Eagle Intelligence Reports
US President Donald Trump’s demand for the United States to regain control of Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan has provoked strong regional opposition. Though not without strategic logic, major obstacles preclude such a restoration in the near term. The United States could more productively pursue cooperation on less provocative security issues. This approach would arouse less resistance and position the United States well for future Afghan-centered security scenarios.
The refiguring of Afghanistan with Bagram into Washington’s strategic thinking could also indicate intensified US engagement in the Eurasian theater. Afghanistan lies at the crossroads of West, Central, and South Asia, sharing a border with Iran, three former Soviet republics, Pakistan, and China. Owing to its geographic attributes, Afghanistan can serve as an intersection point in the security-intelligence front of central Eurasia. Moreover, it offers US rivals — seeking to leverage its economic potential and strategic outposts — opportunities for access, logistics, and influence in Central Asia and beyond.
This article first reviews the strategic logic of the US desire for a renewed military presence in Afghanistan. It then analyzes the challenges to such a restoration and how the United States might manage them. The text concludes by evaluating how a renewed US security role could generate multiple security scenarios involving Afghanistan.
Trump has refocused Washington’s spotlight on Afghanistan. Following the poorly executed US military withdrawal in 2021 and the Taliban’s subsequent suppression of Afghan civil society, frustrated US officials had essentially lost interest in the country. Led by hardline religious zealots based in Kandahar, who enjoy more authority than the political leadership in Kabul, the regime has violated its reform commitments under the Doha Agreement and repressed women and religious minorities.
Following the poorly executed US military withdrawal in 2021 and the Taliban’s subsequent suppression of Afghan civil society, frustrated US officials had essentially lost interest in Afghanistan
Trump calculates that he can combine coercion and inducements to compel Taliban concessions. The Taliban regime seeks to reintegrate diplomatically, end sanctions, secure economic assistance, and prevent interference in its internal affairs. Afghans continue to suffer from widespread poverty, unemployment, and food insecurity. In recent months, some two million, often destitute, refugees have been deported by Iran and Pakistan, further straining the economy. The United Nations and other entities continue to extend emergency humanitarian aid to help the Afghans meet their basic needs, like food, education, and healthcare. However, a lack of international consensus has prevented the mobilization of longer-term development aid or loans. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has frozen Afghanistan’s foreign assets and constrained economic assistance to the country.
Trump justified his demand for Bagram to prepare for conflicts with China, but recovering the air base would provide multiple strategic assets to the United States. At the height of its Afghan war, the Pentagon stationed tens of thousands of US soldiers and contractors at Bagram. With its lengthy runways and hardened shelters, the base provided critical support for US air power and intelligence collection throughout the country. Bagram’s prominence made it a symbol of US military power at the heart of Eurasia.
Recovering Bagram would enable the United States to monitor and strike the many Eurasian terrorist groups present in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia. The UN Security Council monitoring team of the Taliban Sanctions Committee has determined that al-Qaeda, Islamic State–Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and other transnational terrorist groups are present in Afghanistan. To what extent they receive assistance from the Taliban leadership is unclear, but individual members have fought together for many years. The ISIS-K’s massive urban bombing campaign failed to prevent the Taliban regime from consolidating its authority. Nevertheless, the group has exploited strongholds, especially in northern Afghanistan, to conduct deadly terrorist attacks in various Eurasian countries.
The air base could also facilitate potential US military operations against Iran, Russia, and China. Since the best Iranian and Russian defenses are oriented toward their west, having a base to threaten Iran from the east and Russia from the south would strain their defenses and increase US options. Meanwhile, much of China’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is situated near its far western frontier, which borders Afghanistan. US planes and ships based in the Pacific can regularly monitor military activities on China’s east coast, yet the United States could better assess or strike China’s western interior from Afghanistan.
The reintroduction of Bagram Air Base into US military thinking reflects how favorable geography provides asymmetric leverage. The vast size of the US armed forces alone does not make the United States the world’s strongest military power. The Pentagon’s global network of military bases is critical for projecting US power in the world. Reclaiming control of Bagram would give the US a major advantage in intelligence gathering, rapid response capability, and crisis signaling in the heart of Eurasia, the location of the most powerful potential US adversaries. If the United States could reclaim Bagram, it would recover a unique strategic outpost for regional power projection and competition.
Reclaiming control of Bagram would give the US a major advantage in intelligence gathering, rapid response capability, and crisis signaling in the heart of Eurasia
The renewed US interest in establishing a military presence in Afghanistan has reawakened latent Sino-Russian anxieties about US military ambitions in central Eurasia. At a meeting of the Moscow Format Consultations earlier this month, China and Russia induced Afghanistan’s other neighbors, namely India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, into publicly opposing such a restoration.
Before Trump’s recent statement, the US government was rather blasé regarding the gradual growth of Chinese and Russian ties with the Taliban. In July, Moscow became the first government to restore formal relations with the Taliban regime despite perfunctory calls to adopt a more inclusive government by including more women and ethnic minorities. Though Beijing has yet to follow Moscow’s lead, the PRC accepted the diplomatic credentials of a Taliban-appointed ambassador the previous year. China has also organized several meetings between Afghan and Pakistani representatives to mediate their disputes.
Besides their joint opposition to the United States, counterterrorism has been a priority for both Beijing and Moscow. A primary PRC security objective has been to counter separatism, terrorism, and religious extremism because the Chinese authorities worry these “three evil forces” could wreck Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and endanger China’s border and internal security. Russian policymakers have been alarmed by the Taliban’s failure to negate the ISIS-K terrorist threat. The group has operated throughout Eurasia and conducted the most prominent terrorist attack in Russia in years. Last March, it destroyed the Crocus City Hall concert venue outside Moscow, killing more than one hundred people and injuring hundreds more. Many ISIS-K militants gained military experience fighting the Moscow-backed Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria. Chinese and Russian policymakers have decided that engaging with the Taliban and strengthening its internal security capabilities can best advance their interests.
Chinese and Russian policymakers have decided that engaging with the Taliban and strengthening its internal security capabilities can best advance their interests
China and Russia also have longer-term economic goals regarding Afghanistan. Along with Central Asian governments, Beijing and Moscow are eager to exploit the country’s natural resources and incorporate Afghan territory into regional transportation networks. Chinese and Russian diplomats have called on the United States to release Afghanistan’s frozen funds and provide substantial development aid to the country. An improvement in the Afghan economy would generate commercial opportunities for Russia, China, and their regional partners. However, while China and Russia both seek a security buffer against terrorists and other threats emanating from Afghanistan, China has more actively pursued economic opportunities related to the country. Beijing is especially keen to expand its flagship BRI project with trans-Afghan regional logistical corridors.
Despite the allure of recovering Bagram, the current situation inside and around Afghanistan places the facility beyond Washington’s reach. The departing US military destroyed much of its infrastructure, while the Taliban and other Afghan groups have seized its weapons and other components and relocated them. With the support of China and Russia, the Taliban authorities have resolutely rejected a return of US forces to Afghanistan. The Pentagon would need a relatively large security footprint in Afghanistan to protect its soldiers and bases from domestic and foreign-sponsored threats.
With the support of China and Russia, the Taliban authorities have resolutely rejected a return of US forces to Afghanistan
Future developments may establish a better environment for recovering Bagram. For example, Afghans might want US military assistance against Pakistan or Iran. Meanwhile, some Central Asian governments could come to desire US aid to combat regional terrorist movements or to avert a Sino-Soviet condominium in Eurasia. But before that, US policymakers have other options for rebuilding their security influence in Afghanistan.
Pursuing Bagram in the short term will drive regional actors closer in opposition to the United States. The governments of Iran, China, and Russia strongly oppose the concept, while the Indian, Pakistani, and Central Asian governments will resist openly challenging a joint Sino-Soviet stance. The Taliban will leverage the US pressure to improve ties with these countries rather than the United States.
Facing rejection, the Trump administration would likely block comprehensive sanctions relief or development assistance to Afghanistan. It could also instruct the CIA and Pentagon to support the anti-Taliban resistance with money, training, arms, and potentially “over-the-horizon” drone operations. The US government could also favor Pakistan in its dispute with Afghanistan to put pressure on the Taliban and disrupt Beijing’s attempt to balance its strong ties with Islamabad and its interest in cultivating the Afghan Taliban.
In the longer term, a renewed US military footprint in Afghanistan becomes more credible. The United States has established bases in many former adversaries, including Germany, Japan, and Iraq. The Taliban leadership has largely reconciled with Russia despite the brutal years of Soviet military occupation. However, a major US military presence would probably require a new internationally oriented Taliban leadership, the group’s loss of control over parts of the country, or an entirely new regime.
In this scenario, Trump’s Bagram demand could become the opening bid in a lengthy negotiation process that ends with a new US-Afghan security bargain. The United States could start by increasing professional and educational exchanges and engaging in regular joint exercises and training. US officials could also help remove sanctions on the Taliban, channel more funds to Afghans, develop the country’s resources, and mediate the Afghan-Pakistan dispute. At some point, the United States could eventually preposition munitions and deploy US forces on rotation in military facilities in Afghanistan, which would yield strategic benefits without the challenges of managing a major base like Bagram.
Trump’s Bagram demand could become the opening bid in a lengthy negotiation process that ends with a new US-Afghan security bargain
Any US military presence could still drive China and Russia closer together against Washington. Beijing would leverage its economic ties to draw Pakistan to its side, and Moscow would coerce Central Asian governments, some of whom quietly would welcome an increased US presence, into publicly falling in line. But their opposition could decrease if Washington uses its presence to suppress mutual terrorist threats.
If the United States does not have a military presence in Afghanistan, the prospect of long-term Sino-Russian rivalry regarding Eurasia increases. For instance, Beijing and Moscow could compete to incorporate Afghan territory in their alternative Eurasian integration projects. Lacking a common US threat, a downturn in the Sino-Russian relationship becomes more likely. The end of the Russian military operations in Ukraine would also decrease Moscow’s need for Beijing’s support. Additionally, Beijing’s loss of confidence in Moscow’s ability to maintain stability in Central Asia could lead the PRC to abandon its policy of regional security deference to Russia. Beijing and Moscow might try to mobilize their Afghan proxies against each other.
The United States could favor one side, but another course of action, more in line with a “traditional American First” approach, would be to stand aside and let the Sino-Russian rivalry intensify and spread to other areas.
Fundamentally, the issue of Bagram surpasses the demand for a physical airbase. The underlying question is: How can the United States achieve greater influence in the Eurasian theater—and what costs would it incur in trying to do so? Afghanistan could offer a vast wealth of untapped resources, a pivotal logistics hub, and a gateway to the rest of Eurasia. But history rightly designates the country as the “graveyard of empires.” As the United States recalibrates its global security engagements, Washington will need to weigh carefully its Afghan options and pursue them with exquisite agility in the volatile Eurasian region.