middle East into national states such as Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, which gained a special status after the Balfour Declaration. However, Barak does not want to redraw the maps, create new states, or abolish old ones. Rather, he insists that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was unfair and came as a result of Western arrogance in redrawing the maps of the region. Most importantly, Washington will not commit the same mistakes and will not try to reformulate the region, and at the same time will not provide billions in a program similar to the George Marshall program after World War II. So, how does Washington want to achieve its goals in the region?
According to Barak, the region that is now being torn apart in wars and conflicts will find its way through distinguished leaders like Sharaa to convince people of the benefits of peace and democracy. After the Madrid Peace Conference and the Oslo Accords, the late Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres issued words similar to those of the American envoy Barak. Words picturing a new and prosperous Middle East in which Jewish intelligence cooperates with Arab human energy and Gulf money to build a Middle Eastern earthly paradise. These words are now viewed by Israeli and Arab historians as nothing more than daydreams.
What does all this say about the future of Syria? Does Washington now see the solution as a division of influence between Ankara in northern and central Syria and Israel in the south, with US forces remaining as guarantors of the Kurdish regions? Is it a partition scenario? A southern region encompassing the provinces of Quneitra, Daraa, and Suwayda as the Druze stronghold, with Türkiye controlling northern Syria, while eastern Syria remains in Kurdish hands in a quasi-statelet? But what about the Syrian coast, where Alawites and Orthodox Christians are a majority? And what about the remaining Sunni region from Aleppo to Damascus, or what is known as the Syrian interior? Will Moscow return to play a role in protecting the region? Who will guarantee the Sunni society and control its rhythm and movement, taking into consideration the presence of more than 30,000 jihadists from Central Asia? Will a Taliban-style government be established that implements Islamic law?
Syria’s Future Outlook with Historical Lens
From a historical perspective, all these visions seem possible. When the Syrian state emerged following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917 and the beginning of the French mandate in Syria, Paris tried to divide the country and established four states: the State of Damascus, the State of Aleppo, the State of the Alawites, and the State of the Druze. It chose a national flag and a government for each of them, but the experiment collapsed due to political changes in France with the arrival of a government representing the leftist Popular Front.
Pre-Syrian Independence
When Syrian independence came in 1946, the Alawite notables demanded that France guarantee an Alawite state before their departure. But France, which had emerged exhausted from World War II, was not in the mood to allow this. All it could do was pressure the new Damascus government, headed by Shukri al-Quwatli, not to dissolve the “Army of the East.” This Army composed of Syrian recruits and officers cooperating with the French army, and included a majority of sects such as the Alawites, Druze, and Ismailis. This army was a constant headache for all successive Syrian governments, as it carried out more than twenty-two coups or attempted coups. It embroiled the country in lost wars with Israel. The country was finally controlled by Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970.
Post-Syrian Independence
When Syria gained independence, political elites were immediately formed, and political parties were established. The strange thing was that all political parties wanted to destroy the Syrian entity. No one wanted this nascent state in public. Everyone wanted it to be bigger, according to their own perspective. The Baathists were demanding Arab unity from Yemen to Morocco. The Syrian nationalists wanted a state that would unite them with Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine (before the establishment of the State of Israel). The communists wanted an internationalism that would unite them with the leftists of the world who revolved in the orbit of communist Moscow. The Muslim Brotherhood was demanding a caliphate that would extend from Indonesia to the coasts of the Maghreb.
Ramifications of Sykes-Picot Agreement
In the end, the entire political class wanted a state larger than this small entity that the French and English bureaucrats had produced in the Sykes-Picot Agreement. This was done in public, but what was kept quiet was the call for a smaller entity for the sects and ethnicities. Every Druze community center would show off a map that included the Druze of Syria, Lebanon, northern Israel, and the Azraq region in Jordan. The Alawites looked forward to their Alawite extension in southern Türkiye. And the Kurds did not stop dreaming of a Greater Kurdistan that includes areas in Syria, Türkiye, Iraq, and Iran.
In the Aftermath of Arab Spring
After the birth of what was called “Arab Spring” in 2010, the fragility of nationalisms became apparent in the countries that were ravaged by the Arab Spring. In Libya, two governments were established, one in the east and the other the west. Yemen was divided into north and south. Sudan sank into a civil war with calls for a state in the east for the Beja tribes, and in the west in the Darfur region, which is controlled by the Zaghawa and Tebu tribes. In Iraq, the north or Iraqi Kurdistan has become an autonomous region that is remarkably close to being independent. There are calls for a Shiite region that includes nine provinces in the south. In Lebanon, Christians have become more convinced than ever of the impossibility of coexistence. But why has no separatist experiment succeeded so far, despite the sharp division and the lack of agreement among the components of each country on any national symbol, common memory, or unifying history?
Regional Powers Deterring Separatist Tendencies
The answer seems quite simple: regional powers such as Iran, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia, with the support of major countries in the West, reject partition, and even seriously oppose it. When Masoud Barzani announced a referendum on self-determination, the United States, an ally of the Kurds, did not move to save him and allowed the Shiite Popular Mobilization Forces to invade the city of Kirkuk and the disputed areas between Baghdad and Erbil. The dream of Kurdish self-determination, which would have paved the way for an independent Kurdish state, was buried. When leaders in South Yemen announced their desire to return to the state of South Yemen, Riyadh supported President Ali Abdullah Saleh in invading the south. Regional powers fear that the partition contagion will reach them, as they are also composed of ethnicities and sects, and the national unity is at its lowest point.
History Repeats
History repeats itself. When Hafez al-Assad came to power, his ascension was met with great relief. The extremist Ba’ath leadership, from 1963 until Hafez al-Assad’s coup in 1970, isolated the country from the Arab world, led to the collapse of the national economy, and resulted in the loss of the Golan Heights in a war provoked by the Ba’ath regime. Hafez al-Assad presented himself as a moderate figure capable of reigning in his nihilistic extremist colleagues, and he did so. Most of them were killed, imprisoned, or fled the country. He opened up to the Sunnis and merchants of the cities, visited the Umayyad Mosque on all religious occasions, and prayed in the Sunni manner.
In a comical repetition, Al Sharaa presents himself as the only one capable of controlling the takfiris and extremists within its borders. He offered reassurances to countries of the region and the European Union, which explains the general satisfaction with him in the first weeks of his rule and the various offers of assistance. However, after the coastal massacres against the Alawites and the rampant preachers roaming the streets of the capital and major cities, grave doubts now shadow his ability to contain the extremist elements he once commanded. Today, it appears that the thin line separating the two is fading.
It seems that the Syrian fate in the coming time does not differ much from the general path in the region, and explicit calls for partition will meet fierce opposition regionally and internationally, and the situation will likely end with a state with a fragmented center and a weak capital that has nothing to offer the rest of the country, either in terms of benefits or in terms of a convincing national narrative. However, the rise of the parties will remain without the possibility of dividing the country, which for a long time to come will remain shackled to the destinies set in place by the Sykes-Picot agreement. American researchers and thinkers mocked the idea of partition, and say that the British and French were foolish when they tasked themselves with redrawing the maps of the region a hundred years ago at the end of World War I. Now, ironically, American thinkers are openly calling for the preservation of the maps of the region because whoever gets involved in erasing them will be tasked with drawing a different one, and maps in the Middle East are only drawn with blood.
Current Domestic Policy: Don’t Look Down
The new regime in Syria is often busy talking about grand dreams and mega projects that Syria will soon witness. From building residential and hotel towers, with Trump Tower in the middle of them, to modern airports and a new air fleet, to energy, internet, and artificial intelligence companies, and that Syria will quickly turn into the Singapore of the Middle East.
The new regime wants the population to envision Syria as the ‘Singapore of the Middle East.’ Yet when anyone seeks to understand the concrete ways and means to reach that goal, the leadership responds with hostility and suppression.
The reaction of the new regime’s men and its supporters is usually violent when someone questions these projects or asks where the money will come from for all of this, and how this will be done with the current state of security chaos and the presence of entire governorates outside the government’s control or the spread of chaos even in areas under its control, and who will monitor all of this in the absence of a parliament, constitution or effective local bodies.
In the test of the two hundred days in Syria, everything that is happening on the ground seems to be in stark contradiction with the dreams that reach the sky. Until today, the one-color government has not fulfilled almost any of its pledges. The state of services has not improved, and living conditions are becoming increasingly miserable and are approaching the level of hunger in some areas. On the security front, the coastal areas that witnessed sectarian massacres are still in a deplorable state of lack of security, daily violations, kidnappings and demands for ransom, and incidents are spreading rapidly. There have been credible reports of Alawite girls being abducted and coerced into marriage or religious conversion. Preachers roam the Christian, Alawite, and Ismaili minority areas, demanding that the residents convert to Islam. Places of worship belonging to non-Sunni Muslim Syrian communities are regularly attacked. People are harassed and bullied in the streets because of their clothing, whether men or women.
The new government seems incapable of confronting what is happening, and some of those working in ministries say that the government has no powers, and the real center of influence in each ministry is a mysterious figure called “the Sheikh” who is the one who does the real work, in addition to a new apparatus in each ministry called the Political Administration. In reality, no one can determine exactly what this apparatus is, what its powers are, or from where it receives instructions.
Between Singaporean and Iraqi Experiences
A researcher of Syrian affairs will be tempted to compare what is happening now in Syria to what happened in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003. Back then, dreams also reached the sky: a Thomas Jeffersonian-style democracy illuminating the Middle East, legendary reconstruction efforts, and a New Testament figure welcomed in the West as the future of the Middle East. Today, how things ended is known. The figures who returned with US forces quickly fled to the West again. Chaos reigned, corruption reached astronomical levels, political parties established militias, and the new army became a national laughingstock. Ultimately, Al Qaeda, which later evolved into ISIS, controlled a third of the country, and a sectarian war erupted.
In Syria, things are worse. Sectarian sentiments are raging on social media and in the streets. Calls for the expulsion of Christians from the country somehow appeared on state-run television, and the church attack was only the worst warning of what was to come, along with calls for incitement. The declared sectarianism, and it seems that the most important victims of the new era are the Sunnis of the cities, who were famous for moderation, to the point that they called Islam the Levantine Islam, because it is open to others and rejects excommunication.
The Sunnis of the cities are now withdrawing into themselves in front of the hordes coming from the cities of the East or from the Idlib Governorate. They are watching the campaigns of repression and forcing women out of the public scene, with calls for the niqab and attacks on personal freedom. They say that they have moved from a regime that prevents political freedoms to a regime that prevents political and personal freedoms, and that everything that is happening now no longer resembles the Syria they know, and the worst thing is that it is being done in their name. Three years ago, Hollywood showed the movie “Don’t Look Up,” which portrays an American administration trying to convince its citizens not to look up to the sky so that they cannot see the coming meteor that will destroy life on Earth.
The situation seems to be reversed in Syria. The government is trying to convince its citizens to look up to the sky to see the skyscrapers, towers, and resorts on Mount Qasioun overlooking Damascus, and the upcoming giant projects. But for them to believe in this probable future, they must not… Look down.
