Eagle Intelligence Reports
The recently signed Pakistani-Saudi Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) marks a major evolution in both countries’ security policies. Among other considerations, the accord formalizes, with a binding treaty, their military partnership. Though Islamabad and Riyadh had long cooperated on security issues, the agreement marks the first time that Pakistan has, even implicitly, extended its nuclear shield to another country. Furthermore, the pact diversifies Saudi and Pakistani defense ties beyond their primary great-power protectors.
This article first reviews Saudi and Pakistani motivations for signing the pact. It also evaluates the SMDA’s potential consequences for other states. Finally, the text speculates about how these considerations might combine to shape future security scenarios in the Middle East, South Asia, and the global security environment.
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed the SMDA in Riyadh on September 17. Though the accord provides for wide-ranging military, intelligence, and defense industrial collaboration, the parties highlighted the text’s explicit mutual defense clause. The two governments stated they would consider aggression against one as aggression against both.
Some Pakistani and Saudi statements implied the pact could entail Pakistani nuclear weapons use. Pakistani officials have until now insisted that their deterrent is exclusively for national defense and that they would not share nuclear weapons or related technologies with foreign actors. In 2015, Foreign Secretary Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry stated that “Pakistan is not talking to Saudi Arabia on nuclear issues, period.” Islamabad’s recent decision to offer implicit nuclear security guarantees abruptly reversed this stance.
The negotiations regarding the SMDA likely began before this summer’s Iran war and the September 9 Israeli air strike on Hamas’ political leadership in Qatar. Nonetheless, the recent wars in the Middle East, compounded by residual concerns regarding Iranian intentions and nuclear weapons aspirations, undoubtedly stimulated Saudi Arabia’s interest in novel security partnerships.
Washington has been Riyadh’s prime defense partner, but bilateral relations have frequently encountered severe strains. Furthermore, Saudi desires for a civil nuclear cooperation agreement or an enhanced defense treaty with the United States remain unrequited. The SMDA now conveys that despite the improved ties under Trump, the Saudi leadership is not fully satisfied with US policies—putting pressure on Washington to change them.
Unlike the imprecise security guarantees offered by the United States, which some Saudi officials consider insufficiently reliable compared with the US defense commitments to Israel or Washington’s other major allies, Islamabad is offering Saudi Arabia an explicit defense commitment. Riyadh views Pakistan as a credible security partner since thousands of Pakistani troops have regularly rotated to Saudi Arabia since the 1960s. Importantly, Pakistan’s SMDA pledge comes with potential nuclear guarantees.
Unlike the imprecise security guarantees offered by the United States, which some Saudi officials consider insufficiently reliable, Pakistan’s SMDA pledge comes with potential nuclear guarantees
The SMDA will elevate Pakistan’s value to China as a potential conduit for projecting PRC security influence in the Gulf in an indirect manner less likely to arouse local or Western resistance while decreasing Pakistani dependence on PRC support. Among other considerations, Pakistani officials want to hedge against a Sino-Indian reconciliation, which has become more plausible following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s high-profile visit to China in early September.
The agreement further serves a hedging function regarding the United States, which is also an important security partner. Pakistani-US ties have waxed and waned over the years. Though presently good, they could easily sour again. Furthermore, the SMDA helps Islamabad to exploit New Delhi’s currently strained ties with Washington.
Additionally, the SMDA immediately strengthens Pakistan’s ties with Saudi Arabia, a wealthy and influential middle power. The pact further raises Islamabad’s international profile, reaffirms its security solidarity with fellow Muslim nations, helps Pakistan compete for influence with India in the Middle East, and could boost Arab support for Islamabad’s claims over Kashmir.
The pact further raises Islamabad’s international profile, reaffirms its security solidarity with fellow Muslim nations, and helps Pakistan compete for influence with India in the Middle East
The SMDA will deepen Indian anxieties about Pakistan’s and China’s outmaneuvering India in the Middle East. New Delhi could respond by seeking closer ties with Iran, Israel, or Saudi Arabia. Though India has curtailed Iranian oil imports, several of India’s international trade routes traverse Iranian territory, which adjoins both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Israel is one of India’s closest security partners, selling substantial advanced weapons and defense technology. Though India is unlikely to offer explicit security commitments to Saudi Arabia, New Delhi could leverage the two countries’ extensive economic and security ties.
Iranian perspectives regarding the SMDA are likely ambiguous. In the near term, Tehran benefits from the growth of GCC security ties with non-Western powers and having GCC security concerns focused on Israel rather than Iran. But the Pakistan-Saudi alignment could take an anti-Iranian direction if Pakistani or Saudi relations with Iran again deteriorate. Moreover, Tehran would prefer a Gulf-wide security structure that includes itself rather than an exclusive GCC security network linked to Pakistan through an expanded SMDA.
Tehran would prefer a Gulf-wide security structure that includes itself rather than an exclusive GCC security network linked to Pakistan through an expanded SMDA
Beijing might leverage its preeminent position in Pakistan to strengthen its security ties with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states. China aims to increase its foreign arms sales and global military presence, expanding on existing economic and diplomatic ties with these countries. Saudi Arabia is China’s most significant Middle Eastern economic partner, and Beijing mediated the 2023 deal that restored relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, its security position has lagged behind that of the United States. Working through its Pakistani connection rather than directly, China also reduces the risk of entrapment. As evidenced by its stance during the recent Iranian and Indian-Pakistani conflicts, the PRC traditionally eschews direct military involvement in foreign wars.
Though Washington remains central to the security calculus of both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the Trump administration has not adopted a prominent position regarding the SMDA. The low-key response may be due to the White House’s preoccupation with other priorities or the administration’s atypically positive relations with the two governments. The United States does not want to antagonize either country by opposing the accord. Furthermore, US officials may believe they wield sufficient influence to channel the SMDA in positive directions—such as helping contain Iran or prevent renewed India-Pakistan fighting—while preventing it from threatening US interests regarding Israel, nonproliferation, and other priorities.
Many defense pacts have shattered during a crisis or eroded over time due to volatile domestic configurations or security environments. The same could happen if either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia experienced a major security crisis (such as an India-Pakistan or Saudi-Iranian war) in which they received support from their partner they deem insufficient.
For the next few years, though, the SMDA will probably remain a prominent feature of the international politics of the Middle East and South Asia. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would accrue substantial benefits from sustaining their enhanced partnership, while no country has overtly sought to block the agreement. Whatever its duration, the SMDA could substantially impact regional and global security environments through various scenarios, particularly by reshaping deterrence dynamics in the Gulf region and South Asia.
For the next few years, the SMDA will probably remain a prominent feature of the international politics of the Middle East and South Asia
The SMDA could pave the way for enhanced Pakistani-Saudi security cooperation independent of the nuclear dimension. Pakistan is unlikely to employ its nuclear capabilities to defend Saudi Arabia, except under extreme scenarios. In most cases, the stakes would not warrant their use, leaving Saudi Arabia vulnerable to conventional aggression from state actors and sub-conventional aggression from the Houthis and other non-state actors.
As demonstrated during its recent war with India, Pakistan has a powerful conventional military. Saudi Arabia could provide more funding to Pakistan’s defense companies, receiving more weapons, military training, and Pakistani troop deployments in return. Pakistan could also help Saudi Arabia expand its indigenous defense industry, helping Riyadh decrease its dependence on foreign arms.
Furthermore, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif explicitly stated that the SMDA could later expand to include other members. He proffered the opinion that Muslim countries would benefit from establishing a NATO-like collective security arrangement. The initial focus could include more collective training, exercises, arms purchases, and engagements among their senior-level civilian and military officials.
A low-probability but high-impact scenario would be if Saudi Arabia could leverage its substantial influence to induce an Indian-Pakistani reconciliation. Saudi diplomats took a lead role in trying to end the May war between Islamabad and New Delhi. Though Saudi-Indian economic ties are especially prominent, they also have solid defense ties.
Saudi Arabia would benefit if Pakistan allocated more defense resources to Gulf security rather than to countering India. Riyadh also does not want the SMDA to disrupt its good relations with both countries. Ironically, the India-Pakistan rivalry would make both governments wary of alienating Saudi Arabia to the benefit of their rival.
The Trump administration has generally supported the expansion of security ties among US allies as part of its alliance modernization efforts. If US allies can better defend themselves, this would reduce US security risks and defense burdens. However, US retrenchment could facilitate an expansion of China’s regional security presence. Even without US retrenchment, Beijing can leverage its ties with Pakistan to expand its regional security role in the Gulf region.
If China increased its arms sales, defense exchanges, and other security activities in the Gulf region, it could better protect its enormous economic and energy interests in the Middle East while constraining rival India’s maneuvering room. GCC governments might welcome improved defense ties with China through Pakistan, given their near-term concerns regarding Israel and longer-term anxieties about Iran’s nuclear program and the US commitment to Gulf defense.
In the near term, the SMDA may help inhibit the desires of Saudi Arabia—and future GCC countries that could fall under Pakistan’s security umbrella—in developing national nuclear arsenals. The United States has justified extended security guarantees to allies partly on such nonproliferation grounds.
If Pakistan offered extended security guarantees to all participants, the alliance could establish some kind of standing nuclear consultative group to exchange views, share information, and discuss contingencies. By relying on Pakistani guarantees rather than developing their own nuclear arsenals, the GCC states would avoid breaching their NPT obligations or alienating Western countries opposed to further nuclear proliferation.
Longer term, if Pakistan gains substantially from the SMDA, then we could see more countries offering to defend others with nuclear weapons. They could bargain for compensation from their guaranteed state or, at a minimum, hope their stance could lessen international opposition to their nuclear programs. The result would be a world with more nuclear-armed states and a more complex network of nuclear security guarantees. Some of these might overlap and reinforce one another; others might conflict with existing security assurances, complicating countries’ deterrence calculations.
The coming years could see more instances where other vulnerable states seek to hedge against changing great-power politics, the proliferation of strategic weaponry, and the transformation of alliances through defense diversification and multiple overlapping alignments, further confounding the international security environment.