Eagle Intelligence Reports
As Tehran faces the consequences of shifting regional dynamics, its choice between long-term reform or short-term strategic pullback places the regime squarely at a clear fork in the road. Though the regime might pretend it was not affected by US and Israeli strikes, the reality appears entirely different. Its main regional proxy Hezbollah is decimated and on track to lay down its arms while others are distancing themselves from the Tehran. Their absence during Israel’s air strikes across the land tells a different story.
In the aftermath of US announced ceasefire ending the 12-day war with Israel, its high time the Iranian leadership decided — either to continue supporting proxies and pursue nuclear ambitions or shift its focus to development of the nation and empowering its people.
So, what will Tehran do? Whatever path Tehran takes, the decision is unlikely to remain exclusively its own as other powers like Israel and the US have stakes that will inevitably shape the outcome.
In one and a half year since the October 7 attack, followed by recent Israeli attacks and subsequent US strikes on its main nuclear facilities, Iran’s world has turned upside down. On one hand, it is imminent that it reassesses its political priorities and pivot inwards, and on the other, it seriously needs to reconsider its expansionist programs beyond its borders.
Going back about two years ago, to Iranian leaders, there may have been an imperialist project reminiscent of the country’s past glories – sprawling across Central Asia to Basra on the Arabian Gulf to the coasts of the Red Sea, overlooking the Mediterranean along Syrian, Lebanese, and Gazan coasts. Today, however, under the duress of Americans and Israelis, Iran has been pressured into negotiations that place it under scrutiny and interference in its internal affairs.
Tehran, which usually never forgets anything, remembers perfectly well the fate of its adversary Saddam Hussein. The former Iraqi president had met all the conditions required by international inspectors during inspections of the country’s weapons of mass destruction. The inspection process was partly humiliating as it required inspection of presidential palaces as well. At the end, all the due compliance failed to save Hussein from an American invasion and the end of his regime.
Tehran, however, has no illusions about what exactly is required of it. It knows that the dialogue is not just about technicalities such as limitations on uranium enrichment. Discussions will be held about Iran’s 17,000 centrifuges currently in operation and the fate of massive quantities of highly enriched uranium. But will Iran agree to destroy the excess centrifuges as Washington demands? Or will it press for storing them on Iranian soil as a safeguard — should the US revoke the new deal in the future as happened in the past?
Tehran knows that the dialogue is not just about technicalities such as limitations on uranium enrichment. Discussions will be held about centrifuges currently in operation and the fate of massive quantities of highly enriched uranium.
All these technical details are crucial and will occupy considerable deliberation in the roving negotiations between Muscat and Rome, or even other venues in the future. But once technical matters are sorted — if they ever are, then the real discussion about Iran’s political positioning will begin.
Iran entered negotiations with the US over its nuclear program hoping to secure a deal similar to the agreement signed under President Barack Obama in 2015.
The outlines of that 2015 agreement, which was later canceled by President Trump, were that Iran would continue its peaceful nuclear program to a limited extent. Enrichment would not exceed four percent and would be carried out only at the Natanz facility near Isfahan. The Fordow facility would be transformed into a nuclear research center while the Arak site would remain a heavy water production site. In this way, it would prevent Iran from producing plutonium for weapons use.
Mechanisms for inspecting nuclear facilities at any time had also been agreed upon, and the International Atomic Energy Agency was to use modern monitoring techniques for the same. Iran had reached an agreement with six major powers: the United States, China, Russia, France, Germany, and Britain, after arduous negotiations in the Swiss city of Lausanne.
In line with the agreement, the European Union and the US lifted economic and financial sanctions imposed on Iran over its nuclear program. Under the agreement, Iran also agreed to transfer enriched fuel to Russia. However, implementation of the agreement later did not go smoothly as expected, with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Tehran accusing each other.
However, everything changed after Trump came to power. On May 8, 2018, the United States withdrew from the agreement and reimposed sanctions on Tehran. Describing the agreement as disastrous, Trump said the Iranian promise was a lie. However, the rest of the major countries that had signed the agreement declared their continued commitment to the agreement. Among his accusations against Obama and later against Biden administrations, Trump said Obama and Biden transferred billions of dollars to Tehran, which it used to create chaos in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not miss any opportunity to boast that he was the one who convinced Trump to cancel the agreement with Iran. However, Israeli military circles were not pleased with the revocation. They confirmed that Netanyahu left the Iranian nuclear program without supervision until uranium enrichment rate exceeded 60 percent, and by some accounts, above 80 percent. This took Iran closer to possessing a nuclear bomb. Some Israeli experts also said Iran was weeks away from building a nuclear bomb.
Iran’s ambition to obtain a modified version of the Obama-era nuclear agreement may seem unrealistic. Tehran entered negotiations after its allies suffered painful blows and considering US-Israeli military threats to launch a devastating attack to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program.
Trump administration envoys explained that the United States will demand Iran dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. President Trump and his team were adopting the Libyan model, referring to former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s dismantling of his nuclear project and handing it over to the CIA. Trump’s preferred envoy, Steve Witkoff, added Iran was obligated to halt and eliminate its enrichment program and the weapons program.
There was a general impression in Washington that these radical positions by the Trump administration would open the door to bargaining, and that the administration was not truly serious about embroiling itself in another protracted conflict in the Middle East. In reality, the Trump administration would be satisfied with guarantees regarding the level of enrichment and the fate of nuclear fuel. In addition, such an agreement could be lived with, especially after the Iranian threat to the region would be eliminated with Israel carrying out strikes.
The devastating impact on Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus, and the open battle between US forces and the Houthis, leaves a fundamental question: Will the administration accept a modified version of the Obama nuclear agreement? If the story really ends this way, why did Trump do all of this?
The devastating impact on Hezbollah, the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus, and the open battle between US forces and the Houthis, leaves a fundamental question: Will the administration accept a modified version of the Obama nuclear agreement?
Negotiations between Washington and Tehran could not have continued for years. President Trump had given Iran an ultimatum that the agreement must be concluded within two months. Former US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz said all options were on the table now. Waltz, who lacked the diplomatic skills of Witkoff, clearly defined the requirements: complete dismantling of nuclear facilities; immediate cessation of all uranium enrichment activities; ending the ballistic missile program; unconditional access for international inspectors to all Iranian sites; and the reduction of Iran’s regional influence. Tehran, through the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ali Khamenei, rejected the ultimatum, considering it a bluff.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi said negotiations with Washington concerned only enrichment activities. He clarified there was no possibility of dismantling the nuclear project or discussing Iran’s armament with weapons other than weapons of mass destruction. Regarding its proxies in the region, Tehran said that these militias were not Tehran’s proxies and act on their own.
Israel was monitoring the situation, and American statements were coming. Failing to revive Netanyahu’s hopes for a military solution, the next day, less harsh statements from Trump frustrated Israeli officials. The New York Times leaked that the Trump administration had halted plans for an Israeli attack with Washington’s help against Iranian nuclear facilities. The newspaper said that the halt to the attack came after divisions in the administration.
The US administration was divided in two camps: one that supported negotiations, such as Vice President J.D. Vance, Steve Witkoff, the multilateral envoy, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Secretary Tulsi Gabbard. The other camp supported a strike, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and former National Security Advisor Michael Waltz, backed by influential members of the Senate. In the end, the strike was stopped for fear of rising oil prices and because of concerns about Iranian retaliation against military bases in the region.
The most important reason was that President Trump was still clinging to the idea of not getting involved in Middle East wars. The president preferred to conclude deals that were profitable for the United States. In any case, the deadline was sixty days away. It seemed that the Trump administration, which was focused on the economy, and with confronting China, Russia, and the European Union in a trade war, in addition to the pragmatism of Iran, which has lost its arms in the region, would reach a deal sooner than a confrontation.
All these hypotheses collided with one person: Benjamin Netanyahu, who for twenty years, has been keen to present the Iranian threat as an existential threat to Israel. Netanyahu emphasized that there was only one way to confront this threat: an Israeli air strike with American support to destroy Iranian nuclear facilities.
Netanyahu’s famous speech before the US Congress against the Obama administration after it signed the nuclear agreement was a historic event. The occasion presented him as the Israeli prime minister who challenged a sitting American president before Congress to demand the rejection of any nuclear agreement with Iran. This was what Netanyahu did when Iran was strong, and its axis was besieging Israel from all sides.
Netanyahu was present at the press conference in which Trump announced the return to negotiations with Iran but did not comment. He might have betted on Iranian intransigence that would undermine the negotiations and establish himself in Israeli history as a politician greater than Menachem Begin, who destroyed the Iraqi nuclear project on June 7, 1981, and Ehud Olmert, who destroyed the Syrian nuclear reactor on September 6, 2007.
The Iraqi and Syrian projects were geographically closer to Israel, but they were in their early stages and relatively undeveloped. As for the Iranian project, Netanyahu stated in one of his relentless warnings that Iran was days away from enriching the uranium needed to build a nuclear bomb. However, it seemed the decision did not lie with Netanyahu, politically or militarily. According to analysts, Israel did not have the necessary capabilities to destroy all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, which extend across its geographic area. Israel was not part of the US-Iranian negotiating table, and its request to attend as an observer was ignored.
To find out what was happening in Rome, Israel was forced to send Mossad chief David Barnea and Minister Ron Dermer to the Italian capital to meet with Steve Witkoff, the US envoy, who did not reveal much. This meant that until the end of the intensive rounds of negotiations between Iran and the United States, Netanyahu had nothing to do but hope that the negotiations would fail and that Trump would join his vision for a final solution to the Iranian nuclear project.
Against this picture, Israel was dissatisfied with the negotiations and sought to impose a de facto that would end Iranian nuclear ambitions and drag the US into its line, even forcibly. After a series of maneuvers and deceptive statements from Trump and his administration, Israel launched a sudden attack on Iran on June 13.
The strikes targeted Iran’s major nuclear, missile and air defense sites in Iran. They also targeted and eliminated a dozen nuclear scientists and military commanders. The attacks depleted a good deal of the missile arsenal and conversely caused a setback in the nuclear program. The US launched a final scene strike against the most barricaded and deeply hidden nuclear site in Fordow, in addition to the enriching stations in Natanz and Esfahan. The US indicated that its strikes have degraded the Iranian nuclear program, setting it back by one to two years.
The Iranian retaliation against the US Udeid military base in Qatar was meticulously calculated to be limited, harmless and timed in order to avoid provoking a massive strike from Washington. Tehran announced later that its revenge was fairly inflicted, and mission was accomplished. Trump declared a vaguely termed ceasefire he said was endorsed by both sides, Israel and Iran, and that it is “now time for peace.”
The Iranian proxy arms in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen were nowhere to be seen during the Israeli and US strikes, save few missiles launched from Yemen. The Israeli bet on destabilizing the regime in Tehran turned to be an illusion as enormous number of Iranians took to the streets chanting death to Israel and the US and lauding their army “heroes” and leaders. But the accuracy of the targeted assassinations of a larger number of the leading commanders and scientists revealed how dangerously porous the Iranian security was and how deeply it was infiltrated.
The immature end of the war suggests that Israel might have miscalculated the duration of the conflict and the actual missile capabilities of Iran. It might have weakened Iran and degraded its nuclear program, but it definitely failed to undermine its nuclear ambitions. This is considering the fact that Iran still has tens of nuclear facilities unscathed, in addition to the doubts about the degree of damage inflicted on the nuclear targets hit by the US.
The immature end of the war suggests that Israel might have miscalculated the duration of the conflict and the actual missile capabilities of Iran. It might have weakened Iran and degraded its nuclear program, but it definitely failed to undermine its nuclear ambitions.
The US was obviously cautious about complete involvement in the war due to geopolitical fears and domestic political pressures. But most important is that the strikes further amputated Iran’s proxies and its expansionist schemes through nuclear might. However, they have given Iran the coveted excuse to get rid of the humiliating surveillance and monitoring activities it had been subjected to by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which it now perceived as a spying agency of the west. This can give Tehran a free hand to accelerate its nuclear program, raising potential for another round of military confrontation.
The ceasefire that lacks an aftermath strategy to address the casus belli, i.e., the Iranian nuclear program, adds to the uncertainty surrounding the Iranian calculations. It fails to dispel the increasing hatred between the two warring parties and might widen the distrust between Tehran and Washington. The nuclear talks between the US and Tehran that followed the ceasefire have proved to be futile so far.
The Iranian stance has become stiffer, and the country is further insisting on enriching uranium at home. The regime has a gut feeling that it is the real target, not the nuclear program. They still have Saddam Hussein tragedy live in their memory. They realize that whatever guarantees they offer or whatever concessions they make will never satisfy their adversaries. The least thing they will accept is a regime change or complete chaos in Iran. This is one of the reasons the Iranian regime is still clenching onto diehard resistance to western demands.
In the meantime, Israel’s notion of destabilization the Middle East as a means of maintaining hegemony and a security guarantee is not a viable one. This is clear, especially after the 12-day war with Iran revealed that it alone cannot guarantee its dominance or victory.
In the new American strategic vision reshaping the global political landscape, analysts take notice of Donald Trump along with JD Vance and Marco Rubio sharing an insatiable appetite to reshape the world. They are comparable to Dwight Eisenhower, Harry Truman, and George Marshall in post-World War II scenario. Or President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the early 1970s and Zbigniew Brzezinski in the late 1970s.
The comparison seems somewhat comical due to the erratic behavior of the new strategists — Trump and his colleagues — on social media platforms like X and Truth Social. The posts on these social media at times add a touch of lack of seriousness to the atmosphere. Nevertheless, Washington says that the world as we know it (democracy, NATO, European allies, dictators, free trade) no longer exists, and Iran is at the heart of all of this.
The dream of changing Iran was tempting to the imagination of President George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Richard Perle, among others. But they remained preoccupied with problems of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terrorism. But NOW – it is an exceptionally good opportunity as the European Union is obsessed with its fears of Russia, the rise of the far right, refugees, Islam, and energy. And Russia is exhausted from its war in Ukraine, and China is busy securing its export markets amid blitz of American tariffs.
Tehran knows that if the United States and Israel decide to attack Iran again, Moscow and Beijing will do nothing to protect it. The examples of which are numerous to count (the fall of Saddam and Bashar al-Assad, the destruction of Gaza, Hezbollah and southern Lebanon, and large-scale military operations against the Houthis in Yemen).
Washington wants Tehran to transform from an enemy into an ally, urging it to forget the narrative of “the Great Satan.” The US wants Iran to open its heart and markets to American companies, and flourish together. Meanwhile, the US does not ask the Iranian regime to change its internal policies towards questions like repression or women’s rights. President Trump does not hate dictators as he once declared that he loves them and they love him.
The American offer seems tempting to Tehran as it does not affect the foundations of the ruling regime. However, it will mean abandoning its day-and-night denunciations of the United States. But is Iran really ready for such a drastic change, accepting the alliance with the US, and distancing itself from Moscow and Beijing? Will it also have to dismantle its regional axis, which has been severely destroyed, and perhaps it no longer has the energy and finance to rebuild it?
The more serious question is whether Iran will have to accept normalization with Israel or at least be content with watching Israel dominate the Middle East. The answer to this may not lie in the agreement, but rather in the method of reaching it.
This time, the US administration is conducting the negotiations alone, and the new relationship with Iran will be designed to impose a new political reality summarized in distancing Iran from Russia and China, blocking the path of European companies, monopolizing the Iranian market and launching reconstruction projects in Iran that benefit American companies. The scene that emerged after the nuclear agreement during the Obama era saw Tehran’s hotels filled with representatives of European companies, and commercial offers from Western Europe, Russia, China, and Türkiye overwhelmed Tehran.
The lack of diplomatic relations between Washington and Tehran at the time deprived American companies of promising market in Iran, with its one hundred million consumers and enormous oil and gas development potential. The Revolutionary Guards, which controls 40 percent of the Iranian economy, also wanted to preserve its privileges.
What confirms these new suspicions of American inclinations is that Trump’s envoy Witkoff has no knowledge or interest in the nuclear issue. He is a businessperson and real estate developer. It is no surprise that he is tasked with ending the Russian-Ukrainian war. The US administration has made it clear that the guns will not fall silent until Ukraine signs a deal for rare earth minerals located on its soil, and until Moscow agrees not to compete with the United States for oil and gas markets in Western Europe. But does confronting the United States constitute the raison d’être of the Iranian regime? Will the regime fall if it abandons its long-standing rhetoric?
During the 1950s, 60s and 70s, Iran did not particularly belong to spirit of the times that prevailed in the global South. Consider the policy of non-alignment, nationalization, socialism, support for Cuba, the Palestinian cause, Abdel Nasser, Nehru, and Tito, among others. Rather Iran took a completely different path. Except for a brief period during the tenure of Mohammed Mossadegh’s government, Iran was a major US ally and the largest purchaser of American weapons. It established strategic relations with Israel. Internally, politics was repressive, but the state was open about social and modernization policies.
Washington wants Tehran to return to those “beautiful” times, which became the direct reason for the hostility towards the US after the Iranian revolution. That hostility increased due to several other reasons like the US’ support for Saddam Hussein and leaders of the Gulf states. During the tenure of President Obama and the friendship between his Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, many taboos were shattered in Iranian politics.
However, things went back to square one with Trump gaining power for the first time in 2016. The hawks of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard exploited Trump’s hostility and revived hatred towards America, more so after the assassination of Revolutionary Guard’s AL Quds Force commander, Qassem Soleimani, on January 3, 2020.
The Revolutionary Guard commanders and hardline clerics in the Qom seminary, fear the influence of American culture on Iranian youth, who want to glorify life, and no longer accept the repression practiced on the Internet, personal freedoms, the veil (women hijab) and the religious obsession related to glorifying the dead and shrines.
Iranian leaders, who are known for their precise calculations and patience to achieve their goals, will test Washington’s intentions through talks and examine the possibility of reaching a settlement similar to the Obama-era nuclear agreement. Followingly, they will want to return to the era of regional hegemony — the era of dominance over four Arab capitals, the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean. Or they will face Trump’s wrath after his patience completely runs out. Facing all of this, will Iran turn to focus internally to confront the loss of its regional expansion project?
During the peak of the Iranian project’s success in the region, which had been worked on with great patience and enormous financial costs for 25 years, Iranian statements were extremely arrogant, such as, “We are an empire from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean,” “We control four Arab capitals: Beirut, Damascus, Sana’a, and Baghdad,” “We threaten Israel with hundreds of thousands of missiles from southern Lebanon and Gaza,” and “We besiege Israel from all sides, including from within the West Bank.”
Those were the happy days of the buoyant Iranian project. But the most important statement came from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself, who said, “We are expanding in the region, so we don’t have to fight on the streets of Tehran.” This was the clearest indication that Iran’s expansion project in the region was aimed at protecting the Iranian regime at home.
Iran’s expansionist project in the region was aimed at protecting the regime at home; this was clear when Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said, “We are expanding in the region, so we don’t have to fight on the streets of Tehran.”
But will the Supreme Leader now accept a settlement having lost most of its ability to confront Israel in the half year, including the air defense network that protects cities and nuclear facilities, which American experts say was largely destroyed in the attack launched by Israel on October 26, 2024? Tehran denied it and said that the damage was marginal.
Throughout all the years of exporting the revolution and projects of hegemony in the region, the Iranians stood in opposition to what its leaders were proposing.
The younger generations in Iran developing relationships with the outside world through the internet, satellite TV stations and social media have ambitions. First, they did not live during the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and have no memory of the suppression of Iranian society at the hands of the Iranian intelligence agency SAVAK, nor of the corruption of the Shah’s family and the accumulation of wealth at the hands of the Shah’s sister, Ashraf Pahlavi. All that young men and women in Iran see now is the rule of the clergy, which they consider more corrupt than the era of the Shah.
The new Iranian generations want to get rid of sanctions and being reconstruction. They seek a foreign policy that does not clash with the West and the United States. They do not want to send money to foreign projects whose significance they do not understand, such as financing Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The messages sent by student demonstrations in the aftermath of the killing of student Mahsa Amini for not fully adhering to wearing the Islamic hijab by security forces were clear. The Iranian youths want an end to the era of clerical rule and the establishment of a democratic government that does not engage in costly foreign adventures that waste the country’s oil wealth and interfere in the private lives of individuals.
The successor of hardliner President Raisi, who died in a mysterious helicopter accident, reformist President Masoud Bazghashian did nothing to calm an entire generation of Iranians who see their country heading towards a military confrontation with the United States.
The roots of the Iranian youth revolution go back to the massive protests that erupted after the 2009 presidential election that was won by hardline candidate Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. At the time, the opposition questioned the election results and asserted that the real winner was the reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi. Immediately after the announcement of Ahmadinejad’s victory, five million demonstrators took to the streets of Tehran, chanting slogans such as “Where is my vote? Who stole my vote?” The protests were met with a violent crackdown, which led to the deaths of dozens of demonstrators.
During the Green Revolution, young Iranian men and women began to widely use social media to spread their ideas, which were summarized around the principle of “Iran First.” Its most important slogan was “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my heart is a sacrifice for Iran.” This slogan was the first public rejection of the policy of exporting the revolution or interfering in the affairs of the region.
One of the protest leaders, Mehdi Karroubi, demanded that the most sensitive files be declassified, such as the files of Iran’s relationships with Hezbollah and Hamas, and that the money Iran pays in its regional adventures be made public.
The demonstrators also demanded a review of the absolute powers of the Guardian Jurist (who is considered, from a doctrinal point of view, the deputy of Imam Mahdi, whom Shiites believe has disappeared and will return at the end of time to establish justice). This particular demand angered the Iranian authorities as it related to the basic structure upon which the Islamic Republic was established during the time of Ayatollah Khomeini.
The authorities began accusing protesters of acting on foreign orders, a common accusation in the Middle East. Whenever protests erupted, authorities accused protesters of acting at the behest of American Central Intelligence Agency or the Israeli Mossad. What fueled the regime’s anger was protesters’ demand to review the theory of the Guardianship of the Jurist and whether it was suitable as a valid political theory for governance. The authorities responded to these demands by arresting all first and second rank leaders of the protest movement, controlling the media, and practicing strict censorship.
The violent suppression of the protests as well as growing rift between the young leaders of the movement and the old generation of reformists, who rejected the radical demands of the youth, caused the protest movement to decline throughout the country. The movement began losing momentum, partly because it was a movement of the middle class living in the cities and ignored those working in the countryside and distant provinces that continued to provide support to the regime. The movement lost strength also because hundreds of thousands of young people had joined repressive forces such as the Pasdaran and the Basij due to the lack of suitable job opportunities in their areas.
The Iranian political system is unique in the world and contains irreconcilable contradictions. On the one hand, general elections are held for parliament members and the president, but all of these elections are governed by such conditions that make the entire democratic process resemble a contest with a known outcome. Candidacy for parliament or the presidential election is conditional, subject to the approval from a body known as the Guardian Council, which is appointed by the Supreme Leader. This body scrutinizes candidacy applications, and either approves or rejects them according to vague principles. For example, it rejected Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s candidacy in the presidential election, in which Ebrahim Raisi got elected, despite Ahmadinejad serving twice as president after 2005 and 2009 elections.
The Guardian Council is not required to furnish any explanation for rejection of any candidacy. Generally, it filters candidacies undesirable to the Supreme Leader. The unique situation in Iran is that there is a semi-democratic system and elections are held. But the final decision on all state affairs rests with an unelected figure: the Supreme Leader, or the Guardianship of the Jurist (Ayatollah Sistani, the most important Shiite authority, has so far rejected this position). The idea of the Guardianship of the Jurist has spread throughout the world and so have most of Iran’s senior ayatollahs.
Obviously, Iran is on its way to losing all its regional arms. Nonetheless, it chose to protect some allies and leave others to face their fate. It used the diplomatic channel through Oman to find a way out for the Houthis and succeeded in halting US attacks on Yemen.
Why did Tehran seek to save the Houthis? Perhaps it was trying to maintain a threat to Saudi Arabia and Gulf states; to prevent them from aiding the US in launching an attack on Iran in case negotiations fail. At the same time, it was seizing the opportunity to disrupt global trade in the Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal in the event of a war, given its ability to close the Strait of Hormuz in the Arabian Gulf. Using the same strategy, Tehran is trying to find a way out for its Iraqi allies and spare them a fate like that of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Bashar al-Assad.
On the other hand, Tehran considers Baghdad its last line of defense due to the significant intermingling of Shiites in Iraq and Iran, and the presence of major Shiite shrines in Iraq. In any case, Tehran, known for its pragmatic actions, has opted for cold calculations. The Houthis and Iraqi militias still have countries, and resources, and they still offer strategic benefits to Tehran. On the other hand, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime have become a hopeless cause.
Hezbollah’s case in Lebanon appears lost and hopeless. Refunding and arming the party is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible. Israel refuses to withdraw from strategic sites. In southern Lebanon, Hezbollah activists and leaders continue to be targets daily. The Lebanese army and the government are slowly but persistently reducing Hezbollah’s influence within state institutions. Illegal crossings have been closed, and the Lebanese state is closely monitoring Beirut’s airport and port with the help of Western security agencies. Movement of land convoys halted after the fall of Assad regime in Damascus.
Iran’s only strategy is an attempt to preserve municipal and parliamentary election gains of the Shiite community in Lebanon. It seeks political allies after most of its former allies have jumped from the sinking Hezbollah ship. In short, the Iranian imperial project in Lebanon has returned to the era before the Khomeini revolution. It is merely seeking influence among the Lebanese Shiite community without attempting to establish a state within a state or control the state. Meanwhile, Lebanese authorities are set to begin the process of disarming the group’s militia arm.
On September 21, 2014, the Houthi Ansar Allah group took control of the capital, Sana’a, and formed a ruling council. About 16 months later, in March 2016, a military intervention began, led by Saudi Arabia and an Arab coalition consisting of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. The United States provided support with ammunition and weapons. The Saudi Arabia-led coalition launched air strikes and imposed a naval blockade. The Arab intervention succeeded in halting the Houthis’ expansion southward and recapturing large areas from them. However, it failed to end their control of the capital or the provinces of Amran, Saada, and Hodeidah.
The country was pushed to the brink of famine because of the military operation. After Hamas launched a military attack on civilian and military sites in southern Israel, and subsequent Israeli military reaction, the Houthis announced their intervention in the conflict. On November 19, the Houthis hijacked a cargo ship in the Red Sea, claiming it was linked to Israeli commercial interests. This operation was a prelude to many similar actions that disrupted global trade in the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. The Houthis launched a large number of attacks on Israel using ballistic missiles and drones, and the Israeli army responded with a devastating attack on the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah.
The Houthis possess a large military arsenal, inherited from the former Yemeni army when they seized its headquarters. Iran supplied them with ballistic missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometers and a large assortment of Iranian drones. In any case, the Houthis’ participation, and influence in the Israeli-Hamas conflict was very symbolic, and perhaps the participation was merely an attempt by the Houthis to gain popularity after their approval on the Yemeni streets declined due to the deterioration of living conditions.
After the Trump administration arrived at the White House, Trump and his team’s patience with the Houthis’ actions had run out. The US administration demanded that the Houthis stop targeting Israel or commercial ships, but they refused to respond. With the resumption of fighting in Gaza after the failure of the second phase of the truce talks, the Houthis escalated their attacks, and the US forces launched violent raids on vital targets in all areas controlled by the Houthis. The US attacks were similar to the airstrikes carried out by the Arab coalition but lacked an effective ground attack.
The Houthis could have withstood American attacks for a long time. But the Trump administration is known for its strong disapproval towards the idea of a long-term military involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts. In a development that surprised Tel Aviv and the region, President Trump announced an agreement reached with the Houthis to halt American military strikes on Yemen in exchange for a Houthi commitment not to target ships in the Red Sea.
Like most of President Trump’s executive orders, the form of the agreement and the reason for reaching it are unclear. The negotiations that led to this agreement were conducted secretly, as usual, in Muscat, the capital of Oman, under the auspices of the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Trump announced the deal with Houthis during his meeting with Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney. He said, “The Houthis have surrendered and asked the United States to halt the raids, and they no longer want to fight.” It is unclear whether the agreement includes full freedom of navigation in the Red Sea or only a cessation of attacks on American ships. The Houthis, on their part, said the agreement does not include Israel, and they carried out their threats by continuing to launch missiles at Israel. It is strange that the Israelis were not included in these developments, or why the Trump administration did not request guarantees that attacks on Israel would cease.
Tel Aviv did not hide its annoyance with all that was happening, with expectations that this disregard for Israel was only the beginning. All of this caused shock in Tel Aviv, beginning with the dismissal of US National Security Advisor Michael Waltz. The reason for dismissal, as reported in Washington, was that Waltz coordinated with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Iranian issue. It is said they attempted to sabotage the Muscat negotiations and were preparing a military operation against Iran. In Washington, they say it was too early to talk about a crisis between Trump and Netanyahu, but Trump not stopping in Israel during his Middle East trip suggests the crisis has already begun.
In Iraq, the story is more complex. The Iranian-backed militias have not suffered a military defeat and continue to dominate the Iraqi government, particularly through their penetration of security services and the army. However, from an economic angle, the picture appears gloomy. The United States has begun to employ significant pressure tactics, including the cancellation of all exemptions granted to the Iraqi government. Due to developments in the region, the intended rapid withdrawal of the international coalition forces fighting ISIS from Iraq has been removed from agenda.
Moreover, the Iraqi militias have begun to feel the need of American advisors and forces in Iraq after the change in Damascus. The man who went to fight American forces and the Shiites collaborating with them, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, has become president of Syria under the name of Ahmed al-Sharaa. Iraqi fears are that al-Julani still maintains ties with Sunnis in Iraq, who are deeply dissatisfied with the current government in Baghdad.
In Iraqi terms, increased reliance on Washington necessarily means reduced dependence on Tehran. The Iraqi government has begun to speak more loudly about restricting arms to the state and reducing the influence of militias within the country. In the first signs of a retreat, representatives of the Iraqi militias announced they were not interested in getting involved in supporting Gaza or provoking Israel. Rather, they gave the Iraqi government a free hand to develop its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Like many in the region, they are patiently awaiting the results of the Iran nuclear talks.
The frantic race between reaching an agreement or moving towards a military end to the conflict appeared not to end. Washington talked about a decisive round, and the final red lines for both sides have now become clear. Steve Witkoff, the US envoy, confirms that if the two sides do not reach specific agreements, the negotiations will be useless. Witkoff did not keep the US red lines secret, and he clearly stated: “No enrichment. There can be no nuclear enrichment program inside Iran again. This is our red line. This means that the Natanz enrichment facilities, the Fordow plant, and the Isfahan plant must be dismantled.”
American clarity has never been this clear before, which means that a nuclear agreement similar to what occurred during the Obama era, or a modified version of it, is far from American vision. However, the other side raised different red lines, and in fact, they were completely contradictory. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, who negotiated with Witkoff, said that Iran had the right to possess the full nuclear fuel cycle, meaning uranium enrichment in Iran. “Other matters can be agreed upon, such as the degree of enrichment or the fate of the nuclear fuel.”
Meanwhile, both the US and Iran have expressed their willingness to continue talks even after the recent strikes, retaliation, and subsequent ceasefire.
The United States and the region will be closely monitoring the fate of the negotiations. However, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and the Iranian opposition each have different aspirations for the outcome.
The three Gulf capitals which Trump visited — Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha — have different stories and memories about their Iranian neighbor and the future of their relationship with it.
Riyadh presents itself as the leader of the Sunni world, in contrast to Iran’s leadership of the Shiite world. This means that both sides have inherited a narrative that spans more than a thousand years of Sunni-Shiite confrontation across the Islamic world. Riyadh’s relations with Tehran have been fraught since the first day of Ayatollah Khomeini’s return to Tehran from Paris. The Iranian revolution identified Riyadh as one of the allies of the former Shah’s regime. This assessment was not fully accurate as all Gulf capitals did not see the Shah as an ally in the region and viewed with apprehension Shah’s attempt to establish relations with the Arab Shiites in the Gulf.
However, Tehran’s revolutionary rulers chose this line because it made it easier for them to continue interfering in the region and dominating it. On the other hand, the Gulf states felt comfortable getting rid of the Shah and Iran’s competition for an alliance with Washington. Realizing those close to Washington have a freer hand in the region than their opponents, all the Gulf states supported Saddam Hussein’s regime. During his long war with Iran, when the war finally ended, contrary to expectations, Gulf-Iranian relations improved.
Iran emerged from the war exhausted and wanted some breathing space. It began sending moderates to the presidency, such as Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, who regularly visited the Gulf states. Talk began about the unity of the Islamic world, with its Sunni and Shiite wings. Saddam Hussein turned against the Gulf states and invaded Kuwait, and alliances were turned upside down.
Before the talks began and during critical moments, Abbas Araghchi made a habit of visiting the Gulf Arab states to brief them on what was happening. Diplomatic language became more friendly, especially after the military defeats suffered by Iran’s allies in the region. Riyadh clearly wants guarantees that Iran will not become an unstoppable nuclear power in the region. It wants its own peaceful nuclear program in partnership with the United States. Most importantly, it wants guarantees that Tehran will not interfere in internal affairs, particularly Tehran’s attempts to support Saudi Shiites in the Eastern Province.
Riyadh accuses Tehran of all the unrest in Qatif and the attacks on its embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Isfahan after the execution of a Saudi Shiite cleric, who was leading protests. Riyadh also accuses Tehran of being behind the Manama protests in Bahrain and the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, who was close to Riyadh and held Saudi citizenship. The list of Saudi bitterness and anger toward Tehran is exceedingly long and does not stop at supporting Hezbollah and the Houthis, who attacked Saudi Arabia with Scud missiles. Supporting Iraqi groups and establishing a large alliance in the region extending from Basra to Gaza is considered by Saudi Arabia as an existential threat.
Even the most prominent prevailing analysts say that Tehran ordered the October 7 attack to stop Saudi attempts to join the Abraham Accords. If Riyadh wants Tehran not to be nuclear-armed, not to have long-range missiles, to stop its interference in the region, and not to communicate with or incite Saudi Shiites, will the US-Iran agreement guarantee all of this?
Witkoff says that all other things are secondary and unimportant, and the only important thing is Iran’s nuclear and enrichment program. In other words, Washington will not seek to include in the agreement all the factors of the region’s concern about Iran, and perhaps in the worst-case scenario, the success of a US-Iran agreement may lead to an alliance between Washington and Tehran that overshadows American relations with the Arab Gulf states. Does this mean that Riyadh will be hostile to the success of the negotiations in Muscat?
Until the last moments before June 13, Riyadh’s strategy is that a nuclear Iran ranks first on the list of threats, so it will not stand in its way or obstruct it in the manner of Netanyahu. The appropriate response to the possibility of a US-Iranian understanding and the coming alliance is to strengthen the US-Saudi partnership from the defeat of the Iranian axis as nothing remains the same as before.
In the middle of a Saudi nuclear program under the supervision and assistance of Washington, and the implementation of Trump’s dream of investing a trillion dollars in the American market and accepting more American exports to the Saudi market, Riyadh seems comfortable and ready to accept any outcome in these negotiations.
Failed talks will increase American and Israeli pressure on Tehran, and this is a happy event. Its success may lead to the return of Iran as a rational neighbor with the ambition to focus on itself, develop its country, and forget about foreign adventures. Beyond Saudi hopes, the experience of the last twenty years of indirect confrontation seems to indicate that when Tehran had a major alliance in the region, it was unable to decisively influence Saudi policies. Its greatest successes were the Houthis threat, which ended with a Saudi initiative, as well as Saudi Arabia’s loss of its old alliance with Damascus, which was established by the late King Faisal, and the loss of its positions in Lebanon.
But all of that is over now. The new Lebanese government, President Joseph Aoun, and the new Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa all want relations with Saudi Arabia and financial support to rescue them from the reality to which Iran’s policy in the region has brought them.
Abu Dhabi has a more complex story with Tehran. The issue here is not just about Iranian attempts at regional hegemony, interference in internal affairs, or the positioning of Abu Dhabi and Tehran on two different political axes in the region. The UAE has territories occupied by Iran: the three islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. Abu Dhabi demands that every Arab, Islamic, or international meeting reaffirm its claim to the three islands. Tehran refuses to negotiate or litigate before the International Court of Justice. Essentially, this is where it all began, but it does not end there.
Today, every issue the UAE embraces can find Iran on the opposing side, whether it concerns regional axes, Arab issues, relations with the West, or Israel. With the decline of Saudi Arabia’s role due to its preoccupation with its internal affairs or economic development in recent years, the UAE has emerged as a party leading policy across the region and the Arab world in the face of Muslim Brotherhood or Salafi political Islam.
On the Iranian nuclear issue, the UAE has taken a middle ground. It has not adopted Netanyahu’s proposals regarding militarization of the issue or incitement to strike nuclear reactors. It views the success of negotiations between the United States and Iran as a suitable solution to the crisis. Abu Dhabi is satisfied with the course of events and is willing to deal with any outcome of the negotiations.
Meanwhile, it has been developing relations eastward with India and China as trading partners as well as with the Russian Federation to reach an understanding on core issues in the region. It has incredibly special relations with the first and second Trump administrations. After the Abraham Accords, it developed its relations with Israel in the commercial and security fields.
Long before all of this, the UAE had transformed into an indispensable trading hub for all parties, particularly in the re-export trade, acting as a mediator between East and West. In any case, Abu Dhabi is monitoring the negotiations to determine whether the agreement, if achieved, will have an impact on Iran’s behavior in the region.
President Trump’s third stop was in Doha, the oddball ally. On the one hand, Qatar hosts all Islamist and jihadist organizations and parties, from Hamas in Palestine to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria, which recently took power, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Islamists in Sudan, the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, and the Justice and Charity Movement in Morocco. It offers Al Jazeera as their platform to address the Arab world and the world. At the same time, it hosts Israeli hostage talks and has established itself as the sole mediator in this matter. Mossad and Shin Bet leaders regularly visit Doha.
For Doha, which hosts the largest US military base in the region, Iran is a key ally, and the two countries share the same policy on all regional issues. Even when they took opposing positions on the Syrian issue, with Tehran supporting Bashar al-Assad and Doha supporting the Islamist opposition, this did not affect their complex relationship. Their relationship may stay intact despite Iran fired missiles against US Al Udeid Base in Qatar. Though Qatar protested the attack, the event also gave it an opportunity to become a crucial mediator in the resulting ceasefire following 12-day war.
On the Iranian nuclear issue, Qatar is maintaining the general Gulf position of rejecting Iran’s possession of nuclear weapons, while supporting Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear program and rejecting Israeli threats. The current deadlock in talks seems very favorable. Doha prefers a situation of neither military confrontation nor reaching an agreement. A military confrontation will place it in a dangerous position if the conflict expands with the presence of US forces on its territory. However, the success of negotiations and the building of good relations between Washington and Tehran renders Doha’s role as a mediator useless, and its role in all other issues witnessing Iranian-American clashes is automatically diminished.
Despite its preference for the status quo, Doha does not possess sufficient influence to turn the tide, nor does it possess sufficient leverage over the Trump administration. All it can do is hope that the state of neither war nor peace continues for as long as possible.
The term “Iranian opposition” encompasses a broad spectrum of parties and organizations across political, ethnic, and ideological lines. In reality, they share nothing in common except hostility to the Iranian regime.
The oldest organization, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), which has since been renamed as the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), no longer holds noteworthy influence on events or the regime. Its leadership, now based in Albania, merely denounces the Iranian regime’s behavior and exploits specific events, such as the murder of Iranian student Mahsa Amini, to organize demonstrations in European capitals.
The organization has presented itself as capable of obtaining secret information about Iran’s nuclear program, thanks to the presence of pro-Iranian elements. It provides this information to European governments and the US administration. However, trust in this information has declined as it comes from an organization that is hostile to the Iranian regime, no matter what it does.
The NCRI organizes periodic political rallies attended by American and European figures, but these rallies attract only advocates of a military solution who doubt the effectiveness of negotiations and seek military strikes against Iranian nuclear reactors. The advocates are like John Bolton, the National Security Advisor who was fired from the first Trump administration due to his constant calls for a military solution, or Rudy Giuliani, Trump’s former personal lawyer.
In any case, the organization feels threatened by any rapprochement between the West and Iran and rejected the nuclear agreement reached during the Obama administration. In fact, the success of any negotiations would serve a major blow to the National Council of Resistance of Iran.
The Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, which was a partner in overthrowing the Shah’s regime, has lost much of its influence in the Iranian street, and today’s Iranian youth opposed to the regime seem uninterested in all of its old proposals.
The rest of the Iranian opposition is represented by the Kurdish PJAK Party, an extension of the Turkish Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK). This party is also going through a period of weakness, as its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, has announced the end of the armed confrontation with the Turkish state and the abandonment of the dream of a Greater Kurdistan that includes large areas of Türkiye, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Every branch of the party in Syria, Iraq, and Iran is trying to find an independent path.
The rest of the Iranian opposition parties are not in a better situation, as the armed parties and movements that represent the Baloch ethnicity are still waging a futile armed struggle, and some Baloch opposition factions have become so desperate that they have declared their allegiance to al-Qaeda.
In fact, Iranian opposition parties are more hostile to each other than to the Iranian regime, and all their attempts to coordinate among themselves or to hold a national conference to agree on a future program for Iran have failed. Without a unified vision for the Iranian opposition and an agreement on a democratic future for the country, these parties will have no role in Iran’s future, whether Iran continues its confrontation with the West or reaches an understanding to return to the international community. This return would certainly be a blow to the Iranian opposition.
Things seem crucial this time. Tehran’s bet on the end of the Trump era and waiting for better days with a Democratic administration is far more complicated. The US president still has four years left, and there is no guarantee that the Democrats will return at the end of his term if his program to combat illegal immigration or the return of manufacturing to the United States succeeds.
Tehran also wasted the opportunity of four years of Biden’s term without attempting to persuade Washington to renew the nuclear agreement that Trump abrogated. It did not seize the opportunity to develop its relations with the West. Throughout Biden’s term, it was preoccupied with attempts at regional hegemony, supporting anti-Israel organizations, and attempting to thwart the Abraham Accords.
Tehran wasted the opportunity of four years of Biden’s term without attempting to persuade Washington to renew the nuclear agreement that Trump abrogated. It did not develop its relations with the West since it was preoccupied with attempts at regional hegemony.
Tehran entered the negotiations at its weakest point. The country’s economic situation is causing anger among most of the population, and the form of clerical rule no longer holds appeal to Iranian youth. Likewise, its involvement in foreign adventures is a crucial issue for Washington. It can no longer ignore Iran’s proximity to an enrichment level that would allow developing a nuclear bomb. There are influential forces in Washington, including the pro-Israel lobby, calling for the destruction of nuclear reactors apart from the possibility of future strikes. However, reaching an agreement will never be easy.
The US administration must appear profoundly serious about reaching an agreement, but at the same time, it must distance itself from Israeli influences that offer only one way out of the crisis. Netanyahu caused this entire crisis when he persuaded Trump to cancel the nuclear agreement and leave the Iranian program without strict oversight for several years. Israel is no longer severely threatened by Iran’s allies after the blows that Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Assad regime received.
The US administration must learn a lesson from the failure of the previous nuclear agreement. The previous agreement focused on technical matters, i.e., oversight of nuclear facilities, the nuclear fuel cycle, and the level of enrichment, leaving the political issue to good intentions. The result was that Iran received billions of dollars from the Obama administration and used it to arm its allies and cause several wars and disasters in the region.
Today, it seems that the ambition to modify Iran’s behavior at home and abroad is extremely optimistic. This type of regime may not seem able to abandon confrontation because conflict is the reason for its existence, and only through this the legitimacy it seeks can be achieved due to its socio-political composition.
It seems that the best thing the Trump administration can do to the region and the world is signing an agreement that guarantees that Tehran will not obtain a nuclear bomb and link the lifting of sanctions to gradual, step-by-step process. As such, the gradual process should guarantee that the incoming funds will not be used for excessive armament at home or arming outlaw militias in the region.
Trump should also ensure that Iran use the fund to develop the Iranian economy. Iran should contribute to the expansion of the Iranian middle class and increase its connection with the world, at which point anything may be possible.
Remains the question haunting Iran’s adversaries and allies alike: Whatever comes next — retrenchment, reinvention, or reemergence — depends less on Tehran, and more on the region’s response.