The Houthi movement in Yemen is one of the most prominent regional arms utilized by Iran to expand its influence, particularly amid the ongoing conflict since 2014. Iranian support, encompassing military aid, financial backing, and logistical assistance, has been instrumental in strengthening the Houthis’ capabilities against both local and regional adversaries.
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The Houthi movement in Yemen is one of the most prominent regional arms utilized by Iran to expand its influence, particularly amid the ongoing conflict since 2014. Iranian support, encompassing military aid, financial backing, and logistical assistance, has been instrumental in strengthening the Houthis’ capabilities against both local and regional adversaries, most notably the Saudi-led Arab Coalition. UN reports have confirmed the smuggling of Iranian weapons to Yemen via the Red Sea. However, recent developments suggest a potential decline in this support due to internal and external pressures on Iran, raising questions about the future of Houthi influence in Yemen and the broader region.
This study aims to analyze the impact of declining Iranian support to the Houthis and assess how shifts in external patronage could affect their military strength, political strategy, and regional standing. By analyzing recent geopolitical dynamics, this report aims to forecast potential scenarios for the Houthis’ future influence and their ability to sustain their position amid changing regional power centers. The report bases itself on the proxy theory of international relations, which contends that major powers often employ local actors to advance their strategic interests while minimizing direct involvement in armed conflicts. In this framework, the Houthi movement is commonly interpreted as an Iranian proxy operating against Saudi Arabia, the United States, and their regional partners.
The effectiveness of such a proxy strategy is contingent upon the patron’s continued political, financial, and military support; thus, any decline in Iranian backing constitutes a significant variable in assessing the Houthis operational capacity and long-term viability.
“The effectiveness of such a proxy strategy is contingent upon the patron’s continued political, financial, and military support; thus, any decline in Iranian backing constitutes a significant variable in assessing the Houthis’ operational capacity and long-term viability.”
In this context, the Trump administration’s response characterized by intensified airstrikes, redesignation as terrorist, and strikes on Iran reflects a markedly confrontational approach. This raises a critical analytical question: to what extent can the application of military force alone serve as an effective means of neutralizing the perceived threat posed by the Houthis?
Cooperation between Iran and the Houthis became evident in the early 2000s, with Tehran providing military and training support to the movement during its confrontations with the Yemeni government (2004–2010). This support intensified after the outbreak of the civil war in Yemen in 2014, with Iran supplying the Houthis with ballistic missiles, drones, and military experts from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as Hezbollah. This assistance enabled the Houthis to seize Sana’a and large parts of northern Yemen, establishing them as a key player in the regional conflict. Hezbollah provides logistical and training to Houthis, particularly in developing their missile capabilities.
Iran faces a severe economic crisis due to international sanctions, declining oil prices, and rampant inflation, reducing its ability to fund regional allies. Recent tensions between Washington and Tehran, following US President Donald Trump’s threats over Iran’s support for the Houthis and airstrikes on its nuclear program, have led to conflicting messages from Tehran.
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria (December 2024), the decline of Hezbollah’s influence in Lebanon, Israel and US airstrikes have forced Iran to adopt a more inward-focused stance, potentially leading it to reassess its priorities and reduced support for the Houthis.
Escalating US and Western efforts to prevent the smuggling of Iranian weapons via the Red Sea combined with potential threats from the Trump administration (2025) to impose harsher sanctions are significant factors.
Since March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia have sought to de-escalate tensions, which potentially includes reduced Iranian support to the Houthis as part of diplomatic bargaining.
A shortage of advanced weapons (e.g., missiles and drones) will limit the Houthis’ ability to conduct long-range attacks, such as those targeting Saudi Arabia or ships in the Red Sea.
Reduced funding may exacerbate internal divisions within the movement, particularly between pro-Iran factions and those seeking greater independence.
The Houthis’ position in negotiations with the legitimate government and the coalition is likely to weaken, forcing them to make greater concessions.
A lack of external support may push the Houthis to strengthen their control over local resources (e.g., taxes and smuggling), potentially increasing local discontent.
If Iranian support significantly diminishes, the Houthis may lose their ability to withstand military pressure from the Saudi-led Arab Coalition and government forces. This could lead to the collapse of their control over large areas, especially if local and regional powers exploit this weakness. The likelihood of this scenario is high if US and Israel ramp up strikes in the future.
The Houthis might seek to reduce their dependence on Iran by forging local or regional partnerships (e.g., with Russia or China) or leveraging popular support in their areas. This scenario requires astute leadership and adaptability. The probability of this is moderate due to the limited resources and expertise available to them.
If Iran reduces but does not completely halt its support, the Houthis may retain limited influence in northern Yemen. However, they will face challenges in expanding or effectively confronting their enemies, potentially leading to a permanent division of Yemen into zones of influence. This scenario is most likely in the near term. The decline in Iranian support will weaken the Houthis militarily and politically. However, it does not necessarily spell the end of their influence, given their popular base and ability to adapt to changing conditions.
The future of Houthi influence following the decline of Iranian support depends on several variables, including their adaptability, the extent of international pressure on Iran, and the role of regional players like Saudi Arabia. Regional actors like Saudi Arabia should exploit this decline to enhance negotiations with the Houthis, offering economic incentives to integrate them into a comprehensive political process that is aimed at achieving a sustainable peace. The international community should intensify efforts to monitor weapons smuggling into Yemen to curb a resurgence of Iranian support as well as the flow of advanced military technologies that could potentially further destabilize the region. The legitimate Yemeni government should strengthen its presence in liberated areas to fill any vacuum left by a weakened Houthi presence. The government should ensure address governance gaps and provide essential services to the population. These efforts can bridge the power vacuum that could be exploited by the Houthis or other regional actors.
While the reduction in support will limit their capabilities, the Houthis may remain a significant player in Yemen if they successfully exploit their local resources and political circumstances. The Yemeni crisis is complex and requires collective efforts to ensure regional stability.
While the reduction in support will limit their capabilities, the Houthis may remain a significant player in Yemen if they successfully exploit their local resources and political circumstances.
The Houthis, officially known as “Ansar Allah,” is a Yemeni political and military movement that originated in northern Yemen, specifically in Saada Governorate. They evolved from a local movement into a major force in Yemeni politics and conflict. Founded in the 1990s by Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, a Zaydi religious and political figure representing a minority Shia sect in Yemen (approximately 35–40% of the population). The movement began as part of the “Believing Youth” organization, a cultural and religious forum established by Hussein al-Houthi in 1992. The goal of the forum was to revive Zaydi identity, which its followers felt was marginalized following the 1962 revolution that toppled the Zaydi Imamate in northern Yemen.
The movement is a revivalist movement for the Zaydi sect, a branch of Islam that shares belief with other Shia sects that believe in the rightful claim of Imam Ali’s lineage to governance. According to the Zaydi doctrine, the Imamate or supreme leadership of Muslims is restricted to adult males descended from the “two bellies” (the lineages of Hasan and Husayn, the sons of Ali ibn Abi Talib), any of whom may claim the Imamate provided they meet the fourteen conditions of leadership. The Zaydi sect permits the recognition of a Zaydi or non-Zaydi Imam.
Consequently, this doctrine positions the Zaydi sect in opposition to both Shia and Sunni schools of thought. By granting governance rights to the descendants of the “two bellies,” it contradicts the two primary Shia sects (Twelver and Ismaili), which limit the Imamate to a specific number of individuals, culminating in a hidden Imam, according to Twelver and some Ismaili beliefs. It also conflicts with most Sunni schools, which broaden the qualifications for a ruler (Caliph) to include the Quraysh tribe or the general Muslim populace, as seen in many contemporary Islamic political movements. The movement also protests the Saudi-supported Salafi influence.
Initially focused on educational and social issues, the movement soon adopted a political stance opposing the Yemeni government under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. In 2004, the movement transformed into an armed organization following clashes with the Yemeni government, which accused Hussein al-Houthi of incitement against the authorities in bid to revive the Imamate. Hussein was killed in September 2004 during a government military operation, after which his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi assumed leadership and has since been the de facto leader of the movement.
Houthis engaged in a series of confrontations with the Yemeni army in Saada from 2004 to 2010 — also known as the “Six Wars.” These wars enhanced their military capabilities and provided experience in guerrilla warfare. In the period of the six wars, support from Iran grew proportionally. Hezbollah also aids the movement.
The movement gradually evolved into a military and political force, particularly after the 2011 revolution that ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Houthis participation in protests against Saleh boosted their political influence. Though the Houthis participated in protests against Saleh, they rejected the Gulf Initiative that facilitated the transfer of power to Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The 2011 Yemeni Revolution plunged Yemen into political and security chaos. After Saleh’s resignation, the Houthis rejected certain provisions of the Gulf Initiative, which proposed federalizing Yemen, viewing it as an attempt to divide their regions and weaken them. By 2014, the Houthis had seized control of the capital, Sana’a, significantly enhancing their power and influence.
During the civil war in September 2014, the Houthis took control of the capital, Sana’a, with support from forces loyal to Saleh following the collapse of his alliance with the new government led by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. This event marked a turning point, establishing them as a key player in the civil war. To support the legitimate government led by Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi after the seizure of Sana’a, Saudi Arabia led a military coalition in 2015 under the name “Decisive Storm” against the Houthis. Since then, the Houthis have demonstrated growing military capabilities, including the use of ballistic missiles and drones with Iranian support, establishing them as an actor that cannot be ignored in any regional settlement.
Despite the Arab Coalition’s blockade, the Houthis have developed their military arsenal, including ballistic missiles and drones. These capabilities have enabled them to target sites inside Saudi Arabia, such as Riyadh and Najran, and maritime targets in the Red Sea, enhancing their ability to prolong the war in Yemen and exacerbate regional conflicts.
Between 2017 and 2023, the Houthis constructed mountain bunkers and tunnels in rugged terrain, a clear field adaptation following the Arab Coalition’s use of bunker-busting bombs (GBU-31) to support the legitimate government. The mountainous regions provide protection due to large rocks, with bunkers designed to have multiple entrances and exits to accommodate missile platforms, serving as launch and staging points.
The Houthis rely on continuous recruitment, including minors, in areas under their control, using a mix of ideological persuasion, economic pressure, and threats. This ensures a steady flow of fighters to the front lines, despite significant losses.
Their control over Sana’a and resource-rich areas like Hodeidah allows them to generate revenue through taxes and levies, funding their military operations. Refusing to pay government employee salaries also reduces their financial burdens, bolstering their combat sustainability.
The Houthis employ a strategy combining defense of their northern strongholds with offensive attacks on fronts like Marib and Taiz. This approach exhausts their enemies and maintains a balance of power, making a military resolution against them challenging.
One of the most prominent actors emerging after escalation of the Yemeni conflict post-2014, Houthis demonstrate a notable ability to balance political negotiation with continued combat operations. This flexibility has enabled the movement to strengthen its influence within and beyond Yemen while maintaining its military strength against adversaries, including the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the Saudi-led Arab Coalition. One has to analyze the Houthis capacity for negotiation and sustained combat, focusing on the factors supporting these capabilities, the challenges they face, and their implications for the conflict’s trajectory in Yemen.
The Houthis have shown significant adaptability to shifting political conditions. For example, they participated in UN-sponsored ceasefire talks in 2022, which included halting offensive military operations and facilitating fuel access to areas under their control. This flexibility allows them to stall and improve their negotiating position without abandoning their core objectives.
“The Houthis have shown significant adaptability to shifting political conditions. This flexibility allows them to stall and improve their negotiating position without abandoning their core objectives.”
Iran plays a pivotal role in enhancing the Houthis’ negotiating power through military, logistical, and political support. This backing instills greater confidence in negotiations as they know they have alternatives if talks fail. For instance, the continued development of their missile and drone capabilities bolsters their position as a force to reckon with.
The Houthis often impose preconditions for negotiations, such as lifting the siege on Sana’a airport and Hodeidah port, reflecting a strategy aimed at securing tangible gains before entering any agreement. This approach is evident in their rejection of dialogue based on the three references (UN Security Council Resolution 2216, the Gulf Initiative, and National Dialogue outcomes), preferring formulas that ensure their participation in power.
The Houthis effectively use the media to portray themselves as victims of foreign aggression, garnering local and international sympathy. This tactic supports their negotiating stance, presenting them as a party defending Yemeni sovereignty against foreign intervention.
Despite reports of internal conflicts, the Houthi leadership, under Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, has maintained the movement’s unity, supporting their negotiation and combat capabilities.
Declining trust in the Houthis in some areas due to corruption and mismanagement of resources may limit their ability to mobilize community support for their goals.
Continuous military pressure from the Arab Coalition limits the Houthis’ ability to achieve decisive victories but has not broken their combat resolve.
International pressure for a political solution pushes the Houthis toward negotiation, though their designation as a terrorist outfit by the United States complicates this process.
The Houthis ability to balance negotiation and combat suggests the conflict may persist for years, as they use ceasefire as tactics to reorganize and reinforce their positions.
Their rejection of international references and insistence on preconditions make a comprehensive agreement impossible without significant concessions from other parties.
Escalating attacks on Saudi Arabia and in the Red Sea expands the conflict’s scope, potentially drawing greater intervention from regional and international players. The Houthi movement possesses a unique ability to combine negotiation with sustained combat, supported by strategic flexibility, external backing, and a sophisticated military force. This capability has enabled them to withstand stronger military and economic adversaries, though they face internal and external challenges that may limit their effectiveness in the long term. The Houthis’ success in achieving their goals depends on their ability to leverage political and military shifts, as well as the willingness of their adversaries to offer concessions. Resolving the conflict may require a combination of military pressure and political solutions that account for the movement’s dual capabilities.
The relationship between the United States and the Houthi movement in Yemen represents one of the most intricate dynamics within the context of Middle Eastern regional conflicts.
Since the outbreak of the First Saada War in 2004, this relationship has evolved from relative indifference to direct confrontations and military-political escalation, shaped by internal Yemeni, regional, and international factors. During the six Saada Wars (2004–2010), the United States was not a direct party to the conflict. Washington’s focus during this period centered on countering Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which was active in Yemen.
Nevertheless, the anti-American slogans raised by the Houthis, partially inspired by the Iranian Revolution, raised concerns in Washington, particularly amid suspicions of early Iranian support for the movement. However, this support was limited at the time, and the Houthis were not perceived as a direct strategic threat to US interests. US interests in Yemen were not clearly defined beyond countering AQAP and ensuring freedom of navigation, particularly following the USS Cole attack, which positioned Yemen as a security concern for Washington. The US sought mechanisms to combat AQAP independently rather than relying on former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who leveraged AQAP as a tool for political extortion against Saudi Arabia and for manipulation in dealings with Washington. The United States provided the Yemeni government with military and intelligence assistance, primarily directed against Sunni extremist groups rather than the Houthis. The Houthis participated in protests against Saleh but rejected the Gulf Initiative that facilitated the transfer of power to Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. By 2014, the Houthis had seized control of the capital, Sana’a, significantly enhancing their power and influence. During this phase, the US continued to support Hadi’s legitimate government but refrained from direct action against the Houthis.
The US priority remained countering AQAP through drone strikes in areas under the Houthis influence. Nonetheless, Washington grew increasingly wary of the burgeoning ties between the Houthis and Iran, particularly following reports of Iranian arms and training support to the movement.
After the Houthis took over Sana’a, the United States maintained an intelligence-based relationship with the movement. A covert agreement was reportedly reached at the US Embassy involving Houthi leaders and Washington officials, enabling the Houthis to target AQAP in exchange for US air support via drones. The US allegedly covered war costs, paid Houthi fighters’ salaries, supported families of fallen Houthi combatants, and provided medical care for the wounded, with the Houthis tasked with decisively striking AQAP. Michael Vickers, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, confirmed this arrangement, noting that the Houthis’ hostility toward AQAP facilitated US special operations against the terrorist organization. Houthi leader Abdulkarim Al-Khiwani described US air support in their fight against tribes and AQAP in Rada’a as a form of divine assistance.
In late November 2014, Houthi political bureau member Ali Al-Emad unexpectedly traveled to Washington D.C. to attend a conference on engaging Yemen’s private sector in economic growth. A media outlet commented on the visit, stating, “The Houthi in the presence of the Great Satan,” referencing the Houthi epithet for the US. Months later, President Barack Obama, in a speech at West Point, acknowledged a US alliance with the Houthis to counter terrorism threatening US national security in Yemen.
Having secured a strong ally in the Houthis to combat terrorism in Yemen after facilitating their control of Sana’a, the US was blindsided by the Arab Coalition’s swift intervention, led by Saudi Arabia, against the Houthis in 2015. The US response appeared ambiguous following the coalition’s initial strikes on Houthi-controlled military airports and weapons depots in Sana’a and other governorates. US Secretary of State John Kerry cautiously praised the Saudi-led operations in a call with Arab foreign ministers. However, General Lloyd Austin, then-commander of US Central Command, expressed frustration over the Saudi intervention as the US had been covertly supporting Houthi efforts against AQAP. Washington’s eventual approval of Operation Decisive Storm marked a turning point in US-Houthi relations. While the US did not directly participate in combat operations against the Houthis, its support for the coalition rendered it an indirect party to the conflict. The Houthis capitalized on this to bolster their anti-American rhetoric, accusing Washington of complicity in the war on Yemen.
The US reportedly pushed for Houthi governance in Yemen as part of a deal with Iran, aiming to contain the movement while using it as leverage against Saudi Arabia amid strained US-Saudi relations by late 2019.
The U.S. pressured Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government under the guise of humanitarian concerns and “red lines” in the war, appointing a special envoy to Yemen, overlooking Houthi arms smuggling, and advocating for a Sana’a-Riyadh truce to freeze the conflict in a state of neither war nor peace.
The US policy towards Yemen has undergone notable shifts across different administrations, directly and indirectly affecting the position of the Houthis, a key player in the Yemeni conflict. Since the Saudi-led Arab Coalition’s military intervention in 2015 with US support, the relationship between the United States and the Houthis has passed through varied phases, ranging from military support for their adversaries, to political and economic pressure, and even attempts at de-escalation and mediation. With changes in US administrations — from Obama to Trump, Biden, and back to Trump in 2025 — American strategies have evolved, influencing the Houthis political and military behavior. This part of the report analyzes the impact of these shifts on the Houthi position, focusing on US policies of military support, terrorist designation, and economic sanctions.
The US role in Yemen became evident with the outbreak of the civil war in 2014–2015, when the Houthis seized Sana’a and ousted the government of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In March 2015, the Arab Coalition launched Operation Decisive Storm with logistical and intelligence support from the United States under the Obama administration. This support included refueling aircraft and sharing intelligence, bolstering the coalition’s position against the Houthis. During the Obama administration, US support for the coalition enhanced its capabilities against the Houthis, though the movement persisted, benefiting from growing Iranian support and Yemen’s rugged terrain. This support provoked a fierce Houthi response, with anti-American slogans like “Death to America” and a reinforced political narrative as resistance to foreign intervention.
However, the Obama administration adopted a cautious approach toward designating the Houthis as a terrorist group, preferring to treat them as a political party in the national dialogue. Obama’s this move sparked debate about potential tacit support for the movement in the context of rapprochement with Iran via the nuclear agreement (2015). Under Trump, direct operations escalated, pushing the Houthis to develop their military capabilities, including ballistic missiles and drones, to counter US and Saudi pressure.
With Trump’s inauguration in 2017, US policy took a harder line, focusing on confronting Iran and its allies, including the Houthis. The Trump administration escalated military operations such as the 2017 strike on Yakla village in al-Bayda, signaling a shift toward direct intervention. When Biden assumed office in 2021, he announced its intent to end military support for offensive operations in Yemen, emphasizing mediation and diplomacy to resolve the conflict.
Following October 7, 2023, the dynamics shifted dramatically as the Houthis began attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea, claiming solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza war. These attacks, targeting over one hundred ships by January 2025, disrupted global trade and provoked US ire. In response, the US formed the Prosperity Guardian coalition in December 2023 and launched airstrikes against Houthi targets starting in January 2024. The Houthis continued targeting ships linked to Israel and the U.S., leveraging increased Iranian support, including ballistic missiles and drones. They portrayed themselves as a resistance against US and Israeli hegemony, boosting their popularity in some Arab circles.
In February 2021, the US removed Houthis from the list of terrorist organizations to facilitate negotiations and humanitarian aid delivery. The Houthis viewed this move as American weakness, emboldening them to escalate attacks in the Red Sea. Biden’s 2021 removal of the Houthis from the terrorist list provided them with room for political and economic maneuver, which they exploited to expand attacks on Red Sea shipping, particularly after the 2023 Gaza events.
Trump’s return in 2025 led to their redesignation on January 22, as per an executive order from the White House, aiming to cut their financial resources and paralyze their diplomatic movements. In an anticipated move, US President Donald Trump redesignated the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization in January 2025, reversing his predecessor Joe Biden’s 2021 decision to remove them from the list. A State Department statement noted “Houthi activities pose a threat to the security of civilians and American personnel in the Middle East, as well as the safety of our closest regional partners and global maritime trade,” as per Executive Order 14175 issued by President Trump. This decision provides a legal basis for broader actions against this Iran-allied armed militia within a comprehensive strategy to address Tehran during Trump’s second term.
During Biden’s tenure, the United States attempted mediation by appointing a special envoy to Yemen, but the Houthis exploited this shift to bolster their demands, refusing to relinquish control of Sana’a. With Trump’s return, the focus shifted to politically isolating the Houthis, potentially forcing them back to the negotiating table under mounting military and economic pressure.
With Trump’s return in 2025, a tougher policy resumed, redesignating the Houthis as a terrorist organization in January 2025 and intensifying military strikes and economic sanctions. The Houthis responded with defiant statements, vowing that this would not deter their support for Palestine, while intensifying Red Sea attacks as a challenge.
In January 2025, the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on the Yemen and Kuwait Bank, a commercial bank in Houthi-controlled areas, for the first time, to disrupt their economy. This coincided with intensified airstrikes on strategic sites in Sana’a, Saada, and elsewhere, in response to Houthi Red Sea attacks. These pressures prompted Houthi threats of a “strong and effective” retaliation, according to Al-Masirah channel in March 2025, alongside a populist narrative to gain domestic support.
With Donald Trump’s 2025 comeback, US policy toward the Houthis shifted radically. On March 15, 2025, the US launched an intensive air campaign, dubbed “Rough Knight,” targeting Houthi military sites in Sana’a, Saada, and elsewhere — the largest direct US intervention since 2024. US strikes in Yemen form part of a broader landscape tied to the protracted issue of Iran’s nuclear program, intricately linked to nuclear negotiations and the need to secure international navigation.
These actions provided a pretext for militarizing the Red Sea vis-à-vis other global powers and European states while weakening the Houthis militarily to strengthen the Yemeni government’s position in future political settlements. In conclusion, since the Saada War, US-Houthi relations have evolved from neglect to limited cooperation to direct confrontation, driven by shifts in Yemen’s and the region’s dynamics.
As the US seeks to deter the Houthis and protect its interests, it faces complex challenges requiring a multifaceted approach beyond military operations, encompassing diplomatic and political solutions. Yemen remains a multifaceted conflict arena where local, regional, and international interests intertwine, rendering a comprehensive resolution profoundly challenging.
U.S. political shifts have influenced the Houthi position in varied ways:
Military strikes and sanctions have reinforced the Houthi narrative as resistance to American hegemony, aiding in mobilizing domestic support in their controlled areas.
US pressure has driven the Houthis to deepen cooperation with Iran, improving their missile and drone arsenals.
Despite the terrorist designation, the Houthis have maintained a hardline negotiating stance, exploiting the legitimate government’s weakness and their adversaries’ divisions.
They have leveraged these shifts to expand attacks, reflecting a strategy of defiance against US pressure.
U.S. political shifts in Yemen — from military support to mediation and back to a hardline stance — have been a key factor in shaping the Houthi position. While initial Coalition support hardened their military stance, Biden’s de-escalation policies provided room for escalation, and Trump’s second administration has reimposed comprehensive pressure, potentially pushing the Houthis toward either military escalation or negotiation under duress. Their position remains contingent on their ability to withstand sanctions and strikes, as well as Iran’s support as a counterweight.
The return of Donald Trump to the White House in January 2025 has brought with it a sharp shift in US foreign policy, especially in the Middle East. Nowhere is this more evident than in Yemen, where the Trump administration launched an aggressive new campaign to confront the Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah. Widely viewed as Iranian proxies, the Houthis escalated attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, threatening global trade and regional stability. In response, President Trump returned to a familiar playbook: military escalation, economic pressure, and public confrontation with Iran. The new strategy signaled a break from President Biden’s more restrained approach and is already producing visible, albeit mixed results.
At the core of Trump’s policy are three central goals:
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden are vital arteries for global commerce. Houthi attacks not only endangered shipping but drove up insurance premiums and disrupted supply chains. Restoring safe passage is a top priority for the administration.
The Houthis are considered a key pillar in Iran’s regional proxy network. Weakening or eliminating them, Trump believes, will deliver a broader strategic blow to Tehran.
By targeting high-level leadership and weapons infrastructure, including missile stockpiles and drone launch sites, the administration aimed to dismantle the movement’s ability to wage war.
Trump’s approach is defined by a willingness to apply overwhelming force and fast.
Since March 2025, the US has launched dozens of airstrikes against Houthi strongholds in Sanaa, Saada, and Hodeidah. According to Al Jazeera (March 30), more than seventy airstrikes were conducted in a single day, a level of intensity not seen under Biden. The targeting strategy has also shifted. While previous operations focused on missile launch sites, recent strikes hit leadership compounds and, controversially, areas with civilian populations. The move suggests a more aggressive, risk-tolerant mindset in Washington.
On January 22, Trump signed an executive order reclassifying the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The designation aimed to choke off financial and logistical support. The White House announced the move on January 24, emphasizing its importance in isolating the movement internationally.
Simultaneously, Trump had issued direct warnings to Tehran. On March 19, in a public statement reported by Al Jazeera, he threatened military consequences if Iranian support for the Houthis continues. The message was clear: US patience is limited, and retaliation is on the table. Ultimately, the US struck Iran’s three nuclear sites on June 22 following Israel’s attack on the country since June 12.
Though not yet fully operational, US officials have begun coordinating with the Saudi-led coalition and the internationally recognized Yemeni government to explore the possibility of joint ground operations.
Despite early momentum, Trump’s strategy faces significant challenges:
While airstrikes have destroyed infrastructure and eliminated key figures, the Houthis remain capable of launching attacks, including missiles aimed at Israel and ships in the Red Sea. As The Wall Street Journal (March 29) reported, the movement’s military core remains intact.
The Arab Gulf States Institute has cautioned that Trump’s approach could escalate into a broader regional war—especially if Iran decides to retaliate or tensions in the Red Sea draw in other powers.
Civilian casualties from U.S. airstrikes have drawn criticism from human rights groups and could unintentionally strengthen Houthi support among local populations. The longer the campaign continues without a political solution, the more complex the humanitarian crisis becomes.
So far, Trump’s approach has delivered mixed outcomes. The Houthis have been weakened but not defeated. Their attacks persist, and Trump has already adjusted his rhetoric from promising the movement’s “total elimination” to focusing on the narrower objective of “halting attacks on shipping.” Iran, for its part, has denied operational control over the Houthis. On March 16, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard publicly dismissed claims that it directs Houthi strategy, casting doubt on how much leverage US pressure has actually exerted.
Trump’s Yemen policy is built around a high-risk, high-reward formula: use military force and international pressure to eliminate a non-state actor while sending a warning to a regional power. It is a gamble that may yield short-term tactical wins but carries long-term strategic risks. Without a parallel political effort, it is unclear whether military might alone can bring lasting stability to Yemen or truly weaken Iran’s regional hand. For now, the Trump doctrine in Yemen marks a return to maximum pressure, and Washington is watching closely to see what happens next.
The May 6 deal signed between US and Houthis to stop attacking US maritime vessels had upset Tel Aviv as it did not include any clause barring the Houthis from targeting Israel and ships carrying its flag. The Houthis escalated their missiles and drone attacks on Israel while the latter intensified its aerial bombarding of strategic and vital facilities across Yemen. The US-Houthis truce was damaging to Israel’s political mosaic. It helped Houthis to consolidate their grip on power in Yemen and highlighted their position as a dominating power. It dealt yet another blow to the already faltering internationally recognized Yemeni government facing an existential crisis. It also undermines the secessionist Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is the only force able to withstand Houthis military prowess.
The US-Houthis truce was damaging to Israel’s political mosaic. It helped Houthis to consolidate their grip on power in Yemen and highlighted their position as a dominating power. It dealt yet another blow to the already faltering internationally recognized Yemeni government facing an existential crisis.
The agreement had allowed the Zaydis movement a space of time to recollect itself, salvage some of the infrastructure damaged in US-British strikes and shore up its secret arsenal of offensive rockets and drones. The Houthi star shone yet again as other Iranian proxies in the region, namely Hezbollah and Assad regime, faded. It also dwarfed the Iraqi militias which avoided a direct clash with Israel to spare Iraq retaliatory strikes and safeguard itself as a last bastion for the Iranian Shiite hegemony.
The damage Iran’s regional proxies suffered from relentless Israeli strikes was evident from their absence during the Iran-Israel war that broke out on June 12. The scant involvement of Houthis, who fired a few ballistic missiles and drones, demonstrated how severely affected they were. Apparently, they do not pose a considerable strategic threat to Israel. However, this scant engagement should not be construed as their lack of resilience, nor should it indicate that they are not a de facto rising power to be reckoned with.
It is unlikely that the outcome of this war that ended in a fragile and shaky ceasefire favors the anti-Houthi coalition in Yemen. The fragmentation among the ranks of the anti-Houthi coalition will ultimately stop them from seizing the opportunity to unite against the Zaydis. Nonetheless, the war might briefly slow down the flow of arms reaching the Houthis from Iran, forcing the movement to look for alternatives.
The Houthis’ will certainly start to explore their weaknesses next and try to act independently amid tight surveillance to restrict the movement of supplies from Iran to them. They will work on repairing the damage left by the severe strikes, especially in strategic ports, Sanaa airport and power plants. They will attempt reorganization and mobilization of their 350-thousand-strong force, according to the UN. They might also harp on the victories they claim to magnify their own image on the local and international stage. This might thrust them into the status of a state-like entity that can attract US adversaries, like Russia and China, as a reliable partner in the strategic Red Sea passage.
The wide exposure the movement gained during this struggle and the threats it poses to international trade might help open up other routes for arms supply and financing as complimentary to Iran’s, but not as its replacement.
The Middle East has witnessed complex conflicts for years, intertwining local, regional, and international dimensions. In Yemen, the Houthi movement has emerged as a central player in the ongoing civil war since 2014, controlling the capital, Sana’a, and vast areas of the country with Iranian backing, making them a pivotal actor in the regional rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. As events unfold, discussions about the possibility of neutralizing the Houthis within a comprehensive regional deal raise questions about its feasibility, the challenges it faces, and the factors that could facilitate its realization. This part of the report aims to analyze this possibility, focusing on the historical context, regional interests, and previous initiatives, drawing on reliable sources.
“The prospect of neutralizing the Houthis through a comprehensive regional agreement is theoretically feasible if backed by regional and international pressures. However, it faces burgeoning obstacles due to divergent parties’ positions and the complexities involved in the conflict.”
Given the current military/political map of Yemen, neutralizing the Houthis remains distant, even in its mitigated form (disarming them of heavy weapons, confining their influence on a small geographical area, and transforming them into a political party). The movement remains a dominant force in Yemen’s landscape, with a robust and effective military and political structure, despite the wars waged against it since the start of Decisive Storm. The movement thrives amidst joint Prosperity Guardian strikes led by the Biden administration and Israeli attacks on Hodeidah port, Ras Issa, and fuel and power stations. The events followed an intensive US air campaign, dubbed “Rough Knight,” targeting the its military sites in Sana’a, Saada, and elsewhere in one of largest direct US interventions since 2024. Yet, it is resisting Trump’s efforts to dismantle Houthi military power and protect maritime navigation.
The Houthis strength can be attributed to several factors, many of which were outlined earlier when discussing the rise of the movement, and will be briefly reiterated:
Rival forces, particularly in southern Yemen, prioritize keeping the Houthis away from southern governorates and are not opposed to their control of the north. Some even hope they remain dominant there due to perceived benefits. These actors see the Houthis as preferable to other political forces like the General People’s Congress and the Islah Party, whose interests span all over Yemen.
The legitimate government has yet to build state institutions parallel to those controlled by the Houthis in Sana’a. In areas nominally under the legitimate government, political, administrative, and security chaos prevails.
Neutralization and containment, as intended here, refer to ending the Houthi movement’s influence or rendering it significantly limited and secondary. This could be achieved through military defeat or politically supported agreements backed by military pressure. Successfully containing the movement requires dismantling of its military structure, including disbanding its armed forces and confiscating heavy and medium weapons. Containment could extend to dissolving the movement, banning its activities, prosecuting its members and supporters, and implementing other measures targeting violent groups. In this context, neutralizing the Houthis does not necessarily mean their military defeat but could involve integrating them into a comprehensive political process that reduces their military influence or weakens their role as an Iranian tool in the regional conflict. This might include surrendering weapons, participating in a national unity government, or ceasing cross-border and Red Sea attacks, in exchange for political and economic guarantees.
Saudi Arabia, leading the anti-Houthi coalition, has shown flexibility in recent years, as seen in its 2021 ceasefire initiative, which included easing the siege on Sana’a airport and Hodeidah port. This reflects Riyadh’s desire to exit the Yemeni quagmire, especially as it focuses on its Vision 2030 economic plan. The United States, which designated the Houthis a terrorist organization in 2021 before lifting the designation, supports a negotiated solution to reduce tensions in the Red Sea. Recent steps by the Trump administration, including economic pressure and sanctions on Houthi leaders and their terrorist listing, align with a neutralization approach, sending messages to Iran amid US focus on its nuclear program.
“Recent steps by the Trump administration, including economic pressure and sanctions on Houthi leaders and their terrorist listing, align with a neutralization approach, sending messages to Iran amid US focus on its nuclear program.”
The Houthis have shown willingness to negotiate in certain periods, as seen in 2023 talks between a Saudi and Omani delegation and their leaders in Sana’a. According to a BBC report (April 11, 2023), these discussions aimed for a permanent ceasefire. This suggests the Houthis might be open to a deal yielding political gains without sacrificing all influence.
The back-channel negotiations between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia provide another critical contextual element for understanding Red Sea attacks. As part of a potential deal with Riyadh, the Houthis hope to gain recognition as Yemen’s legitimate authority, end Saudi military intervention, and secure humanitarian aid to avoid an economic crisis. They may believe that attacking container ships and posing a serious threat to the Western-led economic system — to which Saudi Arabia belongs — can enhance their leverage at the negotiating table to secure local priorities. However, Riyadh has so far remained neutral, adhering to a sedation strategy to avoid provoking direct Houthi attacks on its territory.
Another interpretation of the secretive Saudi-Houthi negotiations is that, after lengthy and fruitless talks, the Saudis may have decided to address the primary obstacle to a sustainable peace: imbalanced power dynamics. The Saudis have spared no effort in addressing this imbalance by supplying allies with heavy weapons for another battle round. However, with international condemnation of Saudi involvement in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, attention has shifted toward proving Riyadh’s attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully, only for the Houthis to respond with further intransigence. Saudi Arabia could use this to justify a real battle to force the Houthis into a fair and serious peace with other Yemeni components.
Improved Saudi-Iran relations following the March 2023 China-brokered agreement could provide a foundation for a regional settlement, including Yemen. If Iran agrees to reduce its support to the Houthis, their neutralization becomes more feasible.
The war has exhausted all parties. Yemen faces an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, Saudi Arabia incurs economic and military losses, and the Houthis face internal pressures from the blockade and resource shortages. These factors may drive a comprehensive settlement.
The Houthis rejected Saudi Arabia’s 2021 ceasefire proposal, labeling it “media consumption” (BBC, March 23, 2021). This reflects their insistence on maintaining military and political control, especially with advances in Marib and Shabwa.
The legitimate government and the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council oppose any deal enhancing Houthi influence. The Council, for example, expressed reservations about the 2023 UN roadmap for excluding it as a key party to end war in Yemen. (Al Jazeera, December 26, 2023).
Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea, especially after the 2023 Gaza war, bolstered their regional standing but triggered US and British military responses (January 12, 2024); thereby complicating negotiations.
Iran has equipped the Houthis with various weapons and leveraged the Yemeni army’s old arsenal to implement a new concept, establishing factories and centers for missile development and precision enhancement to reduce reliance on direct Iranian supplies. This has enabled Houthis to produce locally made equivalents. Like Iranian weapons, these are simple in design, with easily obtainable or manufacturable components and lacking complex technology to balance effectiveness and operational costs, ensuring a steady supply. Iran benefits from the conflict’s continuation to weaken Saudi Arabia and may only accept Houthi neutralization if it secures significant gains in other areas, such as the nuclear program or sanctions.
The possibility of neutralizing the Houthis within a comprehensive regional deal appears theoretically viable, supported by international and regional pressures, but faces significant obstacles related to party positions and conflict complexities. Success depends on aligning Saudi and Iranian interests, involving all Yemeni parties, and ensuring agreement implementation under international supervision. In the current situation, negotiations remain the most realistic path, though the challenge lies in translating intentions into tangible outcomes.
Integrating the Houthis into a national unity government with the surrender of heavy weapons, in exchange for security and economic guarantees. This scenario requires strong UN mediation and joint Saudi and Iranian support.
Reducing their military capabilities through targeted strikes and negotiation pressure, without complete elimination, maintaining a power balance.
If parties refuse to compromise, this could potentially lead to a new military escalation and the war’s resurgence in Yemen.
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