While US President Donald Trump spoke about how “everyone wants peace in the Middle East” after Hamas accepted a plan to end the war in Gaza, what sprang to mind was the image of Bill Clinton, Yitzahk Rabin, and Yasser Arafat clasping their hands on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993, before announcing a new era of peace and prosperity in the Middle East.
But the scene, which at the time seemed to herald a new era of political realism, has over the decades turned into a mirror that reflects the same repetitive reality with every new initiative, carrying the same promises and ending with the same results.
A quick review of the three decades since the Oslo Accords reveals that the final status of negotiations agreed upon in 1999 was never held, leaving the key issues of Jerusalem, refugees, and borders still unresolved. The temporary transition phase has turned into a frozen, permanent reality, without a sovereign Palestinian state. In the meantime, Israel has expanded settlement construction despite its commitments, with the number of settlers rising from approximately 110,000 in 1993 to more than 700,000. This expansion has fragmented Palestinian geography, making the idea of a unified state virtually impossible. Israel has also maintained security control over more than 60% of the West Bank (Area C), while imposing a permanent siege on Gaza. The period also witnessed five military confrontations, resulting in the killings of tens of thousands of Palestinians, the displacement of thousands more, and the deaths of hundreds of Israelis.
Today, Trump once again speaks in the same tone, considering that what he has achieved is something great and that everyone wants to end the conflict. However, he ignored or overlooked the response of both Israel and Hamas to his plan. On the part of Israel, it rejects any talk about a Palestinian state or any complete withdrawal from Gaza. As for Hamas, it only focuses on returning the hostages and remains silent about the rest of the provisions of Trump’s plan. The hostages and bodies: they serve the Netanyahu government by easing tensions in the Israeli public opinion, and for Hamas, they relieve international pressure. As for peace, that is entirely another matter.
However, when we look beyond the details of each party’s partial rejection, we discover the madness of doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. US President Donald Trump’s plan to end the war is not something new, but rather a continuation of numerous initiatives since 1982’s “Reagan Initiative,” which came after the Lebanon War and the relocation of the Palestine Liberation Organization’s leadership from Beirut to Tunis under US sponsorship. Washington then believed that the conditions were ripe for reshaping the Palestinian landscape away from the PLO’s military apparatus. So, what has changed since 1982?
Trump’s plan to end the war is not something new, but rather a continuation of numerous initiatives since 1982’s “Reagan Initiative,” which came after the Lebanon War and the relocation of PLO leadership from Beirut to Tunis under US sponsorship
As for talk of Arab and Islamic consensus and openness to peace with Israel, how is today any different than the initiative of King Fahd bin Abdulaziz in 1981, the Oslo Accords of 1993, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz’s ‘Arab Initiative’ in 2002 (which enjoyed broad Arab support), the Roadmap for Peace of 2003, and other initiatives and conferences that likewise enjoyed wide Arab and Islamic support?
Today, Washington is resorting to the same containment policy it has long practiced to de-escalate tensions and halt conflicts in the region. It has not endeavored to address the root causes of the conflict or attempted to resolve them. Quite the opposite, it has left the underlying causes to fester during periods of containment, only to witness them suddenly erupting again in everyone’s face, with repercussions and effects far greater than those that came before.
Against the backdrop of this plan, the president’s personal temperament is one of the major driving forces. Trump has consistently promoted the idea of cementing his legacy as a great dealmaker, often by emphasizing it in his interviews and statements. He does not hide his ambition for a shortcut that will bestow him personal glory—or even the Nobel Peace Prize—temporarily, even if everything falls apart later.
The plan he presented to Arab and Muslim leaders in New York was substantially altered by the Israeli prime minister and was reduced to a plan focused solely on dealing with Hamas and securing the return of hostages, leaving everything else as it is. This certainly reinforces the hypothesis that this is nothing more than an attempt to qualify the president for the Nobel Peace Prize.
However, the existence of other factors cannot be negated, including the state of popular anger in the West, particularly in Europe, over what is happening in Gaza. The situation is now putting pressure on Western capitals and pushing Washington to seek a political solution that will ease Israel’s isolation and reshape its image within Western countries.
The Palestinian dilemma is 77 years old, and what is happening in Gaza is only one of its repercussions. Focusing efforts solely on stopping the war would amount to local anesthesia for a chronic condition, resulting in a short- or long-term “truce,” after which we will return to the vicious circle of wars and conflicts that will never end.
The Palestinian dilemma is 77 years old, and what is happening in Gaza is only one of its repercussions. Focusing efforts solely on stopping the war would result in a short- or long-term “truce,” after which we will return to the vicious circle of wars and conflicts that will never end
Apart from the negativity and pessimism, Trump’s plan could also be a golden framework to build on, given the Arab and international consensus to address the Palestinian issue and extricate the Middle East from the instability that has plagued it for the past seven decades.
The region is currently facing a pivotal moment, with many possible scenarios unfolding in the coming days. However, the most prominent one of these possibilities is manifested through American pressure on both Israel and Hamas following their partial approval of the plan. The most crucial phase at the moment: the return of the living hostages and bodies and the entry of large humanitarian aid into the strip. After that, the two parties may enter into a negotiation through mediators, during which Netanyahu and Hamas will try to refrain from implementing the rest of the provisions, especially those relating to complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, the disarmament of Hamas, and any political path for a Palestinian state. This could make the war return at a more intense pace, paving the way for the forced displacement of Gazans—a most likely possibility.
The second scenario is that of an American commitment, under Arab and regional pressures, to seize the current opportunity, build on it, and initiate a political process based on the two-state solution. This scenario also includes a binding timetable, with American and European guarantees for implementing the agreed-upon steps for a Palestinian state. The likelihood of this scenario is low, given the presence of a right-wing government in Israel and a prime minister who fundamentally rejects the two-state solution and views the Palestinian state as an existential threat to Israel.
The third scenario is a headlong push. Israel and its allies may find that an escalatory confrontation with Iran relieves them of the international pressure over Gaza. Israeli strikes could be launched against Iran under the pretext that the Iranian regime refuses to disclose the location of its enriched uranium stockpile and place it under international supervision. This would divert the entire region’s focus from the Palestinian issue toward a new conflict in the region. The possibility of this scenario is considered moderately probable.
The fourth scenario encompasses American and regional pressure on Hamas to disarm, implement all aspects of the plan, and expel its military leaders from the Gaza Strip. This would replicate the situation after the 1982 Lebanon War, when the PLO leaders were relocated to Tunisia. This possibility is considered moderately likely, especially since Washington and the region agree on the idea of disarming Hamas and rejecting its rule of Gaza once again.
Ultimately, the US president’s plan contains an opportunity to open a pathway toward untangling the Palestinian dilemma. Yet all the circumstances surrounding it—from Trump’s handling of the situation to Benjamin Netanyahu‘s rejection of the two-state solution to Hamas’s refusal to disarm—again lead us to a policy of containment, awaiting the next cycle of violence that may be more severe and profound than the previous one.
The US president’s plan contains an opportunity to open a pathway toward untangling the Palestinian dilemma. Yet all the circumstances surrounding it again lead us to a policy of containment, awaiting the next cycle of violence
However, amidst these accumulated failures, every moment of truce, albeit temporary, remains an opportunity to rethink the roots of the dilemma rather than its symptoms. Even the most fragile moments can be the gateway to a serious reflection that redefines what peace means rather than merely repeating attempts to contain the conflict.