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  • Richard Weitz - eagle intelligence reports - author - writer- Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute.

    Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research focuses on Russia-China-U.S. relations along with other international security challenges. He is a graduate of Harvard University, Oxford University and the LSE. Before joining Hudson in 2005, Weitz worked for several other academic and professional research institutions and the U.S. Department of Defense. He has authored or edited several books, multiple reports, and many articles.

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Trump-Putin Alaska Summit: Shaping War and Peace

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. (AFP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump. (AFP)

At the end of last week, the diplomatic world was shocked to learn of a potential breakthrough regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. Following discussions in Moscow last week, US special envoy Steve Witkoff related to European officials that Putin was prepared to negotiate ceasefire terms. US President Donald Trump announced he would meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in person to discuss peace deal.

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At the end of last week, the diplomatic world was shocked to learn of a potential breakthrough regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war. Following discussions in Moscow last week, US special envoy Steve Witkoff related to European officials that Putin was prepared to negotiate ceasefire terms. US President Donald Trump announced that he would meet Russian President Vladimir Putin in person to discuss territorial swaps leading to a ceasefire and eventual peace agreement.

Though Trump is eager to apply his prowess in dealmaking at the summit, others expressed concerns about the absence of Ukrainian representation, the potential for widening transatlantic divisions, the multiple accounts of what Putin told Witkoff, and fears that this was a Putin ploy to escape new US sanctions and gain time to seize more Ukrainian territory.

In response to these multiple stakeholder concerns, the administration has since downplayed expectations. The White House press secretary termed the summit as “listening exercise” to hear Putin’s ideas for a settlement. Trump described the upcoming summit as “a feel-out meeting” at which he would determine, “probably in the first two minutes,” whether further progress was possible.

Rather than a watershed moment in the Ukraine war and in US policy towards Russia, we should see the summit as contributing to a dynamic process that could eventually lead to a range of possible outcomes. This article first assesses the positions of the critical stakeholders. The next section projects potential scenarios for the evolution of the war and peace process. The conclusion evaluates their likelihood and the implications.

Putin’s Calculations

It remains unclear if Putin will compromise on his demand for international recognition that the Ukrainian regions of Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Crimea legally belong to the Russian Federation, even though Ukrainian forces retain substantial territory in several of these regions. Putin and his aides have also insisted on Ukraine’s neutralization, specifically that Ukraine cannot join NATO and that Western troops cannot deploy permanently in Ukraine, and “de-NAZIfication” of the Ukrainian government, with enhanced protection for ethnic Russians in Ukraine. Moscow also wants Ukraine’s Western partners to rescind sanctions on Russia, exclude former Soviet republics from NATO, and withdraw the alliance’s military architecture from members that joined NATO after the May 1997 Russia-NATO Founding Act.  

In the near term, offering a summit and proposing a ceasefire can avert potential sanctions, tariffs, and other potential punitive measures on Russia. Putin agreed to a summit a few hours before the deadline Trump had set the previous week for Putin to either accept a ceasefire or face unspecified punishment. Putin will further gain by displaying that he can travel to the United States despite the International Criminal Court’s March 2023 arrest warrant. The summit also provides Putin with an opportunity to exacerbate rifts between Trump and Ukraine or the United States and its European allies.

The summit also provides Putin with an opportunity to exacerbate rifts between Trump and Ukraine or the United States and its European allies

In the longer term, Putin calculates that time is on his side. Russian forces have made steady territorial gains during the past few months, while the Russian defense industry is finally producing large quantities of weapons and munitions. Putin is confident about receiving continued external support from China and other enablers. Conversely, the Kremlin questions how long Ukraine will enjoy substantial US assistance.


Trump and His Critics

Trump wants to bring peace to Ukraine and would welcome a Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of his contributions. He is confident in his negotiating skills and sees securing Putin’s support as imperative for resolving the war. Several rounds of Russian-Ukrainian and Russian-US talks earlier this year failed to make progress on critical issues beyond prisoner exchanges because the lower-level Russian participants lacked the authority to make substantial compromises. Putin enjoys such power. Trump would also like to decrease US expenditures related to Ukraine and remove sanctions and other impediments to Russian-US commerce. Improving relations with Russia would also enhance Trump’s negotiating hand with China.

Trump’s critics, who include many Democrats and some Reaganite Republicans, see the meeting with Putin as helping to legitimize a pariah leader of a rogue state. They fault the administration for giving the Kremlin “first mover advantage by accepting Moscow’s proposed terms as the basis for negotiations and making Ukraine react negatively, appealing for changes.

However, opposition to Trump’s policies regarding Russia and Ukraine is less intense than his first term, when the Congress, the national security bureaucracy, and European allies substantially impeded Trump’s outreach to Russia. Though congressional support for sanctioning Russia remains high, the Republican majorities in Congress either routinely defer to presidential authority or concentrate on other priorities. Additionally, the White House has consolidated control over the executive branch, so the main challenge to Trump’s Russia policies emanates from abroad.

The White House has consolidated control over the executive branch, so the main challenge to Trump’s Russia policies emanates from abroad

Ukraine’s Priorities

Ukrainian leaders have three main concerns about the Trump-Putin summit. First, they protest that the lack of planned Ukrainian representation at the summit does not adhere to the principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine.” President Volodymyr Zelensky termed any solutions reached without Ukraine’s approval as “dead.” US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News that the administration doubted a Putin-Zelensky meeting would be productive and that Trump instead would lead their two governments to a mutually acceptable outcome. Trump has pledged to call Zelensky and other European leaders soon after the summit concludes to brief them about the outcomes.

Search and rescue workers recover bodies after a Russian missile strike in Kyiv, Ukraine, on August 01, 2025. AFP

Second, the Ukrainian government objects to Moscow’s proposed sequencing. Ukraine wants a ceasefire agreement first before addressing substantive issues. Reportedly, Putin’s conditions require Ukrainian territorial concessions as a prerequisite for any ceasefire. Not only would acceptance of the Russian terms leave more than one-fifth of Ukraine’s internationally recognized territory under Moscow’s control, but Ukrainian withdrawals could rupture the country’s laboriously constructed defense lines.

Finally, after Trump spoke of “some swapping of territories,” Zelensky annoyed him by pointing out that the Ukrainian constitution prohibits such concessions. Ukrainian representatives have, at times, suggested they might accept temporary de facto occupation of some Ukrainian territory by the Russian military, but only if Russian occupation forces treat the Ukrainians in those locations well. They also insist that Ukraine receive NATO membership or other ironclad Western security guarantees, along with sustained foreign economic and military assistance, to ensure that Moscow fulfills its commitments and to protect Ukraine against future aggression. In the past, Ukrainian leaders have also demanded war crime trials, reparations, prisoner exchanges, the return of Ukrainian children from Russia, freedom to continue military modernization, and other Russian concessions to achieve what Zelensky has called a dignified and enduring peace.

European Equities

As soon as they learned of the planned Alaska summit, blindsided European officials organized hasty consultations with US officials. Though they accepted a Putin-Trump meeting as an exploratory first step, they quickly restated the imperatives of continued assistance for Ukraine, further pressure on Russia, and future Ukrainian participation in peace talks. In public, some European leaders, such as NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte, have defended the US decision to resume dialogue with Putin in order to test his intentions.

However, there are signs that European governments’ remarkable unity in support of Ukraine and their deference to US leadership of NATO may be fraying. Anonymous former European officials expressed anxiety to the media that Trump would concede too much to Putin. Several recalled the 1938 Munich Conference or the 1945 Yalta Conference, in which the great powers decided the fate of smaller European countries without their participation and to the detriment of European security.

There are signs that European governments’ remarkable unity in support of Ukraine and their deference to US leadership of NATO may be fraying

Ukraine Scenarios

Though the renewed US peace efforts could yield many possible outcomes, they would likely fall within these broad categories:

Peaceful Ukraine: Russia and the United States agree on ceasefire terms acceptable to the Ukrainian and European governments, rapidly leading to a sustained peace process. Besides a Russia-Ukraine peace deal, they would resume European arms control, expand east-west commerce, and weaken the Russia-China alignment.

Bracket Ukraine: During and after the summit, Russian and US negotiators disagree on Ukraine but make progress on other topics, such as resuming arms control, addressing extra-European regional hotspots, and expanding commercial cooperation in the Arctic region. Though Russian-Ukrainian fighting continues, Trump resists Ukrainian and European pressure to punish Moscow further to avoid jeopardizing Russian-US cooperation on other issues.

Constrain Ukraine: Moscow and Washington negotiate a limited ceasefire, such as prohibiting long-range air strikes or refraining from maritime attacks. As a result, Russia can continue its ground offensive without the threat of deep-penetrating Ukrainian drone strikes or TV broadcasts depicting Russian bombing of Ukrainian cities, which alienated Trump. Though Ukrainian civilians outside the frontlines are safer, international attention and support for Ukraine wane.

Blame Ukraine: The Trump administration approves terms that Putin knows the Ukrainian government and its European backers cannot accept, such as accepting territorial losses in exchange for dubious Russian pledges never to attack Ukraine again. After Zelensky rejects the Trump-Putin summit deal, Trump holds Ukraine responsible for the continued fighting and curtails US assistance to Ukraine, driving a wedge between the United States and those European governments who see Washington as rewarding aggression. 

Re-Freeze Ukraine: Russia and Ukraine negotiate a comprehensive ceasefire, but low-level fighting and cyber and other hybrid attacks persist. Both sides rush to rebuild their military power. The risk of renewed full-scale war is ever-present, as Moscow and Kyiv perceive opportunities to exploit fleeting advantages or avert unfavorable long-term shifts in their relative balance of power.

Trump Walks, Europe Stays

The near-term prospects of an enduring peace that could eventually inaugurate a new era of cooperation between Russia and the West are minimal. Such a benign outcome would almost certainly require the advent of a new Russian political leadership with a different vision of their country’s optimal international orientation. It could take many years for a post-Putin leadership to consolidate control in the Kremlin, and they would need to prioritize the country’s economic development and pursue a foreign policy that tries to balance rather than bandwagon with China.

Conversely, US officials will not soon return to pledging to render Ukraine whatever help it needs for as long as it takes to defeat Russian aggression. Ukrainian and European leaders correctly calculate that, for at least the next few years, they will need to assume primary responsibility for financing Ukraine’s defense and recovery.

A more likely outcome is that, upon hearing Putin’s terms, Trump will conclude that a mutually advantageous agreement regarding Ukraine is unattainable under present conditions. Though he could hold Putin responsible for the deadlock and impose new sanctions on Russia and its foreign partners, Trump would more likely direct his attention to other issues, leaving Russia and Ukraine, supported by European governments, to continue fighting without substantial US involvement.

Firefighters inspect a building in Belgorod, Russia, after a Ukrainian drone attack in November 2024. AFP

Transatlantic Troubles

Ukraine’s fate following any peace agreement would depend heavily on the level of subsequent European assistance. If this aid proves substantial, Ukraine could fortify its new defensive positions, consolidate its democratic transition, attract significant private investment, and become a pillar of the European security architecture. If foreign assistance proves inadequate, or if Ukrainian internal strife intensifies as politicians mobilize public opinion against each other, the Kremlin may calculate that Ukraine can no better resist renewed foreign predation than Czechoslovakia could resist German aggression after the 1938 Munich Conference. The situation would also tempt Russia to try to coerce Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Central Asian republics into following the Georgian path of accepting Moscow’s sovereignty in the former Soviet space.

If the United States disengages from Ukraine, European governments will exercise greater strategic autonomy but also must increase their defense spending substantially to fill the vacuum. Tensions within Europe and between Europeans and the United States could grow considerably. Though some European governments (a coalition of the willing) would favor providing Ukraine security guarantees, keeping NATO troops near Russia, and sanctioning key Russian economic sectors, others would prioritize de-escalating Ukraine-related war risks, limiting defense spending to protect social welfare programs, and cooperating with Moscow. Transatlantic rifts could also deepen if Europeans resent the burdens of protecting Ukraine or the Trump administration perceives European policies as sustaining an unwinnable war. The Kremlin would fuel these divisions in the hopes that the collapse of the present European security order would generate opportunities for restoring Russia’s primacy in the former Soviet republics and expanding its influence throughout the Continent.

If the United States disengages from Ukraine, European governments will exercise greater strategic autonomy but also must increase their defense spending substantially to fill the vacuum

Given the rushed preparations and lack of clarity about what Putin will propose, what Trump will accept, and how Ukraine and Europe will react, the near-term prospects of a diplomatic breakthrough are low. Even if Russia, the United States, and Ukraine eventually agree on ceasefire terms, the prospects for a comprehensive and enduring peace agreement will remain small, given the wide gap in the participants’ positions. Nonetheless, the newly dynamic peace process marked by the summit will set the trajectory for the next phase of the Russia-Ukraine war. For Ukraine, the stakes are existential; for Putin, the goal is to consolidate Russia’s status as a great power; for Trump, the outcome could define his foreign policy legacy; and for Europe, the war’s outcome will strongly determine its strategic autonomy in a new post-liberal world order.

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