Eagle Intelligence Reports
China’s September 3 military parade was more than a show of strength. It signaled the arrival of a new nuclear era that could upend global security calculations. The parade highlighted how the PRC’s growing nuclear arsenal directly challenges US strategic deterrence, escalates regional proliferation dangers, and threatens the demise of global arms control. These challenges ensure that the PRC buildup will substantially influence the future defense policies of the United States and its allies.
This article first reviews the two types of proliferation challenges engendered by China’s nuclear ambitions. These are a further vertical increase in the arsenals of established nuclear weapons states and the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. The text also evaluates some reasons why the PRC orchestrated such a flashy display of its arsenal. The piece ends by outlining potential scenarios for the global and regional proliferation environments.
China’s September 3 military parade signaled the arrival of a new nuclear era that could upend global security calculations. It highlighted how the PRC’s growing nuclear arsenal directly challenges US strategic deterrence
The parade marked the first occasion that Beijing presented all three legs of its nuclear triad in a single showing. These included new air-launched, submarine-launched, and land-based long-range ballistic missiles. They will supplement the PLA’s already extensive portfolio of dual-capable ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic strategic strike systems capable of conveying nuclear as well as conventional munitions. China has been building silos suitable for stationing hundreds of additional strategic missiles in coming years.
Even before the parade, US defense officials had indicated that “the growth in, and diversification of, the Chinese nuclear force…will be a defining feature of this new nuclear age.” Among other consequences, the buildup challenges global arms control treaties constructed in a world with only two peer nuclear-weapon states. These treaties’ viability depended on Beijing’s continuing its long-standing practice of maintaining a modest arsenal of only a few hundred warheads equipped with a couple of dozen missiles that could target the US homeland.
During its first term, the Trump administration, responding to early manifestations of the buildup, unsuccessfully attempted to induce Beijing to join strategic arms reduction talks with Russia and the United States. The Biden administration instead attempted to interest the Chinese strategic community in non-treaty mechanisms that would encourage responsible nuclear behavior and decrease risks through expanded transparency. However, Beijing reflexively rejected negotiating both types of arms control agreements with Washington, whether bilaterally or trilaterally with Moscow.
From the perspective of regional deterrence, the lack of any reference to denuclearization during the PRC-DPRK engagements on the sidelines of the parade stood out. Their previous statements had regularly affirmed the goal of a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.
The omission suggests that Beijing has joined Moscow (which had ceased calling for DPRK denuclearization since the onset of the Russia-Ukraine War) in accepting, at least de facto, that Pyongyang will retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. If Beijing persists in this stance, it will amplify challenges to US and Asian deterrence calculations across multiple scenarios.
The lack of any reference to denuclearization suggests that Beijing has joined Moscow in accepting that Pyongyang will retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future
The parade allowed the Chinese government to display its diplomatic and military prowess. More heads of state attended this year’s event than any previous parade, including the leaders of Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Though Russian President Vladimir Putin has become a regular visitor to Beijing, DPRK Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un’s appearance was notable. His previous visit occurred in January 2019. Furthermore, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian also participated. Though his status and visibility were inferior to that of Putin, Kim, or PRC President Xi Jinping, the parade marked the first occasion when all four leaders of the so-called “Axis of Autocracy” attended the same event in person.
PRC analysts defended their nuclear display as addressing perennial Western complaints about inadequate Chinese defense transparency. Even so, the parade also demonstrated that the PRC had the power to execute the vision of a new system of global governance that Xi had presented in his SCO summit presentation a few days earlier. In his address at the parade, Xi said that the PLA would “firmly safeguard China’s sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.” He further communicated to the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and others that “The Chinese nation is a great nation that is never intimidated by any bullies.”
The PRC government has never indicated how large its nuclear forces will grow or the goals Beijing seeks through its massive buildup. The parade will amplify suspicions that China is pursuing strategic parity with the United States and the Russian Federation. Xi’s comments will also intensify worries that China’s enhanced nuclear shield could convince PRC leaders in a crisis that they could manipulate, or at least manage, escalation risks, perhaps precipitating a war that might otherwise not have occurred.
Another objective of the parade was to weaken US extended deterrence guarantees by demonstrating to international audiences that the United States was vulnerable to PRC nuclear threats. By displaying so many nuclear-capable missiles, the PLA aims to shape foreign calculations, specifically that the United States lacks the means to destroy the Chinese deterrent in a first strike or employ missile defenses to negate a retaliatory strike against the US homeland or its regional allies. Beijing wants to convince the latter that US defense guarantees are inherently unreliable and therefore their governments should prudently accept PRC demands.
Beijing wants to convince US allies that US defense guarantees are inherently unreliable and therefore their governments should prudently accept PRC demands
Since returning to the presidency, Trump has reaffirmed the goal of capping the three countries’ nuclear forces. US officials may use the upcoming Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, when Trump and Xi could meet for the first time this year, to exchange thoughts with their PRC counterparts on potential arms control measures.
The Russian government suspended nuclear talks with the Biden administration due to Washington’s support for Ukraine. Russian-US relations have improved with Trump’s return to office. Moscow has recently communicated interest in exploring options to extend strategic arms control measures beyond next February’s expiration of the New START agreement.
However, if China still refuses to cap its buildup or participate in nuclear reduction negotiations with the United States, Beijing could doom the near-term prospects for strategic arms control. The United States is unlikely to negotiate new treaties with Russia if China, which the Pentagon leadership defines as its “pacing threat,” remains unconstrained.
China’s nuclear brandishing will increase pressure in the United States to augment its arsenal to address the novel security environment. An initial step could be to lengthen the retirement date for current US delivery systems and return some warheads to these platforms that the Pentagon removed earlier to meet New START requirements. The next measure would be to order additional delivery platforms already entering service, such as purchasing more than the planned 100 B-21 strategic bombers. A longer-term response could be to accelerate the development of new US strategic capabilities.
The evolving nuclear environment will lead US defense planners to anticipate more scenarios entailing combined or opportunistic aggression involving the PRC, Russia, and increasingly the DPRK. The same concerns about arms racing and thwarting multiple adversaries simultaneously will encourage Beijing and Moscow to also pursue additional nuclear capabilities.
These China-related developments will further strain the global nonproliferation regime. The PRC buildup has contributed to all five of the nuclear-weapon states recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) increasing their arsenals despite NPT provisions promoting eventual disarmament. Furthermore, China’s de facto acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear program in effect rewards a regime that violated its nonproliferation commitments and numerous UN Security Council resolutions. India and Pakistan have also gained de facto recognition as established nuclear-weapon states outside the NPT.
China’s policies, combined with the disadvantages Ukraine and Iran have recently experienced in abstaining from nuclear capabilities, could alter the calculation of other potential nuclear aspirants, leading them to perceive more advantages in possessing such deterrents and fewer costs in violating NPT principles.
China’s policies, combined with the disadvantages Ukraine and Iran have recently experienced in abstaining from nuclear capabilities, could alter the calculation of other potential nuclear aspirants
The demise of the existing arms control and nonproliferation regimes could eventually pave a path toward new ones more suitable for emerging strategic challenges. These novel instruments would encompass not only more nuclear-weapon states but also more strategic capabilities, including cyber and space weapons and military systems enhanced by artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies.
The advent of novel military technologies could induce restraint among decision makers since few planners could confidently forecast their strategic advantages or how these emerging defense capabilities might interact in a crisis. The new technologies could also facilitate means of verifying whether states were meeting their arms control and nonproliferation commitments.
China’s strategic modernization could outweigh economic fissures threatening to unravel US defense alliances in Asia. Specifically, the PRC buildup could increase US Asian support for US security guarantees and contribute to the modernization of US nuclear alliances with Japan, South Korea, and Australia.
In this scenario, Japanese interest in hosting US advanced weaponry as well as developing Japan’s conventional strike options regarding China would increase. Support for relaxing Japanese restrictions on foreign arms sales and international defense industrial cooperation would expand joint Japanese-US security ties with Australia, the Philippines, and Taiwan.
Beijing’s tolerance for the DPRK nuclear arsenal could disrupt the aspirations of the new ROK government to improve ties with the PRC in order to decrease intra-Korean tensions through denuclearization. Instead, Seoul would rely more on Tokyo and especially Washington for strategic reassurance.
Further south, an expanded AUKUS mechanism could better connect Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan with what hitherto has been a primarily Australia-United Kingdom-United States initiative focused on developing nuclear-powered submarines.
China’s increasingly capable nuclear forces, combined with the diminishing prospects for DPRK denuclearization, could elevate long-term Japanese and South Korean demand for stronger US security guarantees than Washington is prepared to offer.
China’s increasingly capable nuclear forces, combined with the diminishing prospects for DPRK denuclearization, could elevate Japanese and South Korean demand for stronger US security guarantees
Some South Koreans already want an independent nuclear deterrent or at least a revised US nonproliferation policy that would permit South Korea, like Japan, to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Such a revision would improve Seoul’s capacity to manufacture fissile material if deemed necessary.
Future US leaders adhering to an “America First” agenda might encourage such “nuclear hedging” in Japan and Australia, as well as South Korea, to devolve regional defense responsibilities to these treaty allies. The intent would be to strengthen allies sufficiently to reduce security commitments that entail costs and risks for the United States.