Eagle Intelligence Reports
China’s military parade on September 3, 2025, underscored Beijing’s ambition to become the central pillar of those opposing the United States’ global hegemony. Several moments highlighted this Chinese aspiration during the parade. The People’s Liberation Army showcased China’s nuclear triad for the first time, comprising land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable bombers. The message was further reinforced when President Xi Jinping looked over Tiananmen Square with his closest allies standing side by side: Russian President Vladimir Putin on the right and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on the left.
China’s military parade on September 3 underscored Beijing’s ambition to become the central pillar of those opposing the United States’ global hegemony
It is the first time that the leaders from China, Russia, and North Korea have stood together at any Chinese military parade since 1959. While Xi has continuously engaged in in-person diplomacy with Putin after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Kim’s visit to Beijing raises eyebrows, as it is the first time in six years that the North Korean leader has entered China. It was also a rare multilateral appearance for him, underscoring Beijing’s role in bringing Pyongyang back into its orbit.
Although China has been North Korea’s closest ally and a dominant economic partner, contributing to over 90% of its trade, their relations in recent years have been somewhat estranged. It has been so, especially after Pyongyang made a breakthrough in evading international sanctions through military cooperation with Russia and acquired Moscow’s advanced weapons technology in exchange for its troops and weaponry.
As Kim’s marriage of convenience with Putin becomes friendlier than ever, Beijing has maintained a distance from their bromance. China may have been wary that its involvement in the DPRK-Russia cooperation would trigger a harsher response from the US, bringing a significant obstacle to its ambition to become a global power. Consequently, a bilateral meeting between Xi and Kim has not taken place since June 2019. On the other hand, the Russian and North Korean leaders have already hosted two bilateral summits before this year: one in the Russian Far East in September 2023 and another in Pyongyang in June 2024.
Kim’s visit to Beijing and his meeting with Xi, therefore, suggest that China-North Korea relations have turned a new page toward reconciliation. Through his attendance in the military parade, besides securing Xi’s cooperation, Kim was able to promote himself on the global stage as one of the core pillars of Beijing’s attempt to neutralize US power projection in the Indo-Pacific region.
Kim’s visit to Beijing and his meeting with Xi, therefore, suggest that China-North Korea relations have turned a new page toward reconciliation
The restoration of ties with North Korea is indeed necessary for Beijing to counter the US in the region. Yet, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons could trigger nuclear proliferation in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Successively, this could expose Beijing’s vulnerability in regional power projection and add another layer of complexity to its strategic and tactical plan of reunifying Taipei, by force if necessary.
North Korea also contributes to China’s strategic goal of maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. By safeguarding the Kim family regime’s security while remaining a bystander to North Korea’s nuclear program development and sustaining its economic patronage, China can continue to reinforce North Korea as a buffer against South Korea, a US ally, and minimize risks to its territorial integrity.
The restoration of North Korea-China ties has three major implications for Washington and its allies.
Firstly, US President Donald Trump’s approach to initiate dialogue with authoritarian leaders, such as Putin to end the war in Ukraine and Kim to restart denuclearization talks, in hopes of containing and isolating China from strengthening cooperation with its partners, continues to face obstacles.
Since taking office, Trump has repeatedly signaled his intention to negotiate with Putin and Kim, with the former materializing last month in Alaska, while the latter has yet to realize. Pyongyang rejected a US proposal to restart denuclearization talks in the past months as Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong publicly demanded that the US recognize North Korea as a nuclear state. In addition, she also suggested that the personal relationship between the US and North Korean leaders could lead to the denuclearization dialogues. This stance has not changed.
Pyongyang rejected a US proposal to restart denuclearization talks in the past months as Kim’s sister Kim Yo Jong publicly demanded that the US recognize North Korea as a nuclear state
In fact, Trump’s hope of diplomacy with Kim for denuclearization and his negotiation with Putin to end the war in Ukraine are in a deadlock. Putting aside their dialogues with Washington as merely necessary, North Korea and Russia have strengthened their alignment with China.
North Korea has reconciled with Beijing, potentially gaining further economic benefits, and has secured the military technology transfer from Russia to advance its nuclear weapons program. Both developments moved forward with limited US involvement.
Russia is also staying obscure on the results of the Alaska summit. Instead of pursuing bilateral negotiations with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky as formerly agreed upon with the US, Putin appeared in Beijing, reaffirming the support for North Korea with Kim and unity with China with Xi.
However, this cooperation pledge among China, Russia, and North Korea does not appear to be evolving into a trilateral partnership, as is the case with the US, South Korea, and Japan. It can be deduced from the fact that there was no three-way meeting among Xi, Putin, and Kim. Yet, their closer marriage of convenience suggests that their attempt to form an anti-US frontier could strengthen and pose a larger challenge for the US to keep its strategic presence in the region.
This evolving dynamic presents a significant dilemma for Washington, requiring it to balance between deeper engagement and alliance structure in the Indo-Pacific region to counter growing rival influence. Yet, the White House should avoid inadvertently increasing security pressure on Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang, as this could solidify the three countries’ unified bloc in opposing US influence and further undermine Washington’s strategic interests in the region.
Secondly, North Korea’s strengthening cooperation with Russia and China pushes Pyongyang’s denuclearization prospects into a further conundrum and paralysis and simultaneously proliferates military threats against the US and its allies.
A day before his trip to Beijing, Kim visited the factory that produces materials for its missiles, including engines needed for its latest Hwasong-19 and new Hwasong-20 ICBMs, which reportedly have operational ranges of 15,000 km, sufficient to cover the entire continental US, according to North Korean state media. A few days after returning from China, Kim also monitored the test of an engine presumed fitted on the new Hwasong-20 ICBM. These visits suggest that North Korea is further advancing its long-range missile forces. Pyongyang’s missile development in the past two years has also been suspected of benefiting from Russian technological support, amid reports of North Korean personnel’s involvement in the conflict in Ukraine.
China also showcased its latest ICBMs during the military parade, including the DF-5C and the DF-61, all of which are estimated to have an operational range of at least 13,000 km and be capable of reaching the continental US, according to Chinese state media. It also unveiled its new hypersonic missiles, such as the DF-26D, a variant of the DF-26 series that is known as the “Guam Killer” due to its 5000 km range, covering US air and naval bases in Guam, according to a Pentagon report on Chinese military development.
China also showcased its latest ICBMs during the military parade, including the DF-5C and the DF-61, all of which are estimated to have an operational range of at least 13,000 km and be capable of reaching the continental US, according to Chinese state media
The Pentagon report published in December last year estimated that China has around 400 ICBMs and will have more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. A Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report in June also stated that China now has at least 600 nuclear warheads and that its nuclear arsenal is “growing faster than any other country.”
These missile developments from North Korea and China point to the fact that Pyongyang does not have any intention to renounce its nuclear weapons and that Beijing will continue to ramp up its nuclear deterrence capabilities. China has been advancing its Rocket Force capabilities and closing the nuclear and missile gap with the US.
The report also indicated that these missile forces from China and North Korea, along with Russia’s technological support, could constitute a joint front to oppose US military presence. Such an alignment would pose a significant challenge to regional stability and global security. Furthermore, it demands a concerted strategic response from the US and its allies to maintain a balance of power and deter potential aggression and contingencies.
The growing capabilities of Chinese ICBMs threatening the territorial integrity of the continental US amid Chinese and North Korean strategic alignment heighten security dilemmas for the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This escalating threat environment drives a need for a re-evaluation of current deterrence strategies, potentially requiring increased investment in missile defense systems and enhanced intelligence sharing.
FFurthermore, the establishment of missile defense and the more frequent deployment of US strategic assets in the Indo-Pacific region through trilateral cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo have become more urgent tasks. As China ramps up its military modernization to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific region and North Korea cements its partnership with Russia, the US faces an increasing need for cooperation in expanding joint military exercises with its Asian allies, especially South Korea and Japan.
While the three nations agreed to institutionalize the three-way joint exercise as outlined in the Camp David Principles during the Biden administration in August 2023, they need to enhance interoperability and communication through more frequent, complex, and realistic exercises to simulate responses to various contingencies, such as missile attacks and regional provocations.
However, unlike the Biden administration’s emphasis on cooperation with allies, the Trump administration’s pressure on allied nations has raised concerns. Trump’s demand on allies to increase their defense spending is viewed as jeopardizing US ties with South Korea and Japan and the trilateral cooperation among them. The uncertainty in Washington’s commitment to come to their aid in any potential confrontation with China and North Korea has stirred discussions on whether the two nations should examine the possibility of building their own nuclear weapons.
The uncertainty in Washington’s commitment to come to their aid in any potential confrontation with China and North Korea has stirred discussions on whether the two nations should examine the possibility of building their own nuclear weapons
Nonetheless, the increased indigenous capabilities of the two Asian US allies against Chinese and North Korean threats would, in turn, increase deterrence and an early response to potential contingencies in Northeast Asia before US forces intervene. Considering that the potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater will consist of multiple frontiers—for instance, the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula—US allies’ stronger defenses would translate into more robust defense capabilities, enabling Washington’s concentration of its forces in a containment strategy against China and amplifying deterrence through trilateral cooperation.
Ultimately, by deepening their military cooperation, the United States, South Korea, and Japan can present a more unified and formidable front, as underscored by the third Freedom Edge trilateral exercise held from 15 to 19 September 2025, the first such iteration since President Donald Trump and South Korean President Lee Jae Myung took office this year. This enhanced trilateral partnership is crucial for deterring aggression from potential adversaries and maintaining a stable balance of power, which could effectively address complex security challenges, including ballistic missile threats and maritime security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. A strengthened alliance would not only bolster the defensive capabilities of all three nations but also send a clear message that the commitment to regional stability is unwavering.
Looking ahead, the Indo-Pacific’s geopolitical landscape will undoubtedly be shaped by these evolving alliances and security dynamics, as demonstrated by North Korea’s reconciliation with China and strengthening military cooperation with Russia. The increasing convergence of threats, as seen from the ballistic missile challenges, calls for an even more integrated and adaptable approach from the US and its allies. The future developments of trilateral cooperation could potentially incorporate advanced technologies, such as artificial intelligence and unmanned platforms, to counter emerging threats.
The evolving alliance dynamics and military capabilities demonstrate a contrast to the historical preponderance of US power projection in the Indo-Pacific region. The military parade in Beijing, as well as the restoration of China-North Korea relations, is a clear sign of the accelerating redistribution of global power.
China, Russia, and North Korea deepen their military and economic cooperation, formalizing their anti-US stance with possible joint military exercises or increased arms transfers.
This scenario would push Washington to demand an increase in defense spending by South Korea and Japan, possibly up to 5% of the GDP, as was sought from Canada and the European NATO allies. It calls for a more robust and integrated US-led deterrence strategy partnering closely with its allies. This strategy could involve expanded deployment of US medium- or intermediate-range missile systems, potentially for anti-ship or anti-air capabilities, in its bases in allied countries in the Indo-Pacific region.
If the security dilemma between the US and China or North Korea continues, the leadership of the authoritarian states may lean toward de-escalating the tension, as Kim did back in 2018 when he approached South Korea and the US for dialogue after observing heightened international sanctions and security threats coming from Washington following its three nuclear tests in 2016 and 2017. These attempts could open avenues for renewed denuclearization talks or arms control discussions, allowing the US to pursue a more nuanced strategy of engagement while maintaining strong allied defenses.
If the Trump administration continues to dwell on the possibility of reducing US commitment to South Korea and Japan if they do not significantly increase their defense spending, Seoul and Tokyo could pursue their own nuclear arsenal buildup for self-defense and deterrence against continued Chinese and North Korean posturing. This would drastically alter the security landscape, demanding a fundamental re-evaluation of US non-proliferation policies and a concerted effort to reassure allies of its extended deterrence commitments.
Ultimately, the trajectory of China’s alignment with Russia and North Korea, and the pace of US-South Korea-Japan coordination, will frame the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific. Keeping credible deterrence while preserving space for diplomacy remains the only sustainable path. The choices made in the next year will determine whether competition stays managed or slips into crisis.